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Abstract 
 
Exercising a human security policy, based on the compliance with international law and 
being a good international citizen, middle power states find themselves in a legal and 
political dilemma when it comes to the implementation of human security policies in 
conflict situations. This is due to the problem of norm conflict within international law and 
the difficulty of complying with two conflicting yet incontestable norms of international law 
in cases of humanitarian conflict: the prohibition of the use of force and the protection of 
human rights. Despite ongoing debate, encouraging promises, and political initiatives, 
humanitarian intervention remains in a state of norm conflict, and, as such, hinders 
effective responses to humanitarian crises.  
 
This thesis examines the problem of norm conflict in international law and its effects on 
state practice with regards to responding to humanitarian conflicts. This is done by 
looking specifically at the concept and implementation of human security policies. The 
argument made in this thesis is that the norm conflict in humanitarian intervention is best 
responded to prudentially; recognising the distinctive and contingent background to each 
conflict. Human security policies allow middle power states to monitor humanitarian 
developments and raise awareness among states about humanitarian conflicts. 
Responses to humanitarian conflict ultimately remain in the hands of the more powerful 
state actors and their authority to legalise the use of force to intervene through the UN 
Security Council. Yet, it is middle power states that are influential in raising awareness 
and developing the policies for such interventions. 
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Lexis 
 
De lege ferenda     what the law ought to be. 
 
De lege lata     what the law is. 
 
Erga omnes     “toward all” 
An erga omnes law or legal act applies as against 
every individual, person or state without distinction. 
See, for example the ICJ judgment in the 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, 
case at 33. An erga omnes obligation under 
international law is one that is owed to all states. 
 
Estoppel The requirement of consistency in legal 
argumentation.  
 
Jus cogens / ius cogens   peremptory norm / compelling law. 
A principle or norm, recognized by the 
international community as a whole as being 
fundamental to the maintenance of an  
international legal order, from which no 
derogation is permitted.  
 
Jus inter gentes law among Peoples (nations). 
 
Jus gentium     law of peoples. 
 
Jus natural     law of nature. 
 
Lacunae     ‘holes’ in the rule of law. 
 
Lex posteriori derogate priori More recent law prevails over an inconsistent 
earlier law. One test that is applied in 
circumstances when (1) both customary and 
treaty sources of law exist and (2) these two 
sources cannot be construed consistently. 
 
Lex specialis derogate legi generali Specific law prevails over general law. One test 
that is applied in circumstances when (1) both 
customary and treaty sources of law exist and (2) 
these two sources cannot be construed 
consistently. 
 
Non liquet the law is insufficient to provide a decision. 
 
Opinio juris (sive necessitatis) Opinio juris, together with state practice, are 
elements necessary to establish a legally binding 
customary norm in international law. Opinio juris 
denotes a subjective obligation, a sense on behalf 
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of a state that it is bound to the law in question. 
See ICJ Statute, Article 38(1)(b) (the custom to 
be applied must be "accepted as law").  
  
Pacta sunt servant The doctrine that agreements must be observed. 
 
Rebus sic stantibus The doctrine that treaty obligations hold only as 
long as the fundamental conditions and 
expectations that existed at the time of their 
creation hold. 
 
Stare decisis The doctrine that previous court decisions 
establish binding precedent for future cases of 
similar situations.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“Legal treatises do not … provide a fully plausible or coherent account of our moral 
arguments. ... To dwell at length upon the precise meaning of the Charter today is a kind 
of utopian quibbling. And because the UN sometimes pretends that it already is what it has 
barely begun to be, its decrees do not command intellectual or moral respect – except 
among the positivist lawyers whose business it is to interpret them. The lawyers have 
constructed a paper world, which fails at crucial points to correspond to the world the rest 
of us still live in.”1 
 
The concept of humanitarian intervention and the norm conflict between the traditional 
principle of state sovereignty and the promotion of universal values remains central to 
debates in contemporary international relations and international law. This is best illustrated 
by the controversial legal status of humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention 
occupies a grey zone between two incontestable norms in international law – the traditional 
legal rule on the use of force and the evolving moral norm of global human rights protection 
– resulting in a norm conflict. Since the end of the Cold War, preventing human rights abuses 
has emerged as an important policy goal2 but, at the same time, it remains irreconcilable 
with traditional international law on the use of force3 and the principle of non-intervention.4 
This has been referred to as “the Stagnation of International Law” by Joost Pauwelyn, 
Ramses Wessel und Jan Wouters5. In Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer highlights this gap 
between the rules of international law and moral arguments, arguing that rules on the use 
of force, which the United Nations (UN) Charter established, are paper rules overcome by 
                                                          
1 Walzer, M. (2006), Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, fourth edition, Basic Books, 
p. xx.  
2 Hoffman, S. (1996), The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention, Notre Dame University Press, in: Holzgrefe, 
J.L. and Keohane, R.O. (2003), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Politicsl Dilemmas, Cambridge University 
Press, New York. | Rotberg, R. (2010), Mass Atrocity Crimes: Preventing Future Outrages, Brookings, Washington DC. 
|Téson, F.R. (1997), Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, second edition, Irvington on 
Hudson, New York Transnational. | Weiss, T. (2007), Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action, Polity Press, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. | Wheeler, N. (2003), Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in 
International Society, Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
3 Article 2(4) UN Charter “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations”. 
4 Chalk, F.; Dallaire, R.; Matthews, K.; Barqueiro, C. and Doyle, S. (2010), Mobilizing the Will to Intervene: Leadership to 
prevent Mass Atrocities, McGill Queen’s University Press, Montreal. | Cooper, R. and Kohler, J. (2009), Responsibility 
to Protect: The Global Moral Compact for the 21st Century, Palgrave Macmillan, New York. | Evans, G. (2008), The 
Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All, Brookings, Washington DC. | Hamburg, D. 
(2010), Preventing Genocide: Practical Steps towards Early Detection and Effective Action, Bolder CO: Paradigm. | 
Sewell, S.; Raymond, D. and Chin, S. (2010), Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Book, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge MA.  
5 Pauwelyn, J.; Wessel, R. and Wouters, J. (2012), The Stagnation of International Law, Leuven Centre for Global 
Governance, Working Paper No. 97. 
Colliding Norms in Humanitarian Intervention - PhD Thesis - Birte Ahlhaus 
 
2 | P a g e  
 
national interests.6 As such, humanitarian interventions are in a state of potential norm 
development rather than being firmly established in international law.7 While states 
selectively engage in humanitarian intervention there is reluctance to agree to a legal norm 
development which could facilitate the conduct of humanitarian intervention through the 
establishment of specific criteria. Similarly, many lawyers argue that normalizing a right of 
humanitarian intervention is problematic. Hans Correll, for example, maintains that 
humanitarian intervention should not be codified but treated as necessity.8 Further, Frank 
and Rodley argue that humanitarian intervention belongs in the realm of morality rather than 
law based on a concern for the abuse of a legal norm of humanitarian intervention.9  
Moreover, the legal approach clashes with the prevailing normative approach to international 
relations, found in doctrines such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which endorses an 
abstract norm applied universally to cases of mass atrocities.  
 
 Most scholars focus on explaining the emergence of international regimes and the 
effects of the human rights regime on state behaviour.10 Little attention has been given to 
the norm collision between human rights advocacy and traditional law on the use of force. 
This is most apparent in cases where states feel obliged to intervene to protect human rights 
abroad. Discussions on the emergence of a right of intervention almost entirely take place 
within a constructivist international relations literature.11 According to constructivist 
scholarship, state sovereignty is a contingent,12 value based responsibility that involves the 
protection of people from mass atrocities. This normative definition of sovereignty has been 
adopted as a key conceptual feature of the R2P doctrine. In contrast, realists define state 
                                                          
6 Walzer, M. (2006), Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, fourth edition, Basic Books, 
p. xx. ǀ See also: Franck, T. (1970), ‘Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States’, 
in: American Journal of International law, volume 64, p. 809.  
7 Cassese, A. (2001), International Law, Oxford University Press, p. 138.  
8 Correll, H. (2001), To Intervene or Not: The Dilemma that will not go away, Keynote Adress at Duke University, 19 
April 2001, p. 5. 
9 Egede, E. and Sutch, P. (2013), The Politics of International Law and International Justice, Edinburgh University Press, 
p. 283. 
10 Sikkink, K. (1993), The Origins and Continuity of Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe, in: 
Goldstein, J. and Keohane, R. O. (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. | Moravcsik, A. 
(1995), ‘Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and Western Europe’, in: European Journal of 
International Relations, volume 1, pp. 157–189. | Risse, T.; Ropp, S, and Sikkink, K. (1999), The Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
11 Moses, J. (2013), ‘Sovereignty as Irresponsibility? A Realist Critique of the Responsibility to Protect’, in: Review of 
International Studies, volume 39, issue 1, p. 120.  
12 Reus-Smit, C. (1999), The Moral Purpose of the State, Princeton University Press, p. 32.  
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sovereignty in Weberian terms.13 According to Weber, sovereignty is based on a 
responsibility to protect the well-being of the state but such responsibility does not apply 
beyond the state14. This approach is further portrayed by Hobbes’ idea of sovereignty as a 
mutual relation of protection and obedience15 and Morgenthau’s moral defence of the 
national interest.16 This thesis offers a consequentialist approach which first and foremost 
adopts a legal analytical framework to the norm conflict in humanitarian intervention by 
accounting for the political and moral influences on international legal decision making. To 
do this, this thesis focuses on the study of middle power foreign policy, specifically if and 
how the justification of human security enhances the legal interpretation of the norm conflict 
in humanitarian intervention. In applying a critical analysis of the law and politics of 
humanitarian intervention this paper highlights that the application of human security 
remains subject to the “realities of politics and power”17.   
 
 Considering both the legal and international relations literature on the topic, this thesis 
notes one prominent gap: the failure to address the underlying problem of colliding norms in 
international law and its effect on state practice. More specifically, studies of humanitarian 
intervention either argue in favour of, or against change in the traditional rule of law on the 
use of force. However, there might be a third way: a prudential view18 which considers social, 
cultural, and historical contingencies of each case of humanitarian crises. The idea of 
prudence – or moral reasoning - in international law and international relations is not new 
but goes back to the Aristotelian notion of phronesis (prudence or practical wisdom) and to 
the classical realist virtue of prudence (prudentia). Following on from fifteenth and sixteenth 
century philosophers such as Machiavelli19 and Lipsius20, Jonsen and Toulmin21, Fisher22 
                                                          
13 Moses, J. (2013), ‘Sovereignty as Irresponsibility? A Realist Critique of the Responsibility to Protect’, in: Review of 
International Studies, volume 39, issue 1, p. 120. 
14 Weber, M. (1994), The Profession and Vocation of Politics, in: Lassman, P. and Speirs, R. (eds.), Weber: Political 
Writings, Cambridge University Press, p. 309.  
15 Hobbes, T. (edited in 1997), Of the Liberty of Subjects, Chapter XXI of the Leviathan, in: Flathman, R. and Johnston, 
D. (eds.), Leviathan: Authoritative Text, Background and Interpretation, New York, p. 115.  
16 Morgenthau, H. (1951), In Defence of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy, New 
York: Knopf.  
17 Moses, J (2013), ‘Sovereignty as Irresponsibility: A Realist Critique of the Responsibility to Protect’ in: Review of 
International Studies, volume 39, issue 1, p. 133.  
18 Jonson, A.R. and Toulmin, S. (1988), The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning, University of California 
Press.  
19 Machiavelli, N. (1944), The Prince, London: J.M. Dent, p. 117. 
20 Lipsius, J. (2004), Politicorum Sive Civilis Doctrinae Libri Sex (1589) book 4. English version: J Lipsius, Politica Six Books 
of Politics or Political Instruction ed. by J Waszink (Assen 2004).  
21 Jonson, A. and Toulmin, S. (1988), The Abuse of Casuistry, Berkley, The University of California Press, p. 23. 
22 D Fisher, Morality and War (Oxford, Oxford UP 2011) 258.  
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and Jones23 discuss the effectiveness of casuistry in applying ethical rules to specific moral 
cases. Recent studies on international law and international relations, the idea of moral 
reasoning had to give way to ethical and moral approaches as interpretations of international 
law. However, what ethics actually means and how it can be applied to the studies of law 
and politics remains open, or as Wittgenstein once argued “were a complete book on ethics 
ever written it would, with an explosion, destroy all other books”24. A prudential approach 
avoids the universal application of an abstract moral norm to dissimilar cases. In this thesis, 
the prudential approach evaluates the practical influence of colliding norms on human 
security policies where one norm is based on a human rights obligation, more specifically 
the incorporation of human rights in foreign policy, and the conflicting norm is a traditional 
peremptory norm – the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of non-interference. 
The purpose of this thesis is to ask critical questions about the concept of human security 
and its ability to overcome the norm conflict in international law. These questions are 
designed to gain insight into how humanitarian intervention can be best conceptualised 
considering both the reliance of international law on realpolitik considerations and the 
emergence of universal values of human security. 
 
 There are a number of questions which arise from the argument of a prudential soft 
law approach to humanitarian intervention based on human security. To what extent and in 
what ways is the concept of human security promoting a right of humanitarian intervention? 
Is the concept of human security just a rhetorical rehash of principles long used in foreign 
policy? And has there been a notable difference in the interests leading to a humanitarian 
intervention since the adoption of human security that could support the development of a 
global legal regime necessary to sustain effective humanitarian intervention?  
 
 Efforts to redefine security and justify the use of force for humanitarian intervention 
have been a persistent theme in contemporary international relations and international law 
scholarship. Studies on the influence of human rights on state behaviour and the integrity of 
international law are relatively recent and dates back to the mid-1980s ‘‘norm cascade’’25 
                                                          
23 DM Jones, ‘Politics. Statecraft and the Art of War’ in: 4(1) Infinity Journal (2014).  
24 M Garber, Turn to Ethics (introductory speech at the conference on “the Turn to Ethics” at the Centre for Literary and 
Cultural Studies at Harvard University, April 1998).  
25 Schmitz, H.P. and Sikkink, K. (2002), International Human Rights, in: Carlsneas, W.; Risse, T. and Simmons, B.A. 
(eds.), Handbook of International Relations, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. | Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998), 
‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, in: International Organization, volume: 52, pp: 887–917. 
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when UN member states institutionalized human rights through the ratification of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 1976. The publication of the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) doctrine, by the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS), in 2001 opened up a new discussion on the legitimate use of force in 
humanitarian crises; moving the argument away from ‘just war’ and ‘exceptional right to use 
force’ criteria towards the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their 
own and foreign populations from mass atrocities.26 Contemporary international law 
increasingly faces pressure to overcome this norm conflict by legalizing a limited use of force 
in cases of severe humanitarian crises. As former Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy 
argued, there is a need for better reconciliation of the traditional norm of non-interference 
and the use of force with the more recent norm of global human rights protection.27 Yet, as 
current humanitarian crises, such as in Syria, reveal, the norm conflict in international law is 
far from being solved and humanitarian intervention remain subject to realpolitik28 and 
national interest considerations of the member states of the UN Security Council. With the 
humanitarian conflict in Syria entering its third year, and extending into Iraq, the international 
community remains reluctant to intervene, primarily due to the absence of a UN Security 
Council authorization for the use of force. It is a key principle of international law that a state, 
or group of states, cannot legally intervene in another state except in cases of self-defence29 
or as authorized interventions by the UN Security Council,30 even in cases where a state, 
like Syria, violates basic human rights of its citizens and allegedly breaches the 1925 
Geneva protocol prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons.31 While the UN 
Security Council was able to collectively authorize the use of force in Libya in 2011,32 the 
UN Security Council was not able to agree on how to respond to the Syrian conflict. As 
recent state practice highlights, the UN Security Council is only willing to respond to mass 
                                                          
26 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, (ICISS) (2001), The Responsibility to Protect, 
Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, p. vii. 
27 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, (ICISS) (2001), The Responsibility to Protect, 
Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, p. vii. 
28 Realpolitik is a term from the political realist school of thought. It refers to the influence that power and national 
interests have on international relations, law and diplomacy. 
29 Article 51 UN Charter 
30 Article 42 UN Charter 
31 League of Nations (1925), Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, 
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Geneva.  
32 UN Security Council Resolution 1970, from 26 February 2011. ǀ UN Security Council Resolution 1973, from 17 March 
2011. 
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atrocities when such action does not violate the strategic interests of the permanent five 
members. It can hence be argued that the law relating to what the UN might do in the face 
of humanitarian atrocities has evolved even if the fundamental conflict between norms has 
not been resolved. As such, the authorisation of the use of force to counteract mass 
atrocities is not based on a normative framework of human rights protection but rather on 
the national interest calculations of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. The 
absence of a legal framework to overcome the norm conflict inherent in humanitarian 
intervention results in reluctance by states to intervene without UN Security Council 
authorization.  
 
 Arguing that global human rights protection and the traditional rule on the use of force 
are colliding norms, which cause differences in state practice and legal understanding, this 
thesis examines the correlation between state practice and change in international law. This 
is done by examining the applied human security policies of Canada, Australia, and Norway 
with regard to engagement in coercive humanitarian intervention. The adoption of a human 
security policy by middle powers can be interpreted as a normative framework – a form of 
what Fischer calls moral consequentialism33 and Condren calls situational political morality34 
- that links policy decisions to certain value principles. In contrast, realists see a contradiction 
between national interest and values, arguing that security interests will eventually 
undermine humanitarian commitment. Middle power states support a normalization of 
humanitarian intervention by following a human security foreign policy. Arguing that 
international relations and international law are living instruments and correlated, this thesis 
submits that international law and moral concern may be essentially linked. This idea is 
supported by the Marten’s clause which argues that “… in cases not covered by the law of 
force, the human person remains under protection of the principles of humanity and the 
dictates of the public conscience”35 Within this legal framework of colliding norms of human 
rights and non-use of force, it could be argued that the human security policy of middle 
power states may be seen as custom and, hence, justify over time a legal normalization of 
                                                          
33 Fischer, D. (2011), Morality and War: Can War be just in the twenty-first century? Oxford University Press.  
34 Condren, C. (2006), Argument and Authority, Cambridge University Press. Quoted in: Jones, D.M. (2014), ‘Politics, 
Statecraft and the Art of War’, in: Infinity Journal, volume 4, issue 1, p. 21.  
35 See Allen, R.G.; Cherniack, M. and Andreopoulos (1996), ‘Refining War: Civil Wars and Humanitarian Controls’, in: 
Human Rights Quarterly, volume 18, p. 751. ǀ Strebel, H. (1982), ‘Marten’s Clause’, in: European Journal of Public 
International Law, volume 3, p. 252. ǀ Münch, F. (1976), ‘Die Marten’sche Klausel und die Grundlagen des 
Völkerrechts‘, in Zeitschrift für ausländisches, öffentliches und Völkerrecht, volume 36, p. 347. 
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humanitarian intervention. Yet, selective state practice by a minority of states cannot 
constitute customary international law in itself. At best, it reflects a moral interpretation of 
current international law. Further, the influence of realpolitik on the authorization of the use 
of force and the problem of applying abstract norms to particular moral cases leads one to 
conclude that whilst humanitarian interventions can be morally justified in particular cases, 
the current legal framework should not be changed to legitimise them. 
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Theoretical Approaches 
 
“[T]here may be few concepts in international law today which are as conceptually obscure 
and legally controversial as ‘humanitarian intervention’ This results from a lack of 
agreement on the legal meaning of both the term ‘intervention’ and the term 
‘humanitarian’.”36 
 
 The norm conflict examined in this thesis looks specifically at the collision between 
the legal prohibition of the coercive use of force by a state, or coalition, and the moral norm 
to protect populations abroad from mass atrocities. While both obligations can be interpreted 
as norms, this conflict is best described as a conflict between a law and morality as human 
rights protection is not yet a legally binding norm. This thesis argues that the contemporary 
conduct of humanitarian intervention is best described by a prudential approach that 
examines state practice through the interpretation of ethical principles in cases where more 
than one principle or norm applies. A merging of the colliding norms of human rights 
protection and the use of force can only be realized by including contingent rather than 
universal norms which legitimize the conduct of interventions and a framework that legalizes 
it. Jonsen and Toulmin define the concept of casuistry as a normative model for moral 
reasoning, to be preferred over the resort to either universalism or relativism.37 The critique 
is that a general rule, “preoccupied with an abstract model applied generally”38 is not able to 
be effectively applied to particular cases.  
 
 The idea of casuistry is based on Aristotle’s analysis of moral practice. Aristotle 
defined practical wisdom – phronesis – as an approach to overcome moral problems in law, 
politics, ethics and rhetoric. According to Aristotle’s, practical wisdom is obtained by critical 
reflection on actual experience by considering historically contingent aspects of social life. 
Rawls’ Law of Peoples is also a “helpful discussion of the distinction between 
reasonableness and rationality.”39 Yet, it was not until the context of the confessional division 
and the succeeding emergence of the nation state that prudence became an approach to 
international relations scholarship. Following the devastating thirty year war in Europe and 
                                                          
36 Verwey, V.D. (1985), ‘Humanitarian Intervention under International Law’, in: Netherlands International Law 
Review, volume 32, p. 358. Verwey’s statement has been written in the late 20th century. The situation regarding the 
meaning and definition of humanitarian intervention has since somewhat improved.  
37Jonsen, A.R. and Toulmin, S. (1988), The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning, Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
38 Jones, D.M. (2014), ‘Politics, Statecraft and the Art of War’, in: Infinity Journal, volume 4, issue 1, p. 18. 
39 Brown, C. (2002), ‘The construction of a ‚realistic utopia‘: John Rawls and international political theory’, in: Review 
of International Studies, volume 28, issue 1, p. 5. Emphasis added. 
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the Peace of Westphalia, realists such as Nicolo Machiavelli and Justus Lipsius “offered a 
distinctive counsel of prudence and practical morality, when considering the use of force”40. 
Lipsius defined prudence – or casuistry – as a “dialect between the principles which we bring 
to the consideration of particular cases and the facts of those cases as they are revealed to 
us through practical discernment.”41 This is what Fisher terms moral consequentialism42. 
Condren defined the approach of applying abstract rules to particular cases as situational 
political morality43 while Jonsen and Toulmin define prudence as the careful adjustment of 
general rules to specific cases44. As such, the application of universal norms to particular 
moral cases sometimes demands us to “depart slightly from human laws, but only in order 
to preserve his (the prince’s) position, never to extend it”. More specifically Jonsen and 
Toulmin argue that “general ethical rules relate to specific moral cases in a theoretical 
manner, with universal rules serving as axioms from which particular moral rules are 
deduced as theorems.”45 In this sense, an approach to humanitarian intervention must be 
reasonable and consider historical, social and political contingencies. Hence, a general 
norm of humanitarian intervention may not be effective in every case of mass atrocity. This 
argument is in accordance with Chris Brown’s statement that neither a universal prohibition 
nor a universal obligation to intervene could be defensible, rather humanitarian intervention 
needs to be applied selectively.46 Yet, the idea of selective humanitarian intervention has 
also been criticised, for example by Noam Chomsky who argues that the practice of such 
intervention is tacitly made on the basis of realpolitik calculations.47 While this thesis 
supports Brown’s statement that neither a prohibition nor a right to intervene can be effective 
to prevent humanitarian crises, it is argued here that human security can be seen as an 
example of prudence in the sense that moral incentives (such as the moral responsibility to 
prevent humanitarian suffering) can influence the application and interpretation of 
                                                          
40 Jones, D.M. (2014), ‘Politics, Statecraft and the Art of War’, in: Infinity Journal, volume 4, issue 1, p. 18. 
41 Lipsius, J. (1589), Politicorum Sive Civilis Doctrinae Libri Sex, in: Waszink, J. (2004), Justus Lipsius Politica Six Books of 
Politics or Political Instruction, Biblioteca Latinitate Novae, Assen.  
42 Fisher, D. (2011), Morality and War: Can War be Just in the Twenty-First Century? Oxford University Press.  
43 Condren, C. (2006), Argument and Authority, Cambridge University Press, p. 223. 
44 Jonson, A.R. and Toulmin, S. (1988), The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning, Berkeley University of 
California Press. ǀ See also: Toulmin, S. (2001), Return to Reason, Cambridge Harvard University Press.  
45 Jonson, A.R. and Toulmin, S. (1988), The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning, Berkeley University of 
California Press 
46 Brown, C. (2003), Selective Humanitarianism: In Defense of Inconsistency, in: Chatterjee, D. and Scheid, D.E. (eds.), 
Ethics and Intervention, Cambridge University Press, p. 31. ǀ See also: Donnely, J. (2002), ‘Genocide and Humanitarian 
Intervention’, in: Journal of Human Rights, volume 1, number 1, p. 102.  
47 Chomsky (1999), The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo, Vancouver, New Star Books, p. 13 and 80.  
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international law and allow for a more effective contingent approach to humanitarian conflict. 
Yet, realpolitik limits need to be acknowledged.  
 
 While recognising the influence of realpolitik calculations on the authorization of 
humanitarian intervention, the aspect of selectivity per se is not considered the problem in 
this thesis but rather a series of problems arising from the norm conflict in international law. 
By comparing moral reasoning with case studies of state practice, the casuistic approach 
provides a case-based approach in contrast to a normative, value-based approach. While 
casuistry is a common approach in law, it is far more controversial in political science. The 
concept of casuistry does not provide a tool for normalizing humanitarian intervention in 
international law. Assuming that the legal presumption that interventions are illegal is likely 
to deter states from taking action in the face of humanitarian crises, this thesis’ central 
argument is that contemporary policy doctrines, from just war to humanitarian intervention 
to the R2P doctrine, fall short in reconciling policy interests with international law. 
 
 While the term humanitarian intervention is widely used there is no common definition 
of the term itself.48 Humanitarian intervention was often used to describe any justifiable use 
of force, based on the principle to protect the lives and property of populations abroad.  
Michael Walzer calls it the “politics of rescue”49 and John Howard Yoder refers to it as “police 
action”.50 Despite a common state practice of humanitarian intervention, the legal and 
political status of the principle is subject to controversy. The term humanitarian intervention 
intends to give legitimacy to the use of force for humanitarian ends. However, the 
combination of the components humanitarian and intervention is divisive in the sense of 
using force to protect populations from the use of force. Humanitarian intervention is 
commonly defined in broad terms so as to include various forms of diplomatic activity and 
humanitarian assistance alongside different types of military activity, ranging from UN 
peacekeeping missions with a humanitarian objective to full-scale warfare (ostensibly) on 
behalf of an entire population, or a population group.51 (Humanitarian Intervention #1).  
                                                          
48 Holzgrefe, J.L. and Keohane, R.O. (2003), Humanitarian Intervention, Cambridge University Press, pp. 130-173. 
49 Walzer, M. (1995), ‘The Politics of Rescue’, in Dessent, p. 35-41.  
50 Yoder, J.H. (1964), The Christian Witness to the State, Newton, Kansas: Faith and Life Press.  
51 This is the approach taken by Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, who argue that the classic definition of humanitarian 
intervention is inadequate and instead propose a broad definition and concept of humanitarian intervention. | 
Ramsbotham, O. and Woodhouse, T. (1996), Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict, Cambridge: Polity 
Press, see pp. 106-113 in particular. 
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  In 2001, ICISS defined humanitarian intervention as “The kind of intervention with 
which we are concerned in this report is action taken against a state or its leaders, without 
its or their consent, for purposes which are claimed to be humanitarian or protective. By far 
the most controversial form of such intervention is military and a great part of our report 
necessarily focuses on that”52 (Humanitarian Intervention #2).  
 
 Other definitions limit humanitarian intervention to military activity undertaken by the 
international community as a whole, by a regional organization or by an individual State or 
group of States in situations where fundamental human rights of a population or minority 
group are threatened. For example, Sean Murphy interprets humanitarian intervention as, 
“the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organization primarily 
for the purpose of protecting the nationals of a target state from widespread deprivations of 
internationally recognized human rights.”53 (Humanitarian Intervention #3).  
 
 Similarly, Holzgrefe defines humanitarian interventions as, “[t]he threat or use of force 
across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending 
widespread violations of the fundamental rights of individuals other than its own citizens, 
without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.”54 According to 
this definition, humanitarian intervention is characterized by the use of military force (which 
is generally in breach of general principles of international law55) in contrast to the use of 
non-coercive means (which can be in accordance with international law56). This means that 
only military activity falls within the scope of prohibition of the use of force57, while other 
types of non-military sanctions are governed by other rules and principles of international 
law. (Humanitarian Intervention #4). Humanitarian intervention has further been defined as 
                                                          
52 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, (ICISS) (2001), The Responsibility to Protect, 
Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, paragraph 1.38.  
53 Murphy, S. (1996): Humanitarian Intervention: The UN in an Evolving World Order, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
p. 11. 
54 Holzgrefe, J.L. and Keohane, R.O. (2003), Humanitarian Intervention, Cambridge University Press, p. 1. 
55 Article 2(4) UN Charter on the prohibition of the use of force and Article 2(7) on the principle of non-intervention, 
except authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter 7 based on a threat to international peace and security.  
56 Non-coercive measures by a state or group of states include financial or economic sanctions against a state such as 
freezing of states assets or import/export embargos. These methods can be implemented without breaching general 
principles of international law mentioned above. However, these may be long term measures and are often seen as 
ineffective by states in cases of imminent threat.  
57 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter contains the prohibition of the use of force under contemporary international law and 
provides that: “All Members shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” 
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the “justifiable use of force for the purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another state from 
treatment so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits within which the 
sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice.”58 It has also been defined as “the 
theory of intervention on the ground of humanity… that recognizes the right of one state to 
exercise an international control by military force over the acts of another in regard to its 
internal sovereignty when contrary to the law of humanity.”59 Téson defines humanitarian 
intervention as, “the proportionate trans-boundary help, including forcible help, provided by 
governments to individuals in another state who are being denied basic human rights and 
who themselves would be rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive government.”60 
Although these definitions differ slightly, they point to the complex problem of humanitarian 
intervention’s potential illegal use of military force in intervening in the domestic affairs of 
another state for the legitimate protection of human rights.  
 
 
     Coercive 
 
 
 
 Illegal          Legal 
 
 
 
      
 
 
Non-coercive 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
58 Stowell, E. (1931), International Law, Pitman Publishers, London, p. 349. 
59 Simon, S.G. (1993), ‘The Contemporary Legality of Humanitarian Intervention’, in: California Western International 
Law Journal, volume 24, p. 118. 
60 Teson, F. (1998), Humanitarian Intervention: An inquiry into Law and Morality, Transnational Publishers, p. 5.  
HI #1 
Humanitarian 
Intervention HI #3 
HI #4 
HI #2 
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Definition Authorization Conduct Protection 
HI #1 
Wide 
Definition 
N/A Coercive and  
non-coercive  
Broad humanitarian objective. 
HI #2 
ICISS R2P 
No Coercive  Humanitarian ends. 
Civilian Protection. 
HI #3 
Murphy 
 Coercive Protection of internationally 
recognized human rights. 
HI #4 
Holzgrefe 
No Coercive Preventing or ending widespread 
violations of fundamental human 
rights. 
HI 
Working 
Definition 
Yes Coercive Protection of Human Rights. 
Ending of Human Rights Atrocities. 
    
 
 
 This thesis looks at coercive, military humanitarian intervention, which has been 
authorized by the UN Security Council or the intervened state (Humanitarian Intervention). 
Generally such interventions are regarded as legal. Yet, although technically different, 
functionally authorized humanitarian interventions reflect the same dilemma of norm 
collision and apply the same kind of force on the ground as non-authorized intervention. For 
the purpose of this research, humanitarian intervention is defined as the legitimate and legal 
use of force by states against another state for the purpose of ending mass atrocities in the 
latter. Legitimacy is derived from the international community’s agreement that it has to 
intervene in a state where the population suffers from mass atrocities. Legality is derived 
from UN Security Council authorization and/or invitation from the intervened state. In general 
it is un-authorized humanitarian intervention that receives most attention in the literature due 
to the illegal but decisive nature of such use of force. In contrast, authorized humanitarian 
intervention receives little attention in the literature despite the same problem of the use of 
force to intervene in another state.  
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  Conflict Peacef
ul 
Means 
Prospect 
of 
success 
Proportionality Interests UN SC 
Authorizati
on 
Intervenin
g State 
Iraq 1991  Refugees 
Hunger 
Yes Yes No Oil Yes 
Res. 688 
USA 
NATO 
Bosnia 
1992 
 Ethnic 
Cleansing 
Yes Yes No Oil Yes 
Res. 770 
NATO 
USA 
Somalia 
1992 
 Refugees  
Hunger 
Yes Yes No Oil Yes 
Res. 794 
USA 
France 
Ruanda 
1994 
 Genocide No Yes No Oil Yes 
Res. 929 
France 
Haiti 1994  Refugees Yes Yes Yes Oil Yes 
Res. 940 
USA 
Zaire 1996 
 
 Refugees Yes Yes No Humanit
arian 
Yes Canada 
Kosovo 
1999 
 Ethnic 
Cleansing 
Yes Limited No Chrome Yes 
Res. 1160 
NATO 
USA 
East Timor 
1999 
 Genocide N/A Yes Yes Oil Yes 
Res. 1264 
Australia 
Afghanista
n 2001 
 Civil 
Conflict 
No Limited No Oil No USA  
NATO 
Darfur 
2007 
 Ethnic 
Cleansin
g 
Yes Limite
d 
Yes Oil Yes 
Res. 1769 
USA 
UNAMID 
Sum:  7 / 3 7 / 2 7 / 3 3 / 7 1 / 9 9 / 1 USA 70% 
 
  
A further distinction needs to be made between interventions which have been 
authorized by the state where the military activity is conducted and those where the use of 
force for humanitarian ends has been authorized by the UN Security Council under its 
Chapter VII powers. A final distinction should be made between the protection of nationals 
abroad, which some scholars claim is based in the right to self-defence,61 and the protection 
                                                          
61 Bonnett, D.W. (1986), The Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals abroad, in: Cassese, A. (ed) (1986), The 
Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: The Netherlands, p. 39. 
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of other populations. Yet, the protection of nationals abroad is not explicitly framed as a right 
in the right to self-defence as codified in the UN Charter and remains controversial in itself. 
Protection of nationals abroad, although often confused with humanitarian intervention, is 
not part of the doctrine62 and, therefore, not part of the research presented here.  
 
 The relevance of norms in international law and international relations has been 
widely contested, especially since the end of the Cold War and the fragmentation of 
international law which saw an increase in possible norm conflict63. As Deitelhoff and 
Zimmerman point out, “if the validity of a norm is increasingly questioned, non-compliance 
becomes more widespread and will no longer be denounced by norm addressees leading – 
over time – to norm decay.”64 Deitelhoff and Zimmerman further argue that the more precise 
a norm is formulated the less it is at risk to be contested. In contrast, abstract norms are 
more likely to be contested. The notion of norm collision is defined broadly as a conflict 
between two norms; “if one norm constitutes, has led to, or may lead to, a breach of the 
other”.65 Jenks maintained a narrower definition of norm conflict. According to Jenks, “[a] 
conflict in the strict sense of direct incompatibility arises only where a party to the two treaties 
cannot simultaneously comply with its obligations under both treaties.”66 Marceau defended 
Jenks’ narrow definition of colliding norms in a study of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
arguing that “‘since the main objective of interpretation rules is to identify the intention of the 
parties, it is suggested that conflicts should be interpreted narrowly, in order to keep as much 
as possible of the agreement of the parties”.67 To take into account explicit permissions 
provided in another treaty, one should, in her view, refer to the lex specialis principle. A 
                                                          
62 Lillich,R.B. (1993), ‘Humanitarian Intervention through the United Nations: Towards the Development of Criteria’, 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Heidelberg Journal of International Law, volume 53, p. 
560. 
63 Chayes, A. and Handler Chayes, A. (1993), ‘On compliance’, in: International Organization, volume 47, issue 2, p. 188.| 
Sandholtz, W. and Stiles, K.W. (2009) International Norms and Cycles of Change, Oxford. | Badescu, C.G. and Weiss, T.G. 
(2010), ‘Misrepresenting R2P and Advancing Norms: An Alternative Spiral?’, in: International Studies Perspectives, 
volume 11, issue 4, pp. 354-374. | Krook, M.L. and True, J. (2012), ‘Rethinking the Life Cycles of International Norms: 
The United Nations and the Global Promotion of Gender Equality’, in: European Journal of International Relations, 
volume 18, issue 1, pp. 103-127. 
64 Deitelhoff, N. and Zimmerman, L. (2013), ‘Things We Lost in the Fire: How Different Types of Contestation Affect 
the Validity of International Norms’, in: Peace Research Institute Frankfurth, Hessische Stiftung Friedens und Konflikts 
Forschung, PRIF Working Paper number 8, p. 1 
65 Pauwelyn, J. (2003), Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law relates to other Rules of 
International Law, Cambridge University Press, p. 175.  
66 Jenks, W. (1953), ‘The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties’, in: British Yearbook of International Law, volume 30, p. 426. 
Emphasis added. 
67 Marceau, C.F. (2001), ‘Conflicts of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdictions: The Relationship between the WTO 
Agreement and MEAs and other Treaties’, in: Journal of World Trade, volume 31, p. 1081. 
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narrow definition was also advocated by Karl in the Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law,68 Czaplinski and Danilenko,69 and, most recently, by Wolfrum and Matz.70 However, a 
narrow definition of colliding obligations rather than norms in general is problematic because 
it excludes incompatibilities between prohibitions and obligations from the scope of these 
conflict principles altogether. Jenks argued that colliding prohibitions and obligations may 
“from a practical point of view be as serious as a conflict; [as they] may render inapplicable 
provisions designed to give one of the divergent instruments a measure of flexibility of 
operation which was thought necessary to its practicability”.71 Pauwelyn also criticized the 
narrow definition of norm collision and opted for a broader definition. He defined colliding 
norms “as a situation where one norm breaches, has led to or may lead to breach of, another 
norm”,72 making clear in the accompanying argumentation, though not in the definition itself, 
that this definition is meant to cover incompatibilities between permissive norms and 
obligations. By focusing on the breach of norms as a result of colliding norms Kelsen offers 
the following wide definition: “[a] conflict between two norms occurs if in obeying or applying 
one norm, the other one is necessarily or possibly violated”.73  
 
This thesis follows Kelsen and Pauwelyn’s interpretation by adopting a wide definition 
of colliding norms. A collision of norms is defined as situations where one norm has led to, 
or may lead to, a breach of another and particularly refers to those norm conflicts in which 
one of the conflicting norms is a rule of human rights law. Such instances occur more and 
more every day, are increasingly litigated, and can be of great political importance especially 
in cases where the UN Security Council authorizes the use of force for the protection of 
human rights. In the context of international law, norms are defined as legally binding rules 
which establish certain obligations between subjects of international law. In contrast, in the 
context of state practice and policy decision, norms are characterized as moral arguments, 
based on specific, historically and socially dependent, values. Norms, in general, aim to 
provide behavioural guidelines that are directly or indirectly based on certain values or 
                                                          
68 Karl, W. (1983), Vertrag und spätere Praxis im Völkerrecht, Springer Verlag, p.61. 
69 Czaplinski, W. and Danilenko, G. (1990), ‘Conflicts of Norms in International Law’, in: Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law, volume 21, issue 3, pp. 12–13,  
70 Wolfrum, R. and Matz, N. (2003), Conflicts in International Environmental Law, Berlin: Springer Verlag.  
71 Jenks, W. (1953), ‘The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties’, in: British Yearbook of International Law, volume 30, p. 426. 
Emphasis added. 
72 Pauwelyn, J. (2003) Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of 
International Law, Cambridge University Press, p. 176. 
73 Kelsen, H. (1962), Derogation, originally published in: Newman, R.A. (ed.), Essays in Jurisprudence in Honor of 
Roscoe Pound, pp. 339. ǀ Kelsen, H. (1979), Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, Wien, p. 99.  
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cultures. According to Peter J. Katzenstein norms are meant “to describe collective 
expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity“.74 
 
By mass atrocities the thesis refers to large scale, sustained, intentional and 
systematic violence against civilians by states in civil wars that results in mass deaths 
through murder or the deliberate creation of conditions in which civilians die. This term 
includes genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The specific 
term “mass atrocities” has been referenced in policy papers75 and is most commonly used 
in armed civil conflicts.76 While it is recognized in this thesis that non-state actors engage in 
human rights abuses, the focus is on state led abuses and atrocities. It is assumed that the 
relationship between the intervened and intervening state influences the calculations of the 
intervening state of the costs, benefits and outcome of the use of force.  
 
The term soft law refers to official policy statements that are not legally binding (no 
formal international legal consequences) but reflect the normative intentions of states.77 The 
term ‘soft’ is ambiguous and can have two different meanings. First, soft can be interpreted 
as a continuum where legal agreements vary between non-binding (soft) and binding (hard) 
law (e.g. treaties). Yet academics have identified a second meaning of the term ‘soft’ that 
interprets soft law as being aspirational or hortatory.78 For international law, this second 
meaning causes difficulties because it implies that soft law provisions are non-justiciable. 
This means that states cannot be held responsible under international law for non-
compliance with their normative statements of intent.79 However, this thesis argues that soft 
law instruments that are not in and by themselves legally binding might still include 
provisions that clearly set out norms that are perceived by states as binding under general 
                                                          
74 Wiener, A. (2006), Constructivist Approaches in International Relations Theory: Puzzles and Promises, in: ConWEB 
Papers, number 5, Queens University Belfast, p. 9. 
75 Evans, G. (2008), The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All, Brookings, Washington 
DC. | Sewell, S.; Raymond, D. and Chin, S. (2010), Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Book, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.  
76 Straus, S. (2007), ‘Second Generation Comparative Research on Genocide’, in: World Politics, volume 36, issue 4, p. 
462. | Ulfelder, J. and Valentino, B. (2008), Assessing the Risks of State sponsored Mass Killing, Political Instability Task 
Force, Washington.  
77 Shelton, D. (2000), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 11.   
78 Harris, D. (2010), Cases and Materials on International Law, seventh edition, Thomson Reuters Limited, London, p. 
84-87.   
79 The problem of the non-justiciable character of soft law norms is particularly prominent in the US where courts only 
apply hard law that is self-executing (capable of direct application).    
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international law.80 Moreover, soft law may express the opinio juris of the international 
community and therefore might have an effect on the development of customary 
international law, as stated in the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion by the ICJ.81 As 
Shelton points out with regard to the soft law status of human rights “… the non-binding text 
[human rights] is useful to begin the process of consensus, and in some cases may remain 
the only available text where no agreement can be reached.”82 In order to establish how and 
why the justification of the legality of humanitarian intervention, as a legal exception to 
traditional law on the use of force developed as a soft law norm, this thesis analyses the 
state practice of middle powers in the 1990s. The aim is to find out if there is a general 
normative interest to legalize the use of force for humanitarian ends, or if the violation of the 
traditional rule of law is seen as an exemption which should not be generally legalized.  
 
Rules of exception in international law become apparent when state leaders break 
international norms and then offer justifications. The fact, that state violators tend to justify 
their actions in terms of a greater national good, shows, according to Kratchowil and Ruggie, 
that they recognize the norm’s legitimacy.83 This statement may be true, but such 
justifications also reveal the problems caused by colliding norms on both state behaviour 
and international law. Further, rules of exception can be created or articulated in certain 
situations by powerful actors to serve self-interest. For example, Jack Snyder84 argues that: 
 
 ‘‘groups having parochial interests … including economic sectors and state bureaucracies 
… use arguments about security …  - to justify their self-serving policies in terms of a 
broader public interest in national security.’’  
 
Yet, even if rules of exception are created purely out of self-interest, they can exert a 
powerful influence on international law and international relations once they become a 
repeated practice. The recently developed soft law exception to the traditional law on the 
                                                          
80 For reasons why states choose soft law commitments over hard law in specific issue areas see for example: 
Condorelli, L. in: Cassese, A. and Weiler, J. (1988), Change and Stability in International Law Making, Berlin, p. 79. | 
Krisch, N. (2005), ‘International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal 
Order’, in: European Journal of International Law, Volume 16, p. 399.   
81 International Court of Justice (1996), Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, paragraphs 70 - 80.  
82 Shelton, D. (2000), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.463.   
83 Kratochwil, F. and Ruggie, J.G. (1986), ‘A State of the Art on an Art of the State’, in: International Organization, 
volume 40, issue 4, p. 753. 
84 Snyder, J. (1991), Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 
New York, p. 1-2.  
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use of force reflects this influence. If soft law norms result in a rule of exception to traditional 
international law, it may be for the same reasons that other collective ideas tend to change 
in the international system of states: unexpected and undesirable events occur, and a 
socially viable alternative exists.85 Such transformation, however, also requires broad 
societal acceptance of an alternative set of rules. Human rights norms must be supported 
by a wide range of groups within civil society, not just committed activists. This provides a 
framework for analyzing how, why and if the selective soft law justification of a legal use of 
force for humanitarian ends might overcome the problem of colliding norms.  
  
                                                          
85 Legro, J.W. (1997), ‘Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the “Failure” of Internationalism’, in: International 
Organization, volume 51, issue, 1, p. 31. 
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Normative Developments 
 
“Force used in defence of fundamental human rights is therefore not a use of force 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. State Sovereignty makes sense only 
as a shield for persons to organize themselves freely in political communities. A condition 
for respecting state sovereignty is, therefore, that sovereign governments respect human 
rights. Delinquent governments forfeit the protection afforded by Article 2(4).”86 
 
Even though it is not a new phenomenon in international studies, the collision of the norm 
of global human rights protection and the traditional law on the use of force has generated 
heated debate in both international law and international relations since the 1980s.87 On the 
political and ethical side, the principle of state sovereignty and the traditional Westphalian 
system are increasingly challenged by evolving norms related to individual human rights and 
their protection. On the legal side the question is, whether the use of force for humanitarian 
ends without the requirement of UN Security Council authorization can and should become 
a legal exception to the prohibition of the use of force in the international rule of law. Most 
of the related literature looks at the way in which norms of human rights have evolved 
through the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights enacted in 1976.88 The impact of the 
emergence of new legal regimes, such as international human rights, and specifically the 
impact of such regimes on state behaviour has been studied in a second literary wave from 
the 1990s.89 Most authors have concluded that the use of force in cases of severe human 
rights abuses is at the very least morally permissible, and argue that some cases create a 
moral duty to intervene.90 Yet despite the evolution of an ethical responsibility to protect 
                                                          
86 Téson, F.R. (2005), Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, second edition, Irvington on 
Hudson: New York Transnational, p. 217.  
87 Schmitz, H.P. and Sikkink, K. (2002), International Human Rights, in: Carlsneas, W.; Risse, T. and Simmons, B.A. 
(eds.), Handbook of International Relations, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
88 Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K, (1998), ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change’, in: International Organization, volume 52, pp: 887–917. | Donnelly, J. (1986), ‘International Human Rights: A 
Regime Analysis’, in: International Organization, volume 40, pp: 599–641. | Sikkink, K. (1993), The Origins and 
Continuity of Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe, in: Goldstein, J. and Keohane, R. O. 
(eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. | Moravcsik, A. (1995) ‘Explaining International 
Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and Western Europe’, in: European Journal of International Relations, volume 
1, pp: 157–189. |Forsythe, D. P. (1991), The Internationalization of Human Rights, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. | 
Forsythe, D. P. (2000), Human Rights in International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
89 Risse, T.; Ropp, S. and Sikkink, K. (1999), The Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
90 Nardin, T. and Williams, M. (2006), Nomos XIvii: Humanitarian Intervention, New York University Press, New York. 
The Introduction to the book offers a good overview on the current debate over humanitarian interventions.  
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human rights,91 and a relatively consistent pattern of humanitarian intervention being 
authorized by the UN Security Council since the 1990s, humanitarian intervention remains 
in a state of potential norm development rather than being firmly established.92 In 1991, 
Brown University in the US started the Humanitarianism and War93 research project, which 
provides case studies of coercive humanitarian intervention in civil conflicts. Yet, the 
research outcome was highly influenced by humanitarian aid organizations’ views that are 
generally critical towards the use of military force for humanitarian purpose. A further study 
was conducted in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS)94 and the Albright-Cohen report95 in the United States (US).  
 
In 2001, ICISS published a report titled the Responsibility to Protect which aimed to 
develop a framework to prevent humanitarian crises in civil conflicts and find peaceful 
solutions to deal with such conflicts, placing military force as a last resort. The R2P doctrine 
developed out of the need for a clear and coherent framework to respond to intrastate mass 
atrocity crimes. This need has evolved from the inconsistent and uncoordinated way in which 
states and the UN exercised the contestable right of humanitarian intervention. This led to 
ineffective responses to humanitarian catastrophes in Somalia in 1993, Rwanda in 1994, 
and Srebrenica in 1995.96 R2P is used in this research as a valuable starting point, as it 
emphasizes the notion of ‘responsibility’ and a willingness among states to negotiate a 
compromise between responding to events “that affect every precept of our common 
humanity,” with the established principles of sovereignty and non-intervention.97 However, 
the R2P doctrine falls short of providing a legal framework beyond the politicized 
authorization of humanitarian intervention by the UN Security Council. As such, the doctrine 
does not add to existing international law in itself. To be considered emerging customary 
                                                          
91 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), The Responsibility to Protect: report of the 
Internaitonal Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa, International Development Research Center. 
92 Cassese, A. (2001), International Law, Oxford University Press, p. 138.  
93 A summary of the Humanitarianism and War research project can be found in: Minear, L (2002), The Humanitarian 
Enterprise – Dilemmas and Discoveries, Kumarin Press Inc, Bloomfeld, USA. 
94 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), The Responsibility to Protect: report of the 
Internaitonal Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa, International Development Research Center. 
95 Albright, M. and Cohen, W. (2008), Preventing Genocide: A Blue-Print for American Policy Makers (Albright-Cohen 
Report), United States Institute for Peace, Washington DC. | Evans, G. (2008), The Responsibility to Protect: Ending 
Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All, Brookings, Washington DC.  
96 Joyner, C. (2007), ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Humanitarian Concern and the Lawfulness of Armed Intervention’, 
in:  Virginia Journal of International Law, volume 47, p. 698. 
97 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, (ICISS) (2001), The Responsibility to Protect, 
Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, p. vii. 
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law, the R2P doctrine requires the repeated conduct of states, and a corresponding belief 
(opinio juris) that such conduct is required in order to comply with international law.98 If this 
were the case, there would be no controversy about the legal status of humanitarian 
intervention. Further, while the R2P doctrine was referred to and applied in Libya during 
2011, states failed to implement the same doctrine and enforce an intervention in Syria a 
few months later. Instead, the legal status of humanitarian intervention remains highly 
contested and the conduct of humanitarian intervention continues to be selective.  
 
In 2013, the UK government published a paper on the legal position of the use of 
force following the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict. In it, the government 
argued that “[i]f action in the Security Council is blocked, the UK would still be permitted 
under international law to take exceptional measures in order to alleviate the scale of the 
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe”.99 Conditions that must be met for a legal 
intervention according to the UK legal position include a) extreme humanitarian distress on 
a large scale; b) no practicable alternative to the use of force; and c) the applied use of force 
must be necessary and proportionate. Yet, the paper falls short of providing a legal analysis 
or proposition on which such arguments on the legal use of force can be made. Drawing on 
these normative developments - in law and politics - a case can be made for the emergence 
of a constrained norm of humanitarian intervention that is consistent with the concept of 
customary international law. Whether any humanitarian intervention ultimately can be legal 
depends on the purpose of the action and the likelihood that such purpose can be achieved. 
 
  
                                                          
98 Malanczuk, P. (1997), Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, New York: Routledge, p. 35 
99 Prime Minister’s Office (2013), Guidance: Chemical weapon use by Syrian regime: UK government legal position, 
available online at:  
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-
position/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position-html-version  
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Human Security and State Practice 
 
“Human security is going to have to be reconciled with the principle of non-intervention in 
the internal affairs of states. … The norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of other 
states remains basic to international peace and security ... However, in cases of extreme 
abuse, as we have seen in Kosovo and Rwanda, among others, the concept of national 
sovereignty cannot be absolute.”100 
 
The growing consensus on the inadmissibility of human right violations since the end of the 
cold war, has allowed middle power states to develop a normative human security policy. 
Yet, while the concept of human security received global support in the R2P doctrine since 
2001, the implementation of human security remains selective and subject to realpolitik 
interest of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Martti Koskenniemi notes 
that “it is never Algeria that will intervene in France or Finland in Chechnya”.101 The old 
maxim that might makes right is still popular among international relations scholars. States 
that possess greater military power conduct interventions under the cover of 
humanitarianism when it suits their strategic and security interests; confident that their 
superior position will grant them the leverage to convince their adversaries that they comply 
with the international rule of law. Given this logic, strong states should favour a normalization 
of humanitarian intervention in order to lower their costs of having to justify each intervention 
on specific humanitarian grounds. The historical, legal, and primarily political record, 
however, presents a more complicated picture.  
 
 This thesis examines human security policies and state practice of middle power 
states. Middle power states have increasingly incorporated human rights protection into their 
foreign policies, especially in the form of human security. Human security is a particular 
foreign security policy that focuses on the protection of populations from a range of threats 
to their well-being by a wider range of policies, compared with traditional security policies 
that are limited to the protection of the state. However, in practice, states remain selective 
in the actual application of their human security policies. Further, despite the rhetoric of a 
human security policy, states, especially middle power states, support the continued 
existence of the prohibition of the use of force, denying a right or obligation to intervene. 
From a legal perspective, a rule of international law is not diminished but rather is confirmed 
                                                          
100 Cited by Hubert, D. and Bonser, M. (2001), Humanitarian Military Intervention, in: McRae, R. and Hubert, D. (eds), 
Human Security and the New Diplomacy, Montreal, Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, p. 113. 
101 Koskenniemi, M. (2002), 'The Lady Doth Protest Too Much: Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law’, in: 
The Modern Law Review, volume 65, issue 2.  
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and strengthened when violation of the rule is followed by a claim of compliance. The ICJ 
made this argument in justifying its conclusion in the 1986 Nicaragua Case:  
 
“If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule but defends its 
conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, then 
whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that 
attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule.”102 
 
Overall, the international community has been involved in 15 peace keeping missions 
under UN authority and one political mission directed by the Department for Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) in 2013. The graph below from the UN Regional Information Centre for 
Western Europe shows the distribution of military force and humanitarian aid in each conflict 
(except for the current UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali). At the 
same time, there are unilateral interventions in civil conflicts such as the US led interventions 
in Iraq and Afghanistan while other civil conflicts such as in Syria, Mexico or Yemen have 
not been actively responded to by the UN or individual states. What is evident from the 
statistics is that the number of interventions since the end of the Cold War constitutes only 
a small proportion of cases where intervention on the basis of ending mass atrocities might 
have been justified.103 Further, the levels of mass atrocities and human rights violations 
varied greatly among the cases where humanitarian interventions were considered justified.  
 
                                                          
102 International Court of Justice (1986), Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
US), ICJ Report, paragraph 186.  
103 Brown, C. (2003), Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of 
the Congo v Rwanda) Provisional Measures, Order of 10 July 2002, in:  International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
volume 52, issue 3, pp. 782-787. 
Colliding Norms in Humanitarian Intervention - PhD Thesis - Birte Ahlhaus 
 
25 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Martha Finnemore has examined the international normative context,104 to show how 
states have intervened with growing historical frequency to protect human rights. She argues 
that the growing willingness of states to use force on behalf of human rights reflects rising 
acceptance of international norms of humanitarian intervention. Similarly, Thomas Risse 
and Kathryn Sikkink have emphasized how changes in world time105 may account for the 
growing visibility of human rights norms. According to these approaches, recent global 
human rights policies influence state behaviour. The modern norm of the legal use of force 
for humanitarian ends has evolved since the 1980s and has become increasingly 
institutionalized; shaping states’ goals and preferences in the international system. Similarly, 
Bellamy and Williams argue that the number of civil wars and mass atrocities has declined 
over the past twenty years as the norm supporting external humanitarian intervention has 
                                                          
104 Finnemore, M. (2003), The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
105 Risse, T. and Sikkink, K. (1999), The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices, in: 
Risse, T.; Ropp, S. and Sikkink, K. (eds.), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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become institutionalised as soft law.106 The number of new conflicts, those in which there is 
no record of previous armed conflict, has been low throughout the 2000s, and there were 
no new conflicts among states between 2004 and 2006 (see table below). Yet, there has 
been a significant increase in civil conflicts for example in the Arab states (Arab Spring), Sri 
Lanka, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, South Sudan, Mali, and Iraq.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Source: Utenriksdepartementet, Regjeringen, Norway. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/kampanjer/refleks/innspill/engasjement/prio.html?id=492941 
 
 
 
However, while there is a steady decline in conflicts overall, civil and ethnic conflicts 
have increased. Civil Conflicts are at the same level as in the 1970s, but higher than during 
the 1950s (see table below). The result of increased intrastate and decreased interstate 
conflicts is the increase in civil casualties.  
 
                                                          
106 Bellamy, A. and Williams, P. (2012), ‘On the Limits of Moral Hazard: The Responsibility to Protect, Armed Conflict 
and Mass Atrocities’, in: European Journal of International Relations, volume 18, issue 3, p. 539. | Bellamy, A. and 
Williams, P. (2011), ‘The New Politics of Protection? Cote d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect’, in: 
International Affairs, volume 87, issue 4, p. 845.  
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Figure Source: Utenriksdepartementet, Regjeringen, Norway. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/kampanjer/refleks/innspill/engasjement/prio.html?id=492941  
 
 
Further, considering the number of current UN missions in the world and 
humanitarian conflicts that have not yet been responded to (see table below), Bellamy and 
Williams’s claim that the number of civil wars has declined as a result of the 
institutionalization of a norm of humanitarian intervention is somewhat questionable. Due to 
the increased international focus on intrastate and civil conflicts, security and human rights 
concerns have changed and gradually become interlinked. Two, usually distinct, policy 
interests – the protection of state sovereignty through national security and the protection of 
human rights within and outside state borders, increasingly overlap and, at times, collide. 
Human security, a human rights oriented foreign policy advocated by middle power states, 
highlights this norm conflict. To evaluate the presence of proof for the argument of an 
emerging norm of humanitarian intervention, as advocated by Finnemore, Risse, Sikkink, 
Bellamy and Williams, this thesis compares human security policies and state practice of 
middle powers. To evaluate whether or not there is a support in state practice for an 
emerging norm of humanitarian intervention – and hence the possibility of a change in 
international law to accompany normative interpretations – this thesis compares and 
contrasts motives behind middle power human security initiatives. According to prudence, a 
norm cannot be applied in the same way to contingent moral cases. In this way it differs to 
normative reasoning which tries to emphasis a need for a general moral norm allowing for 
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humanitarian intervention. As such, it is more about the efficacy of each intervention rather 
than the number of intervention and how international law can be utilized to improve the 
conduct of humanitarian intervention. 
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The International Rule of Law 
 
“The time is ripe to consider changing or abandoning a rule of humanitarian intervention 
that was created for a quite different world.”107 
 
International law is expected to provide global responses to current international challenges 
and to bring about justice in the world. However, as Kelsen pointed out “[i]nternational law, 
as any normative order, becomes uncertain when too much law exists and norms conflict”.108 
Attempts to legalise international relations through treaties, customary and generally 
accepted principles of law have certainly impacted on state behaviour and, as such, limited 
state sovereignty. While some argue that international law can be perceived as having a 
political utility for states,109 others interpret the implementation of international law from a 
constructivist perspective,110 arguing that it has been the most profound change in 
international relations. Whilst the realist perspective emphasizes and associates power with 
neo-institutionalist concerns of self-interest, constructivists emphasize the role of norms, 
identity, and social actors. Additionally, scholars have paid attention to how international and 
national factors, sometimes in interaction, mediate change in international law and 
international relations.111 At the theoretical level, the arguments presented by specific legal 
and political theories are incomplete in describing the correlated effects of colliding norms 
on the use of force for humanitarian intervention. This thesis adapts a broadened theoretical 
framework with the aim to understand the dynamics and effects of colliding norms. This 
approach underscores the impact of colliding norms on the use of force for humanitarian 
ends. This impact exposes the gap between the practice of international law and fashionable 
                                                          
107 Cited in: Woyke, W. (2000), Handwörterbuch Internationale Politik, Bonn, p. 225.  
108 Kelsen, H. (1960), Reine Rechtslehre [Pure Legal Studies], second edition, Wien. | Kelsen, H. (1979), Allgemeine 
Theorie der Normen [General Theory of Norms], Wien.  
109 Goldstein, J. and Martin, L.L. (2000), ‘Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note’, 
in: International Organization, volume 54, pp: 603–632. | Kahler, M. (2000) ‘Conclusion: The Causes and 
Consequences of Legalization’, in: International Organization, volume 54, pp:661–683. | Keohane, R.O., Moravcsik, A. 
and Slaughter, A.M. (2000), ‘Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational’, in: International 
Organization, volume 54, pp: 457–488. 
110 Heines, S. (2012), The Nature of War and the Character of Contemporary Armed Conflict, in: Wilmshurst, E. (ed.) 
International Law and the Classification of Conflicts, Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, pp. 9–31. 
111 Chalk, F.; Dallaire, R.; Matthews, K.; Barqueiro, C. and Doyle, S. (2010), Mobilizing the Will to Intervene: Leadership 
to prevent Mass Atrocities, McGill Queen’s University Press, Montreal. | Cooper, R. and Kohler, J. (2009), 
Responsibility to Protect: The Global Moral Compact for the 21st Century, Palgrave Macmillan, New York. | Evans, G. 
(2008), The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All, Brookings, Washington DC. | 
Hamburg, D. (2010), Preventing Genocide: Practical Steps towards Early Detection and Effective Action, Bolder CO: 
Paradigm. | Sewell, S.; Raymond, D. and Chin, S. (2010), Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Book, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA. 
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international relations theories. Considering the existing literature, this thesis explores the 
terms needed for a theoretical and interdisciplinary synthesis.  
 
 From a legal perspective, the practical effects of the norm collision inherent in 
humanitarian intervention have increasingly been debated since the 1999 NATO 
intervention in Kosovo. The 1999 Kosovo intervention was not within the legal framework 
regarding the use of force, as set out in the UN Charter but has been regarded as 
legitimate112 based on the increased normative state support for human rights. The 
intervention has not been condemned by the UN, and was later referred to as “illegal but 
legitimate”.113 Legal scholarship on the status of humanitarian intervention in international 
law generally reflects a subjective view, interpreting the use of force for humanitarian ends 
either as illegal or as a moral necessity and an emerging norm of customary international 
law. While there is supporting evidence for each of these positions – such as the traditional 
wide interpretation of the prohibition of the use of force on the one hand and state practice 
of humanitarian intervention and institutionalisation of human rights on the other – there is 
not yet a clear legal framework for states to comply with. Holzgrefe defined these two 
positions as: the classicist view, in which unauthorized humanitarian intervention are illegal, 
and the legal realist view, in which the prohibition of the use of force has to be reconciled 
with the UN Charter’s purpose of the protection of human rights.114 This lack of a general 
legal framework for humanitarian intervention115 and its illegal yet legitimate status in 
international relations116 can and does hinder state responses to severe humanitarian crises 
such as in Rwanda in 1994 and currently in Syria and the Ukraine. Thus, humanitarian 
                                                          
112 See for example: Chinkin, C. (1999), ‘Kosovo: A Good or Bad War’, in: American Journal of International Law, 
volume 93, p. 84. | Malanczuk, P. (1993), Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force, Het 
Spinhuis Publishers, Amsterdam. | Simma, B. (1999), ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force’, in European Journal of 
International Law, volume 10.  
113 See for example the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000), Kosovo Report: Conflict, 
International response, Lessons Learned, Oxford University Press, p. 4. 
114 Holzgrefe, J.L. (2003), The Humanitarian Intervention Debate, in: Holzgrefe, J. L. and Keohane, R.O. (eds.), 
Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, Cambridge University Press, p. 39. On the classicist 
view see for example: Peach, N. (2004), ‘Epochenwechsel im Völkerrecht?‘, in: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, volume 43, p. 13. On the legal realist view see for example: Reisman, W.M. (1985), 
‘Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International Law’, in: Yale Journal of International Law, volume 10, p. 279. ǀ 
Friedman, W. (1964), The Changing Structure of International Law, Columbia University Press. 
115 Reicherter, G. (2005), Rechtsgrundlagen der Humanitären Intervention unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des 
Kosovo Konflikts, Dissertation an der Universität der Bundeswehr in München, p. 15 
116 Peach, N. (2004), ‘Epochenwechsel im Völkerrecht?‘, in: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte, volume 43, p. 25. 
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intervention seems to remain illegal and subject to power politics until it is incorporated into 
the international legal framework.117  
 
 The UN Charter was established to prevent any resort to war118 and, viewed with 
suspicion any doctrine that aims at legitimizing the use of force.119 Likewise, Byers and 
Chesterman argue that the legality of the use of force for humanitarian ends requires “a 
radical change in the international legal system – a change that is, in our view, as 
unwarranted as it is unsound.”120 While recognising the need to protect human rights 
globally, their recommendation is that states accept the illegality of humanitarian intervention 
but still intervene in cases that shock the international community such as Kosovo and 
Rwanda.121According to Buchanan, norm development in international law is achieved by 
“progress through illegality”.122 Buchanan maintains that it is both desirable and necessary 
for states and other actors in international relations to advance humanitarian intervention by 
challenging international law through illegal acts when necessary.123 Yet, this thesis argues 
that the remaining norm conflict between the prohibition of the use of force and human rights 
protection may be an obstacle to effective humanitarian intervention. Repetitive state 
practice of humanitarian intervention, as Buchanan mentions, has not yet been reflected in 
a normative change in international law.  
 
 As such, collective and repetitive use of force for humanitarian intervention, while 
illegal under current international law, can form customary international law over time. Such 
normative change to the prohibition of the use of force is highly controversial. While 
proponents of the classicist view highlight the risk of a possible abuse of a right to 
                                                          
117 This idea of a clear legal framework was presented as a necessity by Kevin Boyle: “It is important for the next 
‘humanitarian war’ that we have a clear framework of legal accountability.” Boyle, K. (2000), Lecture at the Yale Law 
School’s Human Rights Workshop, New Haven, CT, USA.   
118 Freedman, L. (2003), ‘Think Again: War’, in: Foreign Policy, July/August 2003, p. 18.  
119 Atack, I. (2002), ‘Ethical Objections to Humanitarian Interventions’, in: Security Dialogue, volume 33, p. 288.  
120 Byers, M. and Chesterman, S. (2003), Changing the Rules about Rules? Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and 
the Future of International Law, in: Holzgrefe, J.L. and Keohane, R.O. (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal 
and Political Dilemmas, Cambridge University Press, p. 178. ǀ Chesterman, S. (2001), Just War or Just Peace? 
Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, Oxford University Press, p. 226.  
121 Byers, M. and Chesterman, S. (2003), Changing the Rules about Rules? Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and 
the Future of International Law, in: Holzgrefe, J.L. and Keohane, R.O. (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal 
and Political Dilemmas, Cambridge University Press, p. 198.  
122 Cited in: Grareis, S. and Varwick, J. (2003), Die Vereinten Nationen: Aufgaben, Instrumente und Reformen, Bonn, p. 
88.  
123 Buchanan, A. (2003), Reforming the International Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in: Holzgrefe, J.L. and 
Keohane, R.O. (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, Cambridge University Press, p. 
158. 
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intervention, proponents of the legal realist view point out the need for a norm change due 
to social change in international relations since the endorsement of the UN Charter.124 There 
is reason behind critically interpreting a right to humanitarian intervention because there is 
no direct reference to an exception permitting the use of force for humanitarian ends in the 
UN Charter. Yet, the institutionalisation of human rights and the increased moral 
responsibility to protect human rights, as evident in human security policies and the R2P 
doctrine, highlight the norm conflict within the UN Charter between the prohibition of the use 
of force and human rights protection. While legally controversial due to the inconsistent 
application of norms, a prudential application of humanitarian intervention may be more 
effective than a general norm. Humanitarian intervention is not an effective solution to all 
cases of civil conflict but has to consider a variety of political, social and cultural 
contingencies of each case to be applied in a timely and effective way.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
124 Buchanan, A. (2003), Reforming the International Law on Humanitarian Intervention, in: Holzgrefe, J.L. and 
Keohane, R.O. (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, Cambridge University Press, p. 
39. 
Colliding Norms in Humanitarian Intervention - PhD Thesis - Birte Ahlhaus 
 
33 | P a g e  
 
The Contextual Framework 
 
“On the one hand, is it legitimate for a regional organisation to use force without a UN 
mandate? On the other, is it permissible to let gross and systematic violations of human 
rights, with grave humanitarian consequences, continue unchecked? The inability of the 
international community to reconcile these two compelling interests […] can be viewed 
only as a tragedy.”125 
 
The aim of this research is to critically analyse how and if international law should be 
reconstituted to embody normative concerns – such as humanitarian intervention – in order 
to overcome the norm conflict between the legal prohibition of the use of force and the moral 
norm to protect human rights abroad. This is done by specifically looking at middle power 
states’ human security policies and the way in which they represent a prudential approach 
to the application of international law. The emerging field of interdisciplinary study of 
international relations and international law holds significance for the analysis of foreign 
policy decisions regarding states’ engagement in humanitarian intervention. As mentioned 
in the introduction, this thesis adopts a legal consequentialist methodology by approaching 
the norm conflict in humanitarian intervention from a prudential perspective. This is done in 
the context of middle power human security policies and the respective interpretations of 
international law in the light of the norm conflict between the legal prohibition of the use of 
force and the moral duty to protect human rights abroad. While a prudential approach does 
not deny the influence of moral justifications, as put forward in most normative approaches, 
it does also draw on realist limits to the generality of moral norms. Adapting a casuistic and 
case sensitive approach, this thesis aims to evaluate the emergence of a norm of 
humanitarian intervention by examining the state practice and human security policies of 
middle power states. Put differently, the extent to which human security policies influence 
changes in international law may depend on the ‘‘pull’’ of compliance with traditional laws126 
as much as the ‘‘push’’ of norm violations.127 Drawing attention to the problem of colliding 
norms could, in turn, strengthen explanations of when and to what degree change and 
continuity in international law influences what states do. The conclusion drawn from this 
investigation will be valuable in achieving both a deeper and broader understanding of the 
                                                          
125 Speech by Kofi Annan in 1999; quoted in: Tsagourias, N. (2000), ‘Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo and Legal 
Discourse: Self-Deception or Self-Consciousness?’ in: Leiden Journal of International Law, volume, p. 11. 
126Franck, T. (1990), The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, New York, Oxford University Press. 
127 Buchanan, A. (2003), Reforming the International Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in: Holzgrefe, J.L. and 
Keohane, R.O. (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, Cambridge University Press, p. 
158.  
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correlation between foreign policy decisions and soft law development in humanitarian 
interventions.  
 
This research draws on insights from quantitative legal research and comparative 
politics to account for persistence in the use of force, by states, for humanitarian ends and, 
more specifically, the timing of policy decisions to militarily intervene in case of human rights 
abuses. As such, following the introductory chapters on historical developments and 
theoretical approaches to humanitarian intervention, chapter 3 draws on international legal 
scholarship to clarify the legal status of humanitarian intervention and the possibility of 
normative change. The legal scholarship examines the problem of teleological projection of 
humanitarian intervention and the paradoxical implications of norm collision. It is argued that 
Article 2(4) UN Charter must be read in conjunction with the purposes enshrined in Article 
1(1) UN and the mechanisms established to achieve these ends. In present-day debates, 
the literature on the legalization of humanitarian intervention has shifted several times.128 
Authors arrive at different conclusions regarding the law as it is at the moment and the 
potential legal change129 regarding humanitarian interventions. Theoretically, this thesis 
adapts modern legal positivist approaches.130 Classic legal positivists argue that there is 
only hard law and no soft law, based on the legal principle of objectivity.131 Yet, this approach 
fails to consider the changing character of international law, which reacts to social change 
in international relations. Modern legal positivism does not define law as independent from 
its context, and considers soft law instruments, such as joint statements, declarations, 
General Assembly Resolutions, as interpretative tools to define official sources of law.132 
Chapter 4 borrows tools from realist and constructivist theories to examine the state practice 
of humanitarian intervention by examining cases of middle power interventionism. In 
                                                          
128 See for example Murphy, S. (1996), Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an evolving World Order. | 
Mayall, J. (2000), The Concept of Humanitarian Interventions Revisited, in: Schnabel, A. and Thakur, R. (eds.), Kosovo 
and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship , 
The United Nations University. 
129 See for example: Cassese, A. (1999b), ‘Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are we Moving towards International Legitimation of 
Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?’ in: European Journal of International Law, Volume 
10, p. 23. | Kohen, M. (1999), ‘L’emploi de la force et la crise du Kosovo: vers un nouveau desordre jurisdique 
international’, in: Revue Belge du droit international, volume 32.  
130 Simma, B. and Paulus, A.L. (1999), ‘The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A 
Positivist View’, in: American Journal of International Law, volume 93, p. 305. 
131 See for example Ago, R. (1957), ‘Positive Law and International Law’ in: American Journal of International Law, 
volume 691, pp. 698-700. │ Carty, A. (1989), The Decay of International Law? Manchester University Press, p. 108. 
132 Simma, B. and Paulus, A.L. (1999), ‘The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A 
Positivist View’ in: American Journal of International Law, volume 93, p. 305. 
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particular this thesis compares realist arguments on prevailing power politics and 
constructivist arguments on the legal force of international law on state behaviour.133 
Theoretically there is a division between these two approaches to international relations. 
Realism predicts on-going conflict and norm violation134 due to states pursuing individual 
interests rather than international norms; with some scholars even rejecting international law 
as a structural element in the international system.135 Constructivism, in contrast, regards 
aspects of human rights law as increasingly influencing foreign policy.136 Only by considering 
both theories of international relations one can understand the ongoing debate about 
humanitarian intervention. International law and international relations taken together may 
provide answers to the controversy over the use of force for humanitarian intervention and 
the problem of colliding norms.  
 
 
Graph: Different approaches to explain state conduct of humanitarian intervention. 
 
 
 
The focus of the thesis is on three overarching conditions that mediate the impact of 
colliding norms: (1) developments of and fragmentation in international law over time -
                                                          
133 Jennings, R. and Watts, a. (1992), Oppenheim’s International Law, Ninth Edition, London Longman. │ Reus-Smit, C. 
(2009), Constructivism, in: Burchill, S. and Linklater, A. (eds.), Theories of International Relations, fourth edition, 
Palgrave Macmillan, p. 219. | Daddow, O. (2009), International Relations Theory, Sage Publications, p. 114. | Viotti, 
P.R and Kauppi, M.V. (2009), International Relations Theory, Prentice Hall, p. 276. 
134 Krasner, S. D. (1993), Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights, in: Rittberger, V. (ed.), Regime Theory and 
International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
135 Waltz, K. (1979), Theory of International Politics, New York, McGraw-Hill.  
136 Brielrly, J. L. (1958), The basis of obligation in international law and other papers, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 10.  
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chapter 3-, (2) justifications of the legality and illegality of the use of force for humanitarian 
intervention -chapter 4 and 5-, and (3) the national interpretation of international norms by 
middle power states –chapter 6-. The dynamics of international law and relations are of 
importance in explaining both, why there is a certain law, due to events in the past, and how 
law can be changed, as a result of how events have evolved. As Focarelli puts it, “the law 
as it is today is the outcome of past struggles; therefore only a struggle engaged today can 
make the law change for tomorrow”.137 International actors, specifically states, are 
constantly involved in law making and changing. At the same time, a sufficiently objective 
international law exists. Both international law and international relations are, hence, 
interpreted as correlated living instruments, which change over time and influence each 
other. This interpretation is in accordance with the definition of the UN Charter given by 
Edward Hambro in 1946:138  
 
“The UN Charter, like every written constitution, will be a living instrument. It will be applied 
daily: and every application of the Charter, every use of an Article, implies interpretation: on 
each occasion a decision is involved which may change the existing law and start a new 
constitutional development. A constitutional law will grow up and the Charter itself will merely 
form the framework of the Organization which will be filled in by the practice of the different 
organs.” 
 
 Specifically it is argued that (1) there is a strong correlation between foreign policy 
decisions and norm development in international law; (2) the normalization of humanitarian 
intervention remains limited to a state of soft law normalization and potential legal 
normalization, and (3) a prudential approach – situational political morality - may offer more 
reasonable solutions to overcome the norm conflict by strengthening the traditional rule of 
law on the use of force and allowing for the prudential assessment of mass atrocity cases. 
While the casuistic approach to address norm conflict, as proposed for example by Jonsen 
and Toulmin,139 may improve state response to humanitarian conflicts, it does not overcome 
the problem of colliding norms in international law. It is not argued that a new legal space 
needs to be developed but this thesis instead aims to find a prudential way through which 
                                                          
137 Focarelli, C. (2012), International Law a Social Construct: The Struggle for Global Justice, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 301.   
138 Quoted in: Pollux,(1946), ‘The interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations’ in: British Yearbook of 
International Law, volume: 23, p. 54 
139 Toulmin, S. and Jonsen, A.R. (1988), The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning, The University of 
California Press. ǀ Fisher, D. (2011), Morality and War: Can War be just in the Twenty-First Century? Cambridge 
University Press.  
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current international law can be applied more reasonably to the controversy over 
humanitarian intervention. The research looks in particular at the question of when to 
intervene in humanitarian or civil conflicts in contrast to how to intervene. The aspect of 
timing is crucial to the prudential argument of humanitarian intervention. Decisions to 
intervene require a holistic evaluation of the conflict and a wide option of policy responses 
as a response to end mass atrocities cannot be isolated from the context in which the conflict 
occurs. The aspect of timing can ultimately determine the potential for a humanitarian 
intervention to be successful. Although the means by which a state intervenes in another 
state is also significant and just as controversial an aspect as the decision when to intervene 
it will not be central to the analysis offered in this thesis.  
 
Despite controversy over the normalization of humanitarian intervention, human 
security policies as constructed by middle power states, and most of the literature available, 
support it.140 Most authors have concluded that humanitarian intervention in cases of mass 
atrocity is morally permissible even without UN Security Council authorization, and some 
have gone as far as to say that some cases create a moral duty to intervene.141 The use of 
force for humanitarian ends is, thus, discussed in this thesis as a normalized practice (soft 
law) in international relations that remains in a legal grey zone with regard to its legality in 
international law.  
 
  
                                                          
140 Wheeler is sceptical towards a legal understanding of the normalization of humanitarian intervention and argues 
for a soft law approach for characterizing the normalization of humanitarian intervention. He introduces the idea of 
“supreme humanitarian emergency”, the only circumstance under which states can abandon norms of non-
intervention in favour of human rights protection. | Wheeler, N. (2000), Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention 
in International Society, Oxford University Press. | For authors such as Bellamy the issue of humanitarian intervention 
is more complex. He argues that more focus needs to be placed on the role of Western states in supporting 
disadvantaged countries. Hence, Bellamy includes aspects of economic and social justice in his understanding of 
human security. | Bellamy A. (2009), ‘Realizing the Responsibility to Protect’ in: International Studies Perspectives, 
volume 10, issue 1. | Yet, there is a common agreement on the fact that there is an evolution towards a general 
normalization of humanitarian intervention in cases of severe and widespread human rights abuses among states. 
141 Nardin, T. and Williams, M. (2006), Nomos XIvii: Humanitarian Intervention, New York University Press, New York.  
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Chapter 2: “never again” – Promises and Realpolitik 
 
„Act so as to use humanity, whether in your own person or in others, always as an end and 
never as a means‟.142 
 
 
Following the Second World War, the international community promised that never again143 
would the community of states disregard humanitarian crises that shock mankind. According 
to Kant’s categorical imperative, states are subjects to and capable of moral reasoning. Yet, 
following humanitarian crises in Cambodia, Rwanda, Darfur, Bosnia, and now Syria, the 
international community of states is still in search of an effective framework to respond 
legally, legitimately, and in a timely manner to such circumstances. Never again is a powerful 
commitment, but unfulfilled. The protection of civilians who are subject to violence and 
human rights abuses outside a state’s territory is widely discussed.144 While the definition 
for the use of force for humanitarian ends abroad ranges from terms like humanitarian 
intervention to a responsibility to protect,145 the nature and conduct of such interventions 
remains contested and subject to realpolitik considerations.146 The use of force to intervene 
in other states, justified on moral or humanitarian grounds, has often been an essential 
aspect of realist power politics.  
 
 Although the concept of national sovereignty has long been the main legal and 
political obstacle to humanitarian intervention, the idea of humanitarian intervention, as a 
right to protect civilians can be traced back to the fifteenth century, before the establishment 
of the nation state in the Treaty of Westphalia from 1648. In 1453-1648 interventions were 
mainly conducted to protect civilians from religious persecutions, which resulted from the 
                                                          
142 Kant, I. (1785), Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by: Ellington, J.W. (1993), third edition, p. 30.  
143 See for example: Gilbert, M. (2000), Never Again: A History of the Holocaust, Universe Publishers. ǀ Foxman, A.H. 
(2003), Never Again? The Threat of the New Ant-Semitism, Harper One Publishers. ǀ Montgomery, L.H. (2007), Never 
Again: Genocide, Armenia, The Holocaust, Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Darfur, The University of 
Michigan, Ruder Finn Press. ǀ Ronayne, P. (2001), Never Again? The US and the Prevention and Punishment of 
Genocide since the Holocaust.  
144 Hoffman, S. (1996), The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention, Notre Dame University Press, Notre Dame, 
in: Holzgrefe, J.L. and Keohane, R. O. (2003), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, 
Cambridge University Press, New York. |  Rotberg, R. (2010), Mass Atrocity Crimes: Preventing Future Outrages, 
Brookings, Washington DC. | Teson, F. R. (1997), Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, second 
edition, Irvington on Hudson, New York Transnational. | Weiss, T. (2007), Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action, 
Polity Press, Cambridge. | Wheeler, N. (2003), Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
145 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), The Responsibility to Protect: report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa, International Development Research Center.  
146 Realpolitik is a term from the political realist school of thought. It refers to the influence that power and national 
interests have on international politics, diplomacy and law. 
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religious division in Europe. The Treaties of Westphalia ended the Thirty Year War in Europe 
that devastated and depopulated large parts of Europe. As a result of this devastating war, 
which followed the confessional division, the Treaties of Westphalia ordered that the religion 
of the ruler was to be the religion of his or her subjects - Cuius regio, eius religio (whose 
realm, his religion). Dissent was a privilege, not a right, and appeal to any authority higher 
than the ruler (such as the Pope) was not permitted. While the Peace of Westphalia ended 
the confessional war and established fundamental principles of state sovereignty and non-
intervention, it also allowed for absolutist governments. Further, the right to sovereignty was, 
initially, limited to influential European states. African and Asian nations, for example, were 
invaded and conquered, sometimes in the name of civilization and humanitarianism. Though 
a specific doctrine of humanitarian intervention was not fully articulated until the nineteenth 
century147 philosophers like Hugo Grotius148 and Emmerich de Vattel149 already developed 
justifications for the use of force for humanitarian interventions based on the concept of 
natural right in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  
 
 It wasn’t until the nineteenth-century that leaders such as Bismarck, Garibaldi, and 
Victor Emmanuel defined sovereignty as the right of people rather than the ruler. In the 
nineteenth century humanitarian intervention became more common. Repeated 
interventions in the Ottoman Empire, for example in Greece in 1827, Sicily in 1857, Syria in 
1860, Crete in 1866, Bosnia in 1875, Bulgaria in 1877, Macedonia in 1887, and Cuba in 
1898, were aimed at protecting Christian minorities. Following the First World War, dictators 
such as Hitler in Germany and Mussolini in Italy used the justification of humanitarian 
intervention to annex neighbouring countries. It was then that the idea of national 
sovereignty was challenged as it allowed genocidal practices and the conduct of mass 
atrocities by the state. Yet, it was only when the Third Reich invaded other countries that 
the international community considered intervention. Following the end of the Second World 
War, the UN was founded to promote respect for human rights and world peace. The 
achievement of these norms was difficult in practice, with the Cold War, but it informed the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and similar international instruments. The legal norm 
collision and moral dilemma of human rights protection versus commitment to the prohibition 
                                                          
147 In the 19th century the idea of natural rights of each people was used as a moral justification to give legal validity 
to interventions in other states internal affairs. 
148 Grotius, H. (1625), De Jure belli ac Pacis. 
149 De Vattel, E. (1758), Le Droit des Gens. 
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of the use of force has increased since human rights issues gained momentum after 1976, 
when the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights came into force.150 
 
 The first reference to a right of intervention following the Second World War was 
made by Raphael Lemkin in response to UN General Assembly Resolution 96 on the 
prohibition of genocide151. Former ICJ Judge Hersch Lauterpacht confirmed the right of 
intervention as a response to genocide in 1955. Yet, the genocide convention does not 
explicitly state a right or responsibility of the international community of states to intervene. 
In 1987, Bernhad Kouchner, representative of Medcines Sans Frontiers and former French 
Foreign Minister under Sarkozy, referred to a droit d’ingerence, a right to intervene, to enable 
humanitarian aid services in humanitarian conflicts. The current humanitarian intervention 
debate started with the publication of the R2P doctrine in 2001 and its partial adoption by 
the UN in 2005. In order to better understand the current norm collision on the use of force 
for humanitarian ends it is important to look at the historical evolution of international law 
and its impact on state practice. Consequently, this chapter traces the history of political and 
legal developments regarding the use of force and human rights protection. By reviewing 
the developments that led to the institutionalisation of human rights, and the norm collision 
with traditional international law on the use of force, the chapter aims to point out the 
dynamics of this international human rights influence on state practice152 and the 
problematic integrity of international law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
150 Forsythe, D. P. (1991), The Internationalization of Human Rights, Lexington Books. | Forsythe, D. P. (2000), Human 
Rights in International Relations, Cambridge University Press. 
151 UN General Assembly (1948/1951), Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948, Entry into force: 12 January 1951. 
152 Schmitz, H.P. and Sikkink, K. (2002), International Human Rights, in: Carlsneas, W.; Risse, T. and Simmons, B. A. 
(eds.), Handbook of International Relations, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. | Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998), 
‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, in: International Organization, volume: 52, pp: 887–917. 
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Normalizing Humanitarian Intervention 
 
The work of the UN Security Council reflects a “shift in the perspective of this Council, 
where the security of people is no longer a by-product, but is increasingly becoming a 
central tenet of the Council’s work.”153 
 
The principle of sovereignty has been challenged by a policy of sovereignty as responsibility 
by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)154 in 2001. 
Legal and political controversies over previous humanitarian interventions, such as the 1999 
NATO intervention in Kosovo, and cases where an intervention was necessary but did not 
take place, such as in Rwanda in 1994, led states and NGOs to collaboratively define a new 
concept of sovereignty and humanitarian responsibility.155 The ICISS’s paper set the 
conduct of humanitarian intervention in a legal and political context posing the question of 
who is authorized to intervene.156 More specifically, the question is who has the 
responsibility to intervene. Regarding the first question, the answer reflects the legal 
principles on the use of force and intervention evident in the UN Charter. The UN Security 
Council holds the exclusive right to authorize the use of force by a state or group of states 
in case of a threat to international peace and security under Chapter 7 UN Charter. The 
Commission’s paper mentions the inability of the UN Security Council157 to authorize the 
use of force in circumstances where an intervention was both necessary and legitimate. Yet, 
while some proposals were made to overcome the deadlock, in cases of an imminent need 
to authorize an intervention, such as a call to withhold a veto in these circumstances, the 
Commission’s paper does not provide a clear proposition for a legal framework that could 
normalize humanitarian intervention. The question remains how a just reason and right 
cause can be defined and generalized in order to provide a legal framework. Without a legal 
framework humanitarian interventions remain illegal and controversial. To shed more light 
on how just reason and right cause with regard to humanitarian intervention may be defined 
                                                          
153 Statement by former Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy to the UN Security Council on 19 April 2000. 
(S/RES/1296).  
154 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa, International Research Development Center.  
155 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), The Responsibility to Protect: Research, 
Bibliography, Background: Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty, Ottawa, International Research Development Center.  
156 Miller, D. (2007), The Responsibility to Protect Human Rights, Working Paper Series 
SJ006, Oxford University Press. 
157 The inability of the UN Security Council refers to cases in which a decision by the UN Security Council was 
deadlocked due to the use of a veto by one or more of the permanent five members of the UN Security Council that 
hold a veto power (The United Kingdom, The United States of America, France, Russia and China).  
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and generalized this chapter evaluates changes in the normative and legal understanding 
of humanitarian intervention through four historical periods.  
 
 This section explores some of the historical events that influenced and led to the norm 
collision between human rights protection and the law on the use of force. The political and 
legal tensions involved in this norm collision are analysed from a historical perspective, 
recognizing that two distinct values are involved. The first involves the development and 
recognition of humanity as a global value itself. The second involves the aim to prevent any 
recourse to the use of force among the international community of states. The 
institutionalisation and global recognition of human rights following the Second World War 
has been the foci of the debate on a possible additional exception to the use of force as 
outlined in Article 2(4) UN Charter. This attempt is not wholly new, but gained momentum 
through the increased recognition of human rights. The events and doctrines surrounding 
the institutionalisation of human rights involved justifications of coercive intervention in the 
name of human rights protection which can be seen as challenging the integrity of 
international law. The problem of norm conflict between state sovereignty, in terms of non-
intervention, and the protection of populations, in terms of human rights protection, appears 
as early as Hugo Grotius. In his writings on international law he argued that international law 
ultimately exists to protect the rights and duties of individual human beings.158 As such, 
Grotius maintained that the resort to the use of force may be just if used to prevent a state 
from maltreating its own population. Similar, John Locke attempted to overcome the norm 
conflict between sovereignty and the protection of population by means of contract theory.159 
However, Locke’s theory is centred on the idea of ‘trust’ between a state and its citizens 
more than a contract:160  
 
“For all Power given with trust for the attaining an end, being limited by that end, whenever 
that end is manifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and the 
Power devolve into the hands of those that gave it, who may place it anew where they shall 
think best for their safety and security.”161  
                                                          
158 Grotius, H. (1609), De Mare Liberum, translated by Magoffin, R.D. (1916), Oxford University Press, chapter V. ǀ 
Grotius, H. (1625), De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, translated by Kelsey, F.W. (1925), Clarendon Press, book II, chapter 2. ǀ For a 
general overview on Grotius’ concept of international law see: Lauterpacht, H. (1946), ‘The Grotian Tradition in 
International Law’, in: British Yearbook of International Law, volume 1, p. 27.  
159 Locke, J. (1690), The Second Treaties of Government, chapter XIII, para. 149, in: Laslett, P. (1988), Two Treaties of 
Government, Cambridge University Press.  
160 The word ‘trust’ appears more frequently than ‘contract’ in Locke’s work on “The Second Treaties of Government”.  
161 Mc Pherson, C.B. (1980), John Locke Second Treatise of Government [1690], Hackett Publishing Company, 
Indianapolis and Cambridge.   
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 Where the ‘trust’ between a state and its population is in jeopardy, there might be a 
just reason to intervene. In fact, even current international law reflects a limited 
understanding of sovereignty which entails both rights and duties on the international plane. 
In the 1928 Island of Palmas Case, the arbitrator, Max Huber, argued that sovereignty, never 
meant that a state could act in its territory regardless of the effect of its action on another 
state.162 In 1949 this understanding was reaffirmed in Article 14 of the Draft Declaration on 
the Rights and Duties of States which states that: “[e]very State has the duty to conduct its 
relations with other States in accordance … with the principle that the sovereignty of each 
State is subject to the supremacy of international law.”163 Consequently, since the 
emergence of the state in the seventeenth century, approaches have been made to limit 
state sovereignty in favour of concepts of a duty to intervene164 when a state “renders itself 
guilty of cruelties against and persecution of its nationals, in such a way as to deny their 
fundamental human rights and to shock the conscience of mankind”.165 Such approaches 
became more prominent following the 1999 Kosovo intervention. There is reason for taking 
a wider historical approach to the problem of norm collision between human rights and the 
use of force that underlies the conduct of humanitarian intervention. As the above quotation 
by the UN General Secretary in response to the 1994 Rwandan genocide shows, states still 
fail to react in cases of severe humanitarian crisis. 
 
The beginnings of the morally justified use of force in another state are often traced 
back to military intervention by western European powers to save Christian communities in 
the former Ottoman Empire. Yet, examples of interventions for the protection of civilians 
from religious persecution can be found in the sixteenth century; following the reformation 
and confessionalism in Europe. Nearly all of the interventions that took place in the name of 
humanity can be questioned as to the extent of the altruistic intention of the intervening 
states. Considering the current crisis in Crimea, the first Crimean war of 1853-1856 is a good 
example of the realpolitik behind humanitarian intervention. The 1853 Crimean war started 
over Russia’s intention to protect Orthodox Christians and France’s intention to protect 
Christians in the Ottoman Empire. French and British troops supported the Ottoman Empire 
to prevent Russia from occupying the Crimean peninsula. While the official justifications for 
                                                          
162 International Court of Justice (1928), Island of Palmas Case (US versus Netherlands).  
163 International Law Commission (1949), Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States, GA Res. 375 from 6 
December 1949, article 14. 
164 Bettati, M. and Kouchner, B. (1987), Le Devoir d’ingérence, Paris, Denoël.  
165 Lauterpacht, H. (1947), Oppenheim’s International Law, sixth edition, London: Longmans, Green & Co, p. 280.  
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the war were based on humanitarian grounds, France promoted the rights of Catholics, while 
Russia promoted those of the Russian Orthodox faith; the real reason behind the war was 
to deter Russia from seizing Ottoman territory and maintaining the balance of power in 
Europe. The war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Paris on 30 March 1856 in which 
Great Powers pledged to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire.166 The graph below shows the development of justifications for interventions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From a historical perspective, the question of the legality of humanitarian intervention 
becomes internationally significant with the League of Nations in 1929. Until 1929, and the 
introduction of the Kellogg Briand Pact, there was no international legal prohibition on the 
use of force as foreign policy. From a legal perspective, it is valuable to analyse cases of 
humanitarian intervention that took place after 1929, more so cases that occurred following 
the institutionalization of the UN Charter with its prohibition of the use of force and its 
principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs of other states. Each of those cases show 
that despite the League’s prohibition of war (1929-1945) and The UN’s prohibition of the 
threat or use of force (since 1945), states have repeatedly intervened militarily on the 
grounds of humanity. To what extent pure humanitarian intervention has been practised 
since 1945 is difficult to say; because all military intervention is based on mixed motives by 
the intervening state. A pure humanity motivated intervention is hard to find. Realists like 
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Hegel, Clausewitz, and Boyd consider force to be a necessary tool of foreign policy for the 
protection of the state. Pacifists, by contrast, regard the use of force as immoral. Others, 
such as Kant, Walzer, and Fuller, regard the use of force as justified under specific 
conditions. In order to clarify the debate on the right to intervene for humanitarian ends the 
following section traces the evolution of natural law and right as they relate to the use of 
force. 
 
i. Natural Law and Natural Rights 
 
Human rights are at the centre of the normative debate on the legality of humanitarian 
intervention, yet, the legal status of human rights in relation to the traditional principles of 
state sovereignty and non-intervention remains controversial. A historical overview of the 
development of natural law and the evolution of natural rights highlights the conflict between 
natural-law, which limits the authority of the state to certain moral rights,167 and natural or 
individual rights.168 Natural law refers to the use of reason to define rules of law from 
generally accepted moral behaviour. Contemporary human rights literature somewhat 
strangely, rarely refers to the concepts of natural law and natural rights.169 This lacunae 
reflects Oliver Wendell Holmes’ argument that: "The jurists who believe in natural law seem 
to me to be in that naive state of mind that accepts what has been familiar and accepted by 
them and their neighbours as something that must be accepted by all men everywhere."170 
Yet, considering the beginnings of natural law and natural rights is of relevance when 
understanding the modern norm conflict between state sovereignty (natural law) and human 
rights (individual natural rights). This section thus traces the role that natural law played as 
a source of rights and whether the legal status of human rights can be better understood by 
looking at the conflict between natural law and right, as it evolved from the seventeenth 
century.  
                                                          
167 Strauss, L. (1953), Natural Rights and History, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
168 Locke, J. An Essay Concerning the True Origin, Extent, and End of Civil Government, V. pp. 27–28, in: Laslett, P. (ed.) 
(1960), Two Treatises of Government, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3057. 
169 There is no reference to natural law or natural rights in: Lawson, E. (1991), Encyclopedia of Human Rights ǀ 
Simpson, A.W.B. (2001), Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention, 
Oxford University Press. ǀ The following authors do refer to the natural law tradition: Frohnen, B. (2002), ‘Multicultural 
Rights? Natural Law and the Reconciliation of Universal Norms with Particular Cultures’, in: Catholic University Law 
Review, volume 52, 39. ǀ Weinreb, L.L (1992), Natural Law and Rights, in: George, R.P. (ed.), Natural Law Theory: 
Contemporary Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press .  
170 Holmes, O.W. (1920), Natural Law, in: Collected Legal Paper, pp. 310-312. ǀ Gray, J.C. (1921), The Nature and 
Sources of the Law, Macmillan, second edition, p. 309.  
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 The idea of the existence of a universal law of nature, which everybody was obliged 
to obey and all positive law had to conform to, can be traced back to the early stages of 
Western political culture. Aristotle (384-322 BC) recognised that “One part of what is 
politically just is natural, and the other part legal. What is natural is what has the same validity 
everywhere alike.”171 This means that the law of nature is universal and applies to all human 
beings alike. Yet, Aristotle’s statement that man is a social animal, that his nature is best 
fitted for social cooperation, means that the existence of natural law is defined by the polis 
and limited to its borders. The underlying idea of natural law is that “there is a natural and 
universal notion of right and wrong, one that all men instinctively apprehend”.172 The general 
meaning of humanity in this first historical phase of natural law, is based upon Aristotle’s 
notion of a shared understanding of right and wrong. Such universal law of right and wrong, 
according to Aristotle is, in contrast to particular domestic law, unchanging. According to 
Aristotle, any positive law that is in conflict with moral beliefs of right conduct is not really 
law at all, or as St. Augustine put it, lex injustia non est lex [unjust law is not law]. This 
concept has been further developed by Cicero (106-43 BCE) saying that this unchangeable 
law is valid for all nations at all times.173 In the medieval period, which combined classical 
and Christian understandings of morality, Aquinas set out a religious conception of natural 
law, in the sense of a shared understanding of right and wrong, by elaborating the 
importance of natural law for the great community.174 St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-74) held 
that reason and faith were two complimentary methods of investigation. This is based on 
Aquinas’ idea that a part of the eternal law was the natural law, which God had inscribed in 
the minds of every human being. The natural law was therefore eternal and independent of 
individual humans, but it was nevertheless conceivable for humans a priori. 
 
 The concept of natural law theory can be distinguished into two ideas; first the moral 
distinction between right and wrong, ius naturale; and second, the distinction between legal 
and illegal, which is also known as legal positivism or ius gentium175. The idea of ius gentium, 
                                                          
171 Aristoteles, Nichomachean Ethics, 1134b, p. 20. 
172 Cooper, L. (1965), The Rhetoric of Aristotle, Pearson Publishers, p. 73.  
173 Cicero, M. T. (1928, 1977ed), De Re Publica and De Legibus, translated by Keyes, C.W., p. 211.  
174 For a detailed study on Aquinas’ theory of natural law and the international society see Midgley, E.B.F. (1975), The 
Natural Law Tradition and the Theory of International Relations, London.  
175 Brierly explains the difference between ius gentium and ius natural as follows: “Jus gentium is needed to fill the gap 
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a law among peoples, or positive law, regards law as made by the will of properly constituted 
sovereign authorities. Legal positivism argues that whether a certain rule is a law depends 
on its source. Valid laws are rules that come from certain people in accordance with certain 
procedures that the society enforces. A rule can be a genuine law even though it is unjust. 
Perhaps a good example of the potential conflict between natural law and positivist law is 
slavery: According to natural law men were free, yet slavery was legal under positive law. 
Roman law, for example, recognized slavery's reality, but at the same time stated that it was 
contrary to natural law. This early idea of the Law of Nature is therefore the fundamental 
source of ideas concerning the tension between two norms, human rights and state 
sovereignty.  
 
 According to Strauss and Tuck,176 the natural law concept altered drastically in the 
seventeenth century; when natural law of the medieval empire was supplemented, or 
confronted, with the idea of natural right, and the right of the state – the beginning of the 
raison d’état. In contrast to natural law, natural right emphasises individual rights. Strauss 
explains the difference between right and law by arguing that a right protects the individual 
from wrongful acts, whereas law obliges the state, and individuals, to live according to 
certain moral based laws. Finnis gives a comprehensive account of the differences between 
the notions of natural law and natural rights in Natural Law and Natural Rights. He provides 
an overview of the history of the use of the term ius from St. Thomas, to Grotius and Hobbes, 
pointing out the shift from the Roman idea of a right to individual rights. Trying to reconcile 
the ideas of natural law and natural rights, Finnis concludes that the modern use of “right”, 
meaning something someone has, is a restatement of the requirements of justice from the 
side of the recipient. American jurist Roscoe Pound equally argued that natural law was 
"devised for a society organized on the basis of kinship" whereas rights characterized a 
society "which conceived of itself as an aggregate of individuals and was reorganizing on 
the basis of competitive self-assertion".177 Turning to the definition of natural rights, Jeremy 
Bentham, who was critical towards the concept of natural rights, defined rights in the 
                                                          
customary rules, the rules of jus gentium inter se”, Brierly, J.L. (1958), The Basis of Obligation in International Law, in 
Lauterpacht, H. (ed.), The development of international law by the international court, Stevens and Sons publishers, 
London, p.  362. 
176 Strauss, L. (1953), Natural Right and History, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, p. 181. ǀ Tuck, R. 
(1980), Natural Rights Theories, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ǀ See also: Sanders, A. J. G. M. (1988). Conflict 
and Consensus in South African Natural Law Thinking, in: Hund, J. (ed.), Law and Justice in South Africa, Johannesburg: 
University of South Africa. 
177 Pound, R. (1954). An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, p. 15. 
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nineteenth century as “"benefits secured for persons by rules regulating the relationships 
between those persons and other persons subject to those rules.”178 The evolution of natural 
rights, although distinct from natural law, can be seen as an extension of natural law as 
natural rights can only be enforced in a society that respects natural law.  
 
 Grotius, Hobbes, Spinoza, Pufendorf, and Locke all contributed to the emergence of 
the modern natural right philosophy. Following Aristotle’s doctrine that man is a social 
animal, a zoon politikon, Hugo Grotius is typically held to be the first Western philosopher 
who detached the law of nature from God. He stated that “[The law of nature] would have a 
degree of validity even if we should concede that which cannot be conceded without the 
utmost wickedness, that there is no God.”179 Hugo Grotius developed the theory of natural 
right based on Aristotle’s idea of the individual as a zoon politikon, placing the individual and 
his natural rights at the core of the law. Grotius’ most important contribution to legal theory 
is that he applied his concept of natural law in the sphere of international law; his Law of 
Nations was built on his Law of Nature.180 He held that the nation-state came into being 
because the individuals wanted to improve their security and prosperity within a community. 
Grotius further argues that if the sovereign violated the basic rights of his people, he had 
transgressed his jurisdiction, and other states would have the right to intervene and re-
establish the order of the Law of Nature. Instead of focusing on the right intention of the 
intervention, Grotius focused his attention to the justifiable means of the intervention, 
introducing the principle of proportionality. By contrast, John Locke argued that natural law 
exists in a social vacuum. Locke concluded that there is no natural consensus about moral 
standards; what one people calls good and sacred, another violates and considers that good 
and sacred.181 As such, Locke agreed with Thomas Hobbes that rules work only under 
conditions that are the opposite of natural conditions of civilization and political life. Locke 
also agreed with Hobbes that natural right is a right of every man to everything. Defining the 
state as the protection from the anarchy of all-against-all, Locke defined a social contract as 
the foundation of society, giving the sovereign very wide discretionary powers both 
externally and internally. Overall, moral and legal scholars in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries considered humanitarian intervention to be in conformity with natural law and 
                                                          
178 Finnis, J. (1980), Natural Law and Natural Right, Oxford University Press, p. 203.   
179 Grotius, H. (1625) De Jure Belli ac Pacis, prolegomena, para 11. Grotius considered this a deductio in absurdum-
argument.  
180 Grotius, H. (1625), De Jure Belli ac Pacis, II, XXV, paragraph 6.   
181 Zuckert, M.P. (1994), Natural Rights and the New Republicanism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 204. 
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natural right, so long as the intervention fulfilled certain criteria including a just cause and 
proportionality. The traditional concept of natural law, and more specifically the later idea of 
natural right, limited state sovereignty internally, by the principle of humanity and externally 
by the rules of a just war [bellum iustum]. The following section examines the concept of just 
war in more detail.  
 
ii. Just War 
 
According to Mednicoff, just war theory “offers a set of ideas and considerations which de-
emphasize state sovereignty and prioritize justice”.182 As such, he claims, “the just war 
tradition can enhance international legal deliberations relevant to humanitarian 
intervention.”183 Most of the constructivist discussion on a normative right of intervention is, 
to some extent, based on the morality of war and the just war debate. The most prominent 
defender of the just war theory is Michael Walzer. His argument is based on the account of 
permissible warfare in terms of self-defence. More recently, Nigel Biggar’s In Defence of 
War defends the early Christian just war tradition on the use of force. It is a book on the 
ethics of war as it engages with both normative approaches and examples of state practice. 
Biggar defends faith based pacifism, as defined by John Howard Yoder, Stanley Hauerwas, 
and Richard Hays, in contrast to secular pacifism as promoted by David Rodin. This is based 
on Biggar’s observation that the international community today is promoting effective, if not 
actual, pacifism rather than just causes to use force. Yet, Biggar also criticizes the view that 
war has become unnecessary as “wishful thinking”.184 Biggar’s book highlights the 
complexity of the just war tradition and discussions on the morality of war by pointing out 
the conflict between moral reasoning on the justice of an act and the brutal reality of the act 
itself.185 He contends that war can be morally legitimate, legally justified, and indeed 
Christian, based on the case studies he offers in his book. Yet, all of his case studies are 
considered justified which leaves the question under - which conditions is war not, or no 
longer, considered just? Biggar’s study further focuses on cases of war, rather than the use 
                                                          
182 Mednicoff, D.M. (2006), ‘Humane Wars? International Law, Just War theory and contemporary armed 
humanitarian intervention’ in: Law, Culture and Humanities, Association for the Study of Law, volume 2, p. 374.  
183 Mednicoff, D.M. (2006), ‘Humane Wars? International Law, Just War theory and contemporary armed 
humanitarian intervention’ in: Law, Culture and Humanities, Association for the Study of Law, volume 2, p. 374. 
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of force for human security. The following thus evaluates the development of just war theory 
before moving to arguments of just war as a ius ad bellum for sovereign states.  
 
 While the ancient Greeks held that war was not justifiable unless there was a just 
cause for waging it, a just war (bellum iustum) theory developed in the middle Ages and 
predates modern international law. Rather than providing binding rules and principles, just 
war was generally perceived as a set of guidelines to constrain states in their use of force in 
foreign policy. Before the reign of Constantine the Great (306–337 AD), the early Christian 
church considered the use of force as immoral186. According to John Howard Yoder, Stanley 
Hauerwas, and Richard Hays, the "Constantinian shift"187 led to a profound change from a 
renunciation of violence to a debate on the legitimate and illegitimate, justified and unjustified 
use of force.  
 
 The central ideas of just war theory go back to writings by St. Augustine (354-430), 
who tried to link the Christian ideal of pacifism and the political reality of war, by introducing 
a set of criteria that made the waging of war justifiable. The modern understanding of just 
war theory is based on elaborations of St Augustine’s work by Aquinas,188 - and Jesuit 
thinkers such as Vitoria, Suárez, and Gentili.189 Central in their theory were the concepts of 
just cause and intention, which were also central features of Christian moral theory. Aquinas, 
Vitoria, Suárez, and Gentili held that war had to be waged in accordance with certain basic 
requirements in order to be justified. However, they extended the justifications for a just war 
in order to find a universally applicable right of a just war. For example, Suárez held that the 
defence of innocent people, no matter where in the world, would be a just cause.190 Further 
Gentili argued that: “It is the nature of wars for both sides to maintain that they are supporting 
a just cause. In general, it may be true in nearly every kind of dispute, that neither of the two 
                                                          
186 Nardin, T. (1996), The Comparative Ethics of War and Peace, in: Nardin, T. (ed.), The Ethics of War and Peace: 
Religious and Secular Perspectives, Princeton University Press, p. 245.  
187 Yoder, J.H. (1994), The Politics of Jesus, second edition, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. ǀ See also: 
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189 Grotius, H. (1646), De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres. ǀ Mednicoff, D.M. (2006), ‘Humane Wars? International Law, Just 
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disputants is unjust.”191 With regard to the right intention as a criterion of just war, Gentili 
noted that: “[W]hether or not it is necessary for the justice of a war that the leader have a 
good motive, is a matter for the theologians”.192 Authors such as St Augustine proclaimed 
that there was a right of humanity to respond to offensive state acts,193 in particular to 
prevent harm to innocents.194 In this sense, the use of force against non-Christians was 
perceived as righteous.  
 
This doctrine of a moral conduct of war dominated the time of religious reformation in 
the sixteenth century. The idea of a just cause based on natural law to intervene in another 
state can also be found in the Islamic tradition of jihad195 and in Asian philosophy196. Aquinas 
argued that there is no general, valid objection to the act of waging war. But for the war to 
be just, it had to meet certain requirements. Firstly, it had to be waged by a competent 
authority, that is, “by the authority of princes or of the church”.197 Secondly, there must be a 
just cause for the war, namely “that those who are attacked merit the attack because of 
some fault (culpa)”.198 Just cause for war could be found in self-defence; restoration of 
peace; assistance of neighbours against attack; and, most notably, “defines of the poor and 
oppressed”.199 Finally, just war had to be waged with a right intention. In general, Aquinas’ 
theory of a just war, like Augustine’s, relied on Christian moral theory, where an act was only 
good if it was motivated by a just cause. To summarize the idea of just war with relation to 
the conduct of humanitarian intervention, proponents of the just war theory in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries generally considered humanitarian intervention, as part of the 
doctrine of bellum justum, to be in conformity with the law of nature. The use of force as part 
of a states’ foreign policy was not legally prohibited per se, but it had to fulfil certain 
requirements in order to be legal. The first international trial related to crimes against 
                                                          
191 A. Gentili De Jure Belli Libri Tres (1612) I, IV, para 48. 
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humanity was the trial of Peter von Hagenbach200 in 1474 in Austria. Schwarzenberger201 
and Bassiouni202 describe the trial as the first international war crimes trial. The underlying 
theory adapted in the Hagenbach trial was that all persons, including a sovereign, were 
answerable to a higher law, irrespective of any domestic or regional laws. Nevertheless, the 
difficulty remained to give content to and specify the higher law that had been breached. A 
critique of the natural law and just war theory is provided by Botero, Bodin and Hobbes.203 
While Hobbes did not deny that a sovereign may commit an atrocity worthy of punishment, 
he asserted that the world lacked a tribunal with competence to make such a determination. 
Just war theory can then be interpreted as a limit on the sovereignty of states; in that their 
internal sovereignty is restricted by the principle of humanity and their external sovereignty 
by the rules of bellum justum. More recently, the idea of just war has been reworked by 
scholars such as Walzer. According to Walzer, an acceptable justification for the use of force 
only exists in case of self-defence.204 However, this narrow approach to just war does not 
comport with the current norm conflict between protecting populations abroad from severe 
humanitarian crises and the prohibition of the use of force. Both Rawls205 and Habermas206 
approached the question of just war from a Kantian perspective, defining military 
humanitarian intervention as an apolitical instrument to re-establish peace and justice. Yet, 
they base their just war theory on different approaches. While Rawls’ just war theory is based 
on the controversial argument that well-ordered societies are entitled to wage a just war 
against criminal states, Habermas based his just war approach on procedures that are 
grounded in international law.  
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iii. From Just Cause towards a Ius ad Bellum for the Sovereign State 
 
In the context of the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a shift from 
the influence of Christian doctrine resulted in a more realistic view on the theory of 
sovereignty and the law of war. The principle of state sovereignty received its legal 
confirmation in the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which ended the religious Thirty Years 
War.207 This change coincided with the shift from natural law to natural right as well as the 
evolution of the nation state208. With increased recognition of individual rights and the 
extension of state sovereignty, the use of force as a means of foreign policy was no longer 
based on natural law.  Based on justification of the protection of religious minorities, the 
European powers established control over the Ottoman Empire209 and the conduct of 
humanitarian intervention became a general aspect of European states’ foreign policy 
towards the Ottoman Empire.210 Examples include the 1826 Greek struggle with the 
Ottoman Porte. Great Britain, France and Russia’s intervention was based less on 
sentiments of humanity than by interests for the tranquillity of Europe211. The practice of 
interventions on humanitarian grounds by the European powers during the nineteenth 
century in the Ottoman Empire has been criticized by scholars then and now not only 
because there was a lack of criteria for interventions but also on the inconsistency of practice 
and the selective practice of intervention. Further atrocities by the Ottoman Empire were 
also reported in what is now Syria in 1860.212 Atrocities were also committed, for example, 
by Spain in Cuba in 1898; forcing large numbers of the Cuban population into concentration 
camps.213  
 
 Furthermore, legal positivism came to dominate legal theory over natural law. Writers 
on the Law of Nations supported the principles of territoriality, sovereign immunity, and non-
interference in a foreign nation’s affairs. The sovereignty of the nation-state was no longer 
restricted by notions such as justice or humanity. The just cause justification for the use of 
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force to protect civilians was replaced by a customary right to war, in accordance with the 
states’ practically unlimited external sovereignty. Machiavelli, one of the founders of 
international relations realism, wrote about politics as it was, not as it ought to be. Describing 
state behaviour during the European Renaissance, Machiavelli came to the conclusion that 
rulers did what they wanted, there were no constraints on their power internally or externally: 
“When it is a question of the safety of the country no account should be taken of what is just 
or unjust, merciful or cruel, laudable or shameful, but without regard to anything else, that 
course is to be unswervingly pursued which will save the life and pursue the liberty of the 
[fatherland].”214 Bodin applied Machiavelli’s realist approach to the principle of state 
sovereignty, arguing that the sovereign, as the supreme legislator, had to respect the natural 
law, divine law, and ius gentium, but these were not serious practical restraints.215 As such, 
there is a fundamental shift away from Grotius’ later teachings, as the nation-state was not 
restricted by notions such as ‘justice or humanity. The following section looks at the change 
from the concept of bellum iustum to the concept of bellum legale216 in more detail. 
 
iv. Realpolitik and the search for legal guidance 
 
While states were relatively unrestrained in their foreign policy decisions, even the dominant 
realist view of state sovereignty in the seventeenth century was, nevertheless limited by 
prudence. The state was allowed to decide the dominant religion within its territory but 
religious freedom had to be granted to minorities.217 Yet, such limitations did not serve as a 
legal foundation to justify humanitarian intervention. Instead, legal scholars such as 
Emmerich de Vattel developed a principle of non-intervention: “Nations are free and 
independent of each other as men are by nature" and it is a "general law of their society that 
each Nation should be left to the peaceful enjoyment of that liberty which belongs to it by 
                                                          
214 Machiavelli, N. (1513), The Prince, quoted in Mushkat, R. (1986), The Concept of Just War in International Law, LLD 
Thesis, UNISA, p. 21. 
215 See Abiew, F.K. (1999), The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention, Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, p. 27. 
216 Kochler, H. (2001), Humanitarian Intervention in the Context of Modern Power Politics: Is the Revival of the 
Doctrine of the Just War compatible with the International Rule of Law?, International Progress Organization, Vienna, 
p. 5. 
217 Abiew, F.K. (1999), The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Interventioin: Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, p. 44.  
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nature.”218 More precisely this means that state sovereignty as a right entails the principle 
of non-intervention as a rule:  
 
“It clearly follows from the liberty and independence of Nations that each has the right to 
govern itself as it thinks proper. No foreign State may enquire into the manner in which a 
sovereign rules, nor set itself up as judge of his conduct, nor force him to make any change 
in his administration.”219 
 
 Although Vattel later changed his view to a limited right to intervention, the 
international rule of law in the eighteenth century did not reflect a right of humanitarian 
intervention. While the justification of war was no longer a question of justice, the just cause 
principle was modified by a right to use force as an extension of foreign policy. The early 
nineteenth century saw a variety of interventions on grounds of realpolitk: Austria’s 
intervention in Italy (1821); France’s intervention in Spain (1823-1827); Britain’s intervention 
in Portugal (1826-1828); the intervention of Britain, France and Russia in the contest 
between the Ottoman Empire and Greek insurgents (1821-1830).220 Indeed, European 
states intervened in the Turkish Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century on a regular 
basis, justified on the grounds of the protection of Christians in the Empire. Moreover, 
European states did not consider the Ottoman Empire on equal terms before 1856. 
Phillimore described the use of force in the nineteenth century as “the exercise of the 
international right of action, to which, from the nature of the thing and the absence of any 
common superior tribunal, nations are compelled to have recourse, in order to assert and 
vindicate their rights.”221  
 
v. An international right of action  
 
Before 1918, the European states assumed that the right to the use of force was based upon 
a strict theory of state sovereignty. Yet war was regarded as a last option, only to be used 
when peaceful measures were not successful in solving a conflict. Despite efforts by the 
World Peace Conference in 1878 in Paris to declare that la guerre est un brigandige 
                                                          
218 Vattel, E. (1916), The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of 
Nations and of Sovereigns, translated by Fenwick, C.G. (ed.), Washington: The Carnegie Institution, Introduction, § 15, 
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219 de Vattel, E. (1758), Droit des gens, I, II, IV, paras 54-5. 
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internationale222 state practice only changed slowly. Nevertheless, offensive wars declined 
and states increasingly justified their use of force on humanitarian grounds. Thus, when 
Western powers intervened in what is now Greece to protect Christians from the occupying 
Ottomans in 1827, the London Treaty, which formally authorized the intervention, stated that 
it was undertaken “by sentiments of humanity.”223 Whether this right actually existed under 
international law at the time remains questionable. European diplomats were of the 
conviction that humanitarian intervention was a lawful measure of armed force drawn from 
international customary law. Further examples include the French intervention in what is 
now Syria during the Ottoman era in 1860224, to save persecuted Christians. The 
intervention was sanctioned by leading European states at the Conference of Paris in 1860. 
This instance is widely regarded as a case of humanitarian intervention. Similarly, Russia 
intervened in what is now Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Bulgaria in 1877225 upon 
authorization from several European powers. The US action against Cuba in 1898 has also 
been referred to as a case of humanitarian intervention.226 From a legal position, Wheaton 
regards intervention as legitimate because “the general interests of humanity are infringed 
by the excesses of barbarous and despotic governments.”227 This view has been supported 
by Halleck who states that “[a]nother ground of foreign interference, in the internal affairs of 
a sovereign state, is that of humanity, it being done for the alleged purpose of stopping the 
effusion of blood caused by a protracted and desolating civil war in the bosom of the state 
so interfered with.”228 By contrast, some authors, most notably Brownlie and Fenwick, hold 
that “alleged humanitarian motives were influenced or affected by the political interests of 
the intervening state” and that therefore “no genuine case of humanitarian intervention has 
                                                          
222 “The offensive war is [an act of] international banditry” Résolutions textuelles des Congrés universels de la Paix 
(Berne, 1912). Quoted in Brownlie, I. (1963), International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, p. 25. 
223 The London Treaty for the Pacification of Greece (1827). See Abiew, F.K. (1999), The Evolution of the Doctrine and 
Practice of Humanitarian Interventioin: Hague, Kluwer Law International, p. 48-9. | Brownlie rejects the instance as 
genuine humanitarian intervention, in: Brownlie, I. (1963), International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, p. 339. 
224Brownlie, I. (1963), International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford, Clarendon Press, p. 72. | Abiew, F.K. 
(1999), The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Interventioin: Hague, Kluwer Law International, p. 
50.  
225 Abiew, F.K. (1999), The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Interventioin: Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, p. 50. 
226 Brownlie, I. (1963), International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford, Clarendon Press, p. 72. | Abiew, F.K. 
(1999), The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Interventioin: Hague, Kluwer Law International, p. 
50. 
227 Wheaton, H. (1846), Elements of International Law, third edition, Philadelphia, p. 112. 
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occurred”.229  Nevertheless, the language used by the intervening states clearly indicates 
some sort of opinio juris regarding the right of humanitarian intervention. 
  
In the early twentieth century, there was less willingness to intervene for the sake of 
humanity. The unilateral use of force was increasingly viewed as illegal. While the right to 
wage war as part of states’ sovereignty was not put in question, the 1899/1907 Hague 
Conventions230 and the Geneva Conventions, nevertheless, introduced humanitarian 
aspects into the use of force against another state. Kant already established the 
philosophical basis of non-interference and non-use of force between states in his Perpetual 
Peace,231 in which he identified non-interference and non-use of force as the basic 
conditions for peaceful relations among ethical communities. In the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the Geneva Law, which protects victims of armed conflicts, and the 
Hague Law, which regulated the means and methods of warfare, were incorporated in 
international humanitarian law. The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1923 and the 
Geneva Protocol of 1925 defined the aggressive use of force as an international crime. The 
Briand-Kellogg Pact established the first general prohibition of the use of force as a means 
of foreign policy in 1928,232 which has become a principle and norm jus cogens within 
international law. The Briand-Kellogg Pact further declared in article 1 that: “The High 
Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they 
condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as 
an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another”.233 Similarly the Latin 
American Saavedra-Lamas Treaty of 1933, prohibited intervention both armed and 
diplomatic.234 The League of Nations was yet another attempt to constrain the unilateral use 
of force by states. The Covenant of the League of Nations did not comment on humanitarian 
                                                          
229 Brownlie, I. (1963), International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford, Clarendon Press, p. 72. | Verwey, V.D. 
(1985), ‘Humanitarian Intervention under International Law’ in: Netherlands International Law Review, volume 32, p. 
399. ǀ Fenwick, C.G. (1945), ‘Intervention: Individual and Collective’ in: American Journal of International Law, volume 
39, p. 650.  
230 Laun, R. (1947), Die Haager Landkriegsverordnung, third edition, Wolfenbuettel, Hannover.  
231 Kant, I. (1795), Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf, Friedrich Nicolovius, Koenigsberg. See especially 
preliminary article 5: ‘Kein Staat soll sich in die Verfassung und Regierung eines anderen Staates gewalttaetig 
einmischen’, no state shall interfere in the constitution or governance of another state using force (translated by 
author).   
232 Treaty between the United States and other Powers providing for the renunciation of war as an instrument of 
national policy, signed on 27th August 1928 in Paris, ratified and entered into practice on 24th July 1929. 
233 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War (1928, emphasis added). The treaty entered into force immediately, as 
it was signed by 63 states, an overwhelming majority of states at the time. The treaty has never been terminated, but 
has for all practical purposes been replaced by the UN Charter art 2(4). 
234 Neff, S.C. (2005), War and the Law of Nations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 374. 
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intervention, yet, humanitarian intervention was widely, if not unanimously, accepted as an 
integral part of customary international law. However, divergences certainly existed as to 
the circumstances under which such intervention was considered legal.235 Brownlie, in 
contrast, dismissed the existence of a customary right of humanitarian intervention. 
Regarding state practice in the inter-war period, the international community, through the 
League of Nations, only intervened in the Saar plebiscite 1934–1935.236 The League of 
Nations ended when aggressive totalitarian regimes in Italy and Germany intervened 
militarily in neighbouring countries. According to Abiew, the debate on the right of 
humanitarian intervention before the UN Charter can be summarized as a coexistence of 
sovereignty and a moral right of humanitarian intervention.237 This coexistence highlights 
the norm collision following the move from natural law to natural right. While state 
sovereignty remains central to international relations, the rights doctrine permits a moral 
justification for humanitarian intervention. As state practice before and after the legalisation 
of the use of force shows, the coexistence of state sovereignty and a moral right of 
humanitarian intervention historically results in norm conflict.  
 
vi. Humanitarian Intervention 
 
Before 1945 there was no effective international legal rule for the protection of individuals 
based on a concept of human rights. The protection of individuals did not occur consistently 
and often depended on the existence of a treaty. Following the Second World War, the UN 
Charter provided legal guidance for and limited the conduct of realpolitik by UN member 
states. Any rule or right of humanitarian intervention had to be reframed in accordance with 
the UN Charter. Lauterpacht argued that the UN “marks a further step in the direction of 
elevating the principle of humanitarian intervention to a basic rule of international society,”238 
because the Charter made human rights a core concern. In fact, international law in general 
has changed dramatically by making human rights one of its central features. The protection 
of individuals, which had always been considered to concern domestic jurisdiction, became 
regulated, in principle, by international law. From the Westphalian Peace Treaties to the 
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238 Oppenheim, L. (1955), International Law: A Treatise, Vol. I, Peace, 8th ed. by H. Lauterpacht, New York: David 
McKay, p. 313. 
Colliding Norms in Humanitarian Intervention - PhD Thesis - Birte Ahlhaus 
 
59 | P a g e  
 
Briand-Kellogg Pact and finally to the UN Charter, a more defined and general prohibition of 
the threat and use of force by states has been established.  
 
Yet, due to rapid developments within international law since 1945, which resulted in 
a fragmentation of the international legal order,239 rules and principles of international law 
have demonstrated increasing contradictions. The increase in international courts, quasi-
courts, and other legal institutions reflects this development.240 According to the Project on 
International Courts and Tribunals (PICT),241 there are currently 125 international institutions 
that apply and develop international law. Governing global issues such as human rights or 
protection of the environment through legalising these policy areas comes into conflict with 
the principle of state sovereignty. These developments in international law opened a new 
debate on the just use of force in international relations, especially after 1990. Buchanan, 
for example, argues in favour of international law; justifying the use of force for humanitarian 
ends.242  
 
However, from a positivist legal perspective, international law does not claim specific 
moral foundations but rather intends to be generalizable and consent based. Armed 
humanitarian intervention was not a common practice during the Cold War, because states 
placed more value on sovereignty and order than on the enforcement of human rights. 
Humanitarian interventions, in civil conflicts, were impaired by a necessity to intervene in US 
or Soviet-spheres of interest. That is not to say that there were no efforts to alleviate or stop 
armed conflicts during the Cold War era. In fact, the UN conducted peacekeeping 
                                                          
239 For a more detailed analysis of the fragmentation of international law see: Nicolaidis, K. und Tong, J. (2004), 
‘Diversity or Cacophony? The Continuing Debate over New Sources of International Law’ in: Michigan Journal of 
International Law, volume 25, p. 1349. ǀ Koskenniemi, M. und Leino, P. (2002), ‘Fragmentation of International Law? 
Postmodern Anxieties’ in: Leiden Journal of International Law, volume 15, p. 553. 
240 Apart from the development of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
further international, hybrid (international – domestic), regional, trade and investment, and human rights courts have 
developed. These include European Fair Trade Association (EFTA), World Trade Organisation (WTO) Appellate Body, 
but also tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
241 The „Project on International Courts and Tribunals" (PICT) was established in 1997 by the Center on International 
Cooperation (CIC) of the New York University, and the Foundation for International Environmental Law and 
Development (FIELD). Since 2002, PICT is a joined project between CIC and the Centre for International Courts and 
Tribunals of the University College London, www.pict-pcti.org. 
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operations, primarily in Africa, but they were peacekeeping missions without any mandate 
to intervene in an armed conflict, never mind violate the notion of sovereignty.243 
 
After the Cold War, the number of international armed conflicts decreased, while at 
the same time the number of civil conflicts within states increased.244 Kaldor defines these 
developments as new wars or complex emergencies, which are characterized by a 
combination of causes, namely civil and ethnic conflict, mass displacement of persons, 
disputed sovereignty and the breakdown of national government.245 Civil conflicts have often 
resulted in gross violations of human rights. In these new civil wars, the clash of the legal 
prohibition of the use of force and the protection of human rights became increasingly 
apparent. The UN Security Council has selectively chosen to regard certain civil wars and 
the inherent violation of human rights to be a threat to international security and peace and 
in response has authorised collective use of force. In fact, UN authorized military force to 
intervene in the domestic affairs of states has been used 56 times between 1990 and 2000, 
compared to only 22 times throughout the entire duration of the Cold War.246 However, 
humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era remains selective and limited to national 
interests. Examples of the selective character of humanitarian interventions are the 
genocide in Rwanda, where the international community failed to react. Likewise the 
international community failed to intervene in the Darfur genocide in 2003. Nevertheless, an 
intervention took place in Kosovo in 1999, when Europe was faced with a humanitarian crisis 
within its own region. 
 
vii. The Duty and Responsibility to Protect 
 
The justification and discourse on the use of force to intervene in other states, on the 
grounds of protecting civilians from human rights abuses, has moved beyond the 
controversial term of humanitarian intervention. It is now a duty, or responsibility, to protect. 
Despite the normalization of crimes against humanity, and following on from the concept of 
humanitarian intervention in international customary law since the 1990s, there remains an 
on-going controversy about whether human rights abuses entail threats to international 
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peace and security. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) published a report on the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in 2001. The central theme was 
"the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from 
avoidable catastrophe - from mass murder and rape, from starvation - but that when they 
are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community 
of states."247  
 
In December 2004, this idea was taken up in the context of the debate on United 
Nations reform. In its report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, the High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change stated that “there is a growing acceptance 
that while sovereign governments have the primary responsibility to protect their own 
citizens from such catastrophes, when they are unable or unwilling to do so that 
responsibility should be taken up by the wider international community - with it spanning a 
continuum involving prevention, response to violence, if necessary, and rebuilding shattered 
societies.”248 The UN high-level panel even went so far as to speak of an "emerging norm 
of a collective inter-national responsibility to protect," which encompasses not only "the 'right 
to intervene' in any State, but the 'responsibility to protect' every State when it comes to 
people suffering from avoidable catastrophe."249 The UN General Assembly partially 
adapted the concept of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) in 200, in its World Summit 
Outcome Paper. In the paper, the UN General Assembly confirmed that the international 
community has a responsibility to protect populations from internal atrocities, including 
crimes against humanity.250 The Outcome Document contains two paragraphs (paragraphs 
138 and 139) on the responsibility to protect. Though avoiding the controversial and still ill-
defined use of the term humanitarian intervention, the current debate on the duty or 
responsibility to protect has not overcome the underlying difficulty regarding the criteria 
justifying intervention; nor the fact that interventions continue to be inconsistent in their 
application. States continue to decide the criteria of application for the doctrine of 
                                                          
247 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) developed a framework for permissible 
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humanitarian intervention rather than following a generally accepted norm or UN Security 
Council decision. 
 
 The advance of the R2P doctrine by ICISS since 2001 is an attempt to normalize 
humanitarian intervention globally. However, over a decade after its publication, the R2P 
doctrine, though adopted by the UN in parts, has neither been able to overcome the 
legality/legitimacy distinction; nor does it provide a solution to the selective application of 
humanitarian intervention. While it has been referred to and supported the intervention in 
Libya in 2011251 states failed to implement the same doctrine and enforce an intervention, 
in Syria a few months later. Yet despite the evolution of the R2P doctrine, its partial adoption 
by the UN, and a relatively consistent pattern of humanitarian intervention being authorised 
by the UN Security Council, humanitarian intervention remains in a state of potential norm 
development, rather than being firmly established.252 Yet the rise of the concept of 
responsibility to protect from an idea into an alleged emerging legal norm raises suspicions 
from a positivist perspective. How can a changing norm of the use of force for humanitarian 
ends turn into an emerging legal norm within four years, and into an organizing principle for 
peace and security in the UN system one year later?  
 
 None of the main UN documents in which the responsibility to protect has been 
treated in depth can be regarded as generating binding international law under the classic 
sources of international law, as set forth in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ). Moreover, different bodies have employed the same notion to describe 
different paradigms. In fact, the text of the Outcome Document of the World Summit, which 
is arguably the most authoritative of the four documents in terms of its legal value, leaves 
considerable doubt concerning whether and to what extent states intended to create a legal 
norm. Even in practical terms the normalization of humanitarian intervention is controversial. 
For example, Koskenniemi highlights that “it is never Algeria that will intervene in France or 
Finland in Chechnya.”253 In fact, the liberal demand for a normalization of humanitarian 
intervention is guided by a double standard and risks of misinterpretation as well as abuse. 
While the use of force for humanitarian ends may seem morally justifiable when used by 
                                                          
251 UN Security Council Resolution from 17th of March 2011, 6498th Meeting. Text available on: 
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western states, a humanitarian justification used by Russia to intervene in Georgia in 2008, 
and its annexation of Crimea in 2014, has been criticised by western states on sovereignty 
grounds.254 Moreover, Russia maintained that NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Kosovo 
was illegal, which makes it difficult for Russia to use humanitarian justifications to claim the 
legality of their actions in Georgia or the Crimea. Hence, a moral responsibility to intervene 
is highly problematic. An established right of humanitarian intervention clearly threatens the 
idea of sovereignty and is in conflict with the UN Charter, which was created as a forum for 
sovereign states to interact. States continue to apply the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention on a case by case basis rather than following a generally accepted norm, or UN 
Security Council decisions. A good example of this practice is the support of the no-fly zone 
by the Arab League prior to the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya. While the Arab League 
generally opposes a right to humanitarian intervention, it supported foreign intervention to 
counteract civil war Libya.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
254 See for example: Evans, G. (2008), Putin Twists UN Policy, in: the Australian, Sept. 2, 2008, available online at  
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Conclusion 
 
Since 1945 international law has developed significantly, but somewhat prudentially. There 
has been an increase in legal regimes governing arms control, human rights, the laws of 
war, and environmental law. However, the expansion of legal regimes and their influence on 
state practice presents a particular problem, one which has become evident in the past 
decade: the collision of norms. There have been numerous examples of the use of force by 
states in support of international norm of human rights protection. While there is much 
speculation as to the shape of the future international system, it is argued that international 
law influences states’ foreign policy decisions while at the same time being shaped by states’ 
changing perceptions of what they perceive as legitimate conduct. Even states that prefer 
to act multilaterally, such as middle powers, have used force in support of a legal claim to 
human rights protection as will be examined in more detail in the case study chapters. To 
suggest that the increased possibility of norm collision in international law can create legal 
grounds for the use of force does not deny the importance of international law for the 
international community of states, but emphasises the legal and political dilemmas resulting 
from such norm collision.  
 
Although human rights literature fails to mention, or refer, to the concept of natural 
law and natural rights,255 the historical review has shown that the move from natural law to 
natural right is significant to the understanding of the current norm confusion over 
humanitarian intervention. The move from natural law to natural right, with its emphasis on 
state sovereignty and individual rights, allowed states to use moral justification for the use 
of force for the protection of populations. The historical review further highlights the 
consistent practice of morally justified intervention since the early sixteenth and seventeenth 
century and its conflict with the state right to sovereign authority since 1648. The legal and 
political scholarship, in contrast to state practice, has always been divided as to whether or 
not a customary right of humanitarian intervention exists. While the legalisation of the 
prohibition on the use of force, from the Briand-Kellogg Pact to the UN Charter, cannot 
                                                          
255 There is no reference to natural law or natural rights in: Lawson, E. (1991), Encyclopedia of Human Rights ǀ 
Simpson, A.W.B. (2001), Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention. ǀ 
The following authors do refer to the natural law tradition: Frohnen, B. (2002), ‘Multicultural Rights? Natural Law and 
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University Press.  
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prevent states from the use of force per se, it does make states justify the use of force by 
reference to international law.  
 
The UN Charter prohibits the use of force by its member states without UN Security 
Council authorization. Yet, the legal prohibition on the use of force for human rights 
protection is at odds with state practice. States have continued to selectively engage in 
humanitarian intervention since the 1990s. Such state practice has been further 
institutionalised in the R2P doctrine, and its partial adoption by the UN General Assembly 
and UN Security Council. Despite controversy about the character of the normalization of 
the use of force for humanitarian intervention, the vast literature available on this issue 
agrees that there is a general move towards it.256 The World Summit in 2005 included an 
affirmation by all states, in the UN General Assembly, of their “willingness to take timely and 
decisive collective action”257 for humanitarian purposes (though only with Security Council 
approval). The UN Security Council explicitly endorsed the concept in Resolution 1674 in 
2006, and applied it with varying degrees of ambiguity in relation to Darfur (Resolution 1706), 
Somalia (Resolution 1814), and Libya (Resolution 1973). Although there is a common 
agreement among states to protect human rights, the problem of identifying a state’s 
underlying motives behind a humanitarian intervention makes it difficult to write law around 
the soft law normalization of humanitarian intervention. While the soft law normalization of 
humanitarian intervention allows the norm to be open for political and legal discourse on 
case by case assessment; nonetheless a legal normalization demands state consent on 
clear definitions of humanitarian intervention. There is, as yet, no widely accepted legal basis 
for humanitarian intervention either within the UN Charter or customary international law. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
256 UNDP (2006), The Human Security Framework and National Human Development Reports, in: Human Development 
Report Office, National Human Development Report Series, NHDR Occasional Paper 5. The security policy paradigm 
shift from national security to the protection of civilians was pushed forward in particular by middle power states and 
has been adapted by the UN during the 1990s (see: Goldberg, E. and Hubert, D. (2001), Case Study: The Security 
Council and the Protection of Civilians, in: McRae, R. and Hubert, D. (2001), Human Security and the New Diplomacy, 
Montreal, p. 223-230.).   
257 UN General Assembly (2005), World Summit Outcome Document, (A/Res/60/1): §9, §119-120, §122, see in 
particular: §138-140.  
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Chapter 3: Normative Approach 
 
“International law, as any normative order, becomes uncertain when too much law exists 
and norms conflict”258. 
 
With the institutionalisation of the UN, international law increasingly governs international 
relations and functions as a key resource for states in their international dealings. There is 
a need to understand the nature of international law to evaluate the practical implications of 
norm collision on state practices of humanitarian intervention as well as the integrity of 
international law itself. As stated above, international law and international relations are 
correlated and influence each other. This is especially true for the development and 
application of international law. Contemporary international law in terms of its application 
revolves around the political interests of the permanent five members of the UN Security 
Council (P5) whose veto frequently operates as a legalisation for the use of force in cases 
of humanitarian crises according to chapter 7 UN Charter. The use of force and a mitigation 
of Article 2(4) UN Charter by a state are only legal in the case of the self-defence of a 
state,259 or in the event in which the UN Security Council declares a situation in a state as a 
threat to international peace according to Article 39 UN Charter.260 Yet, the wide definition 
of Article 2(4) UN Charter and its general prohibition of the use of force increasingly collide 
with the UN interest in the protection of human rights. Article 1 UN Charter lists the protection 
of human rights as one of the key tasks of the UN.  
 
 However, there is no legal regime provided for in the UN Charter that governs 
humanitarian intervention. As such, humanitarian interventions remain one of the most 
controversial areas of international law.261 The absence of a distinct and clear provision for 
the protection of human rights has, amongst other complications, led to inaction, or 
ineffective actions, by the international community. This resulted in the loss of many civilian 
lives. At the same time, an exception to the prohibition on the use of force for the protection 
of human rights abroad is often considered unpredictable, its legal regime ambiguous, and 
its recourse too selective. Proponents of the legality of humanitarian intervention rely on the 
                                                          
258 Kelsen, H. (1960), Reine Rechtslehre [Pure Legal Studies], second edition. | Kelsen, H. (1979), Allgemeine Theorie 
der Normen [General Theory of Norms].  
259 Article 51 UN Charter. 
260 Evans, M. (2010), International Law, third edition, Oxford University Press, p. 130.  
261 Gray, C. (2006), The Use of Force and the International Legal Order, in: Evans, M. (ed.), International Law, second 
edition, chapter 20, Oxford University Press, p. 595. 
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concept of limited sovereignty that developed historically as outlined in the previous chapter. 
As such, a limited use of force is justified for humanitarian intervention on the basis that 
norms, human rights, and the prohibition of the use of force, are meant to protect 
populations, rather than the state as an entity.262 However, contemporary international law 
imposes only limited positive duties on states which hardly allows for an intervention. The 
ILC limits the occasions which require the international community to “cooperate to bring to 
an end through lawful means” serious violations of peremptory norms to cases where a 
“gross or systematic failure by the responsible state” to comply with “a peremptory norm of 
general international law” is evident.263 From a legal perspective, the humanitarian 
intervention debate concerns the justice of the use of force measured by the lawfulness of 
the act. This measurement is not always straightforward, as the lawfulness of an act is 
independent of the moral judgement of an intervention. For example, imagine that, following 
an official invitation by the Iraqi government,  the US intervenes militarily in Iraq to protect 
natural resources in Northern Iraq during an IS insurgency. The intervention further protects 
Iraqi people from genocide by the IS and starvation in the mountains of Northern Iraq. The 
intervention may not have been purely humanitarian but nevertheless lawful.   
 
 This chapter examines the normative foundations of the prohibition of the use of 
force, the recently emerged norms on human rights, and the theoretical approaches adopted 
by lawyers to overcome the norm collision underlying humanitarian intervention. Most 
international law can be objectively interpreted from a normative perspective with regard to 
the sources laid out in Article 38(1) of the statute of the ICJ. The first part of the chapter, 
therefore, draws on traditional legal positivism to look at existing approaches to overcome 
norm collision in international law. In practice, there are political tensions inherent in the 
interpretation of legal norms. The second part, applying ideas from modern legal positivism, 
offers an examination of the politics of norm interpretation and develops some critical 
questions regarding the practical effects of norm collision on state and interstate practice. 
The aim of the second part is to examine the current legal status of humanitarian 
                                                          
262 See for example: Téson, F.R. (2005), Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, Irvington on 
Hudson: New York Transnational Publishers, p. 217: “State Sovereignty makes sense only as a shield for persons to 
organize themselves freely in political communities. A condition for respecting state sovereignty is, therefore, that 
sovereign governments respect human rights”.  
263 International Law Commission (2001), Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN 
GAOR Doc. A/56/10, article 40. ǀ See also: Crawford, J. (2002), The International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries.  
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intervention, and the possibility of normative changes within international law, through the 
interpretative reading of legal documents and analysis of state practice. The last section of 
the chapter looks in more detail at the soft law interpretation of humanitarian intervention.  
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The International Rule of Law 
“The prohibition of the [threat of or] use of force in contemporary international law is 
burdened with uncertainties resulting from the, undoubtedly ambiguous, wording of the 
relevant provisions of the UN Charter, as well as from their unclear relations to each 
other.”264 
 
Due to the general principle of state sovereignty, it is for states to decide what rights they 
will protect and what sanctions they will impose. While some states have rejected the idea 
of a right to intervene,265 the academic world remains divided on the legal status of the use 
of force for humanitarian ends. While a number of scholars recognize the lawfulness of the 
practice,266 others maintain that it violates Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.267 John Locke 
argued in 1680 that “wherever law ends, tyranny begins”.268 International law can be 
understood as a set of norms and practices created and ratified by states to facilitate 
cooperation among states and protect diverse values such as justice and human 
development. Debates about the role, function, purpose, and nature of international norms 
are rich and complex both in the disciplines of international relations and law. The disciplines 
of public international law and international relations overlap in many aspects but remain 
distinct. An important feature of both analyses is the influence of a system. As Slaughter-
Burley states: 
 
 “[i]nternational law and international politics cohabit the same conceptual space. Together 
they comprise the rules and the reality of the international system, an intellectual construct 
that lawyers, political scientists, and policymakers use to describe the world they study and 
                                                          
264 Simma, B. (2002), The Character of the United Nations: A Commentary, second edition, Oxford University Press, p. 
135. 
265 China and Russia are two key examples, in part because of the situations in Tibet and Chechnya, respectively. 
266 Simon, S. (1993), ‘The Contemporary Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention’ in: California Western 
International Law Journal, volume 24, p. 144 “[N]ations do possess the right to intervene unilaterally for humanitarian 
purposes in both rescue and non-rescue cases so long as the intervention is done properly.” | Mertus, J. (2000), 
‘Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from Kosovo’ in: William and Mary Law Review, 
volume 41, issue 5, p. 1748 (suggesting that the U.N. Charter implicitly permits and even mandates humanitarian 
interventions such as NATO’s intervention in Kosovo). | Reisman, W. M. and McDougal, M. (1973), Humanitarian 
Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in Lillich, R.B. (ed.), Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations, Charlottesway, 
p. 167. | Levitt, J. (1998), ‘Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Cases of ECOWAS in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone’ in: Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, p. 375 (“[T]here has been a shift in 
the law de lege ferenda, permitting unilateral humanitarian intervention by groups of states and regional actors in 
internal conflicts.”).  
267 Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter reads:  
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the 
following principles: All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes 
of the United Nations.   
268 Locke, J. (1960), Second Treaties of Government, [original draft in 1680] Cambridge University Press, P. 400.  
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seek to manipulate. As a distinguished group of international lawyers and growing number 
of political scientists have recognized, it makes little sense to study one without the 
other.”269  
 
This means that international law does not exist in a political vacuum, rather it is 
driven by political philosophies and evolves through political interaction. Yet, it is 
conventional and reactive. John Austin defined law as “a simple command by a sovereign 
enforced by sanctions and punishments.”270 He understands rules fitting this theory as 
positive law. He thus argued that international law is law “improperly so called” and is merely 
“positive international morality”.271 As such, the argument is in line with the Hobbesian view 
of international law. The problem for international law is the lack of a sovereign able to 
enforce compliance to the rule of law. In contrast to most national systems, international 
regimes are horizontal and decentralized; which means that all states are perceived as equal 
before the law and that there is no higher authority than states controlling compliance with 
the law. Further, international law can be interpreted as fragmented, which means that it is 
divided into distinct regimes that have no overall coherence and which result in colliding 
norms.  
 
Other critiques refer to the society and law argument. A crucial point of a national 
legal system is the existence of a society which accepts to be bound by the law. Hedly Bull 
states that “common values form a society, if the members conceive themselves to be bound 
by it.”272 He further identifies international law as one of the vital tools of interaction in the 
international system.273 The legalization of international relations through binding treaty 
obligations as well as customary law since the end of the Second World War can be seen 
as influencing states behaviour. This is because almost all states observe almost all 
principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all the time.274 
International law is defined by jurists such as Westlake, Oppenheim, Brierly and Lauterpacht 
as follows: 
 
                                                          
269 Slaughter-Burley, A. (1995), ‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda’ in: American 
Journal of International Law, Volume 205.   
270 Cassese, A. (2010), International Law, Oxford University Press, p. 5. 
271 Austin, J. (1995), The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, in: Rumble E.R. (ed.), Cambridge University Press, pp. 
112, 123, 171, and 175.  
272 Harris, D. (2010), Cases and Materials on International Law, Seventh Edition, Sweet ans Maxwell, p. 5 
273 Bull, H. (1977), The Anarchical Society, London: Macmillan, p. 71.  
274 Henkin, L. (1968), How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, p. 47. 
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“International Law, otherwise called the Law of Nations, is the law of the society of States or 
Nations.”275 
 
“Law of Nations or International Law […] is the name for the body of customary and 
conventional rules which are considered legally binding by civilized States in their 
intercourse with each other.”276  
 
“International Law is the body of rules of conduct, enforceable by external sanctions, which 
confer rights and impose obligations primarily, though not exclusively, upon sovereign states 
and which owe their validity both to the consent of States as expressed in custom and 
treaties and to the fact of the existence of an international community of States and 
individuals. In that sense international law may be defined, more briefly (though perhaps 
less usefully) as the law of the international community.”277 
 
Many of the aspects detailed in the overview of definitions of international law come 
to prominence when the politics of international law and its practical impact on state practice 
are analysed. While there are some globally shared norms such as peace, security, and 
environment protection, ideas of how to achieve these norms vary greatly among states. 
Yet, recent practice confirms that states try to justify their foreign policy decisions in legal 
terms. Political scientists often criticize the legitimacy of international law because it is made 
by state behaviour based mainly on western understandings of law.278 However, from a legal 
perspective it can be seen as legitimate, as states only bind themselves to laws they officially 
agree to be bound by. In fact, the development of international law is based on the principle 
of state sovereignty evident in the UN Charter: ‘The Organization is based on the principle 
of the sovereign equality of all its members.’ A good understanding of the character of public 
international law might therefore be Friedman’s idea of the “international law of co-
operation”279. The legal character of international law should be seen as a continuum. The 
more independently international courts can judge, the more legal the character of 
international law. The legal character of international law does not gradually increase on the 
continuum; rather it is dependent on contextual incidents due to its historical contingency. 
Both, international law and international relations are interpreted in this thesis as living 
                                                          
275 Westlake, J. (1904), International Law, Cambridge University Press, p. 1. 
276 Oppenheim, L. and Roxburg, R. (1920), International Law: A Treaties, Longmans London, p. 1. | Jennings, R. and 
Watts, Sir A. (1996), Oppenheim’s International Law, Oxford University Press, p. 4. In the updated version of 
Oppenheim’s definition international law is defined as: “the body of rules which are legally binding on states in their 
intercourse with each other. These rules are primarily those which govern the relations of states, but states are not 
the only subjects of international law”.  
277 Brierly, J.L. (1963), The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the Law of Peace, ed. by Sir Humphrey Waldock, sixth 
edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 1.  
278 See Dixon, M. (2007), Textbook on International Law, Oxford University Press, pp. 1-21.   
279 Cassese, A. (2001), International Law, Oxford University Press, p. 5. 
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instruments. This means that international law and relations are interrelated and historically 
contingent. This interpretation is in accordance with the definition of the UN Charter given 
by Edward Hambro in 1946:280  
 
“The [UN] Charter, like every written constitution, will be a living instrument. It will be applied 
daily: and every application of the Charter, every use of an Article, implies interpretation: on 
each occasion a decision is involved which may change the existing law and start a new 
constitutional development. A constitutional customary law will grow up and the Charter itself 
will merely form the framework of the Organization which will be filled in by the practice of 
the different organs.” 
  
The doctrine of sources in international law is a useful starting point for the normative 
interpretation of the norm collision between the use of force and human rights. As Edwin 
Egede and Peter Sutch argue, “the specification of sources is intended to determine the 
basis of a rules’ legality.”281 The question of the rank and hierarchy of international rules and 
norms is also important in the analysis of legal norm development. Nevertheless, the legality 
and perceived legitimacy of any rule of international law has to consider and be interpreted 
within the historical context, and social environment.282 Article 38(1) of the statute of the ICJ 
states which sources of the international rule of law are of a binding character and which 
sources the judiciary may refer to when determining advisory opinion or judgment. It says  
 
"the court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as 
are submitted to it shall apply: international conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States; international custom, as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law; general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations; subject to the provisions of article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings 
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for 
determination of rules of law."  
 
Though there is agreement that the main sources of international law do not imply a 
hierarchical relationship, state practice, and judicial opinion generally recognize the 
                                                          
280 Quoted in: Pollux (1946), ‘The interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations’ in: British Yearbook of 
International Law, volume: 23, p. 54 
281 Egede, E. and Sutch, P. (2013), The Politics of International Law and International Justice, Edinburgh University 
Press, p. 47.  
282 Byers, M. (1999), Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary International Law, 
Cambridge University Press, p. 182. | Besson, S. (2010), Theorizing the Sources of International Law, Oxford University 
Press, p. 163. | Kratochwil, F. (2009), Legal Theory and International Law, in: Armstrong, D. (ed.), Routledge Handbook 
of International Law, Routledge, p. 55. | Allott, P. (2000), The Concept of International Law, in: Byers, M. (ed.), The 
Role of Law in International Politics, Oxford University Press, p. 69.  
Colliding Norms in Humanitarian Intervention - PhD Thesis - Birte Ahlhaus 
 
73 | P a g e  
 
existence of superior, peremptory norms that override other norms and bind all states, the 
so called jus cogens.283  
 
Jus cogens obligations, cannot under any circumstance, be derogated. Examples 
include the prohibition of genocide, ethnic cleansing, slavery, racial discrimination, and 
torture. According to Article 53 and 64 of the VCLT, jus cogens is defined as a peremptory 
norm of general international law “accepted and recognised by the international community 
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character”284. The practical implications of jus cogens, with regard to the specific norms on 
the use of force and human rights, for law and politics will be explained in more detail later 
in the chapter. 
 
 Academic writing on international law anticipates that a conflict between two treaty 
norms arises only where a party to two treaties “cannot simultaneously comply with its 
obligations under both treaties”285. The problem with this strict definition is that it does not 
recognize a situation where a permissive norm may conflict with a general rule or, in this 
case, a prohibition. Lawyers tend to use established conflict principles such as the lex 
posterior and lex specialis maxims to judge in cases of colliding norms. Yet, in cases where 
two peremptory norms collide, such established principles might not be helpful in order to 
determine whether a permissive norm actually constitutes a lex posterior or lex specialis 
intended, by the contracting parties, to be the prevailing norm. The following analysis 
examines the definitions adopted in academic accounts of international law; and will explore 
whether an adequate solution to the norm collision of the law on the use of force and the 
norm of human rights protection can be derived from legal theory and, if so, whether a norm 
change can be transposed to international law. In international law, arguments about 
                                                          
283 The terms jus cogens and peremptory norms have the same meaning and can be used interchangeably. According 
to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 53, the tile ‘treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm 
of general international law (jus cogens)’, supports this statement.  
284 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 which entered into force in January 1980. United Nations Treaty 
Series, Volume: 1155, Full text available on: 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.   
285 Jenks, W. (1953), ‘The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties’ in: British Yearbook of International Law, volume 30, p. 426. 
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conflicting norms have been articulated by Pauwelyn,286 Kelsen,287 and Wiederin.288 The 
chapter expands on these legal accounts, taking into account the correlation between 
international relations, in the form of state practice, and international law, in terms of norm 
development.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
286 Pauwelyn, J. (2003) Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of 
International Law, Cambridge University Press. 
287 Kelsen, H. (1962), Derogation, in: Newman, R.A. (ed.), Essays in Jurisprudence in Honor of Roscoe Pound, and 
Kelsen, H. (1979), Allgemeine Theorie der Normen. 
288 Wiederin, (1990), ‘Was ist und welche Konsequenzen hat ein Normkonflikt?‘ in: Rechtstheorie, volume 20, p. 311. 
Colliding Norms in Humanitarian Intervention - PhD Thesis - Birte Ahlhaus 
 
75 | P a g e  
 
Norm Collision in International Law 
 
“The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as a policy of force, such as 
has in the past, given rise to the most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be 
the present defects in the international organization, find a place in international law.”289 
 
The prohibition of the use of force is one of the iconic achievements of the legalization of 
international relations, and has been formally institutionalized in the UN Charter. More 
recently, the judicialisation of human rights and the institutionalization of human rights in the 
UN Charter – and other treaty – based human rights regimes have altered the debate on 
the strict prohibition of the use of force in light of severe humanitarian crisis. This normative 
change is driven by the development of new customary law as well as a subset of non-
derogable and peremptory human rights norms. In order for the use of force for humanitarian 
ends to be legally normalized within international law, it has to reflect a certain status of legal 
normativity. Chesterman, for example, calls the current legal regime of humanitarian 
intervention a “normative vacuum.”290 Legal jurisprudence has long hesitated between rules 
(strict normativity) and standards (normative ambiguity).291 In the context of humanitarian 
intervention, this hesitation may be characterized as one between soft and hard law. Strict 
normativity, or hard law, would entail the adoption of a clear legal framework for the use of 
force. Such a framework would set out the limited instances in which the use of force can 
be conducted lawfully (ad bello) and determine which rules govern its conduct (in bello). The 
strict normativity approach entails the formulation of a clear norm of the use of force, thereby 
reinforcing the normative regime currently in place. The proponents of codification support 
the view that formulating a formal doctrine would increase the level of deterrence, while 
promoting fairness and norm-internalization. It is hoped that, with the codification of the use 
of force for humanitarian ends, states would modify their behaviour to comply with the new 
norm, creating a predictable pattern of behaviour over time.292 Normative ambiguity, or soft 
                                                          
289 International Court of Justice (1949), Corfu Channel Case, UK vs. Albania, ICJ Reports paragraph 4 at p. 35.  
290Chesterman, S. (2001), Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, Oxford University 
Press, p. 227.  
291Kratochwil, F. (2000), How Do Norms Matter? in: Byers, M. (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in 
International Law and International Relations, p. 43. Kratochwil associates this question with the first two levels of the 
legal order: “The first level involves choices between specific rules and more general, and therefore vague, standards. 
The utilization of strict rules safeguards procedural uniformity; the invocation of discretionary standards results in 
more situation-sensitive decisions, but does so on an ad hoc basis. Ambiguity also enters at a second level of doctrines 
designed to resolve first-level disputes. Doctrines, contrary to the hopes one might place in them, are only able to 
provide us with a list of counterpoised functional arguments for the applicability of rules and standards without, 
however, being able to provide a solution to the new dilemma.”   
292 This argument rests on the observations that states generally try to justify their action through legal standards, 
suggesting that legal standards do affect state behavior, at least to some extent.  
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law, in contrast, would maintain the flexible and ambiguous status quo293 that enables states 
to have recourse to ad hoc decisions on an intervention. It holds that the use of force for 
humanitarian ends should not be governed by too clear a norm. Richard Falk writes, 
somewhat ambiguously, “it remains beneficial to maintain maximum and flexible support for 
the alleviation of suffering and the establishment of peace, and thus abiding by a highly 
selective, and inconsistent, doctrine of humanitarian intervention.”294 Normative ambiguity 
comprises a variety of perspectives, each of which dismisses the value of elaborating a rigid 
rule of unilateral humanitarian intervention.  
 
 Normative ambiguity does not mean that there is no normative framework. It is the 
degree of normativity that distinguishes it from strict normativity. Yet, the idea of normative 
ambiguity is vague and applied to the norm collision inherent in humanitarian intervention 
means that a humanitarian response to a civil conflict is subject to power politics and the 
interest of great powers. Although there is not a specific international legal norm prohibiting 
the use of force for humanitarian intervention, a constellation of norms including laws on the 
use of force, laws of war, decisions of international tribunals295, doctrinal and academic 
writings, condemns the use of force for humanitarian or any other ends. The question 
remains, though, whether it is feasible to have a norm change on the use of force in order 
to overcome norm collision.  
 
 This thesis argues that the use of force for human rights protection abroad has 
developed into a state of normative ambiguity, or more specifically soft law, based on 
significant yet selective state practice. Such normative change in state practice and the 
incorporation of human rights into international law result in a norm collision between the 
traditional law on the use of force and the recent norm of human rights protection. What 
needs to be analysed is how such norm change affects the integrity of international law and 
state practice. In legal terms, norms have the fundamental functions of obligating, prohibiting 
and permitting.296  
                                                          
293 The status quo is described by Michael Glennon as “a realm in which expectations have been confused, 
predictability has been lessened, and the contours of law have been rendered uncertain.” In: Glennon, M. (2001), 
Limits of Law: Prerogatives of Power, P. 85.  
294 Falk, R. (1995), ‘Complexities of Humanitarian Intervention, a New World Order Challenge’ in: Michigan Journal of 
International Law, p. 510.  
295 Such as the Case of Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua versus U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 135 (June 27).   
296 Röhl, K. F. (1994), Allgemeine Rechtslehre: Ein Lehrbuch, p. 192.  
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 However, according to Kelsen, derogation is also a specific function of norms.297 The 
recent increase in colliding norms, especially between the traditional rule on the use of force 
and the more recent norm on human rights protection can be attributed to several factors. 
The recent increase in the number of international courts and tribunals, together with the 
expansion of areas regulated by international law, have led to increased fragmentation of 
international law. Within in the context of international law, the issue of overcoming colliding 
norms is usually dealt with through the interpretation of legal documents. Colliding norms 
are a source of uncertainty in international law and threaten the integrity of the international 
legal system. Uncertainty arises in the tension between the choices of compliance with two 
incompatible norms which both demand equal observation in a specific situation. The 
theoretical argument on the definition of colliding norms has been part of an ILC study on 
the fragmentation of international law in 2006 and in particular Martti Koskenniemi’s 
conclusions drawn from that study.  
 
 Traditional legal scholarship generally draws upon hierarchical approaches or 
systematic integration to overcome norm conflict. Yet, these traditional principles are often 
used in a legal vacuum, excluding references to political and social realities or historical 
facts. This thesis, therefore, adopts an interdisciplinary approach in order to examine the 
correlation between international law and international relations within the context of 
colliding norms. Further, this thesis aims to discover if a practical resolution to the problem 
of colliding norms may be achieved. Within the context of colliding norms of the use of force 
and human rights protection there is a collision between a prohibition and an obligation. With 
both norms at the heart of the UN Charter, the definition of colliding norms also has to 
contend with the aspect of collision of two peremptory norms. 
 
  
                                                          
297 Kelsen, H. (1962), Derogation, originally published in: Newman, R.A. (ed.), Essays in Jurisprudence in Honor of 
Roscoe Pound, pp. 339–361. 
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a. Hierarchy Approach  
Though there is agreement that the main sources of international law do not imply a 
hierarchical relationship, state practice and judicial opinion generally recognize the 
existence of superior, peremptory norms of jus cogens.298 According to Article 53 and 64 of 
the VCLT, jus cogens is defined as a peremptory norm of general international law “accepted 
and recognised by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which 
no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character”299. Interestingly the hierarchy implied in the 
concept of jus cogens is based upon the character of a norm rather than the formal source 
from which the norms originate (which is the source of hierarchy in Article 38 ICJ Statute).300 
According to the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility,301 
some breaches of international law not only trigger a right, but also a certain obligation of 
states to react to such breaches of international law. The ILC further states that breaches of 
peremptory norms allow for a positive obligation of states to ‘to cooperate to bring the serious 
breach to an end through lawful means’302 and a negative obligation of states not to accept 
a breach of peremptory norms as lawful and not to support a state in maintaining the breach 
such a norm.303 Although the notion of jus cogens has been formally legalized in 
jurisprudence,304 its practical application in cases of norm conflict has remained limited.305 
The lack of practical application of jus cogens norms by international judicial bodies is due 
to limited mechanisms to enforce consequences of breaches of jus cogens norms. For 
example, judgements regarding the jus cogens prohibition of torture, usually refer to the 
                                                          
298 The terms jus cogens and peremptory norms have the same meaning and can be used interchangeably. According 
to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 53, the tile ‘treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm 
of general international law (jus cogens)’, supports this statement.  
299 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 which entered into force in January 1980. United Nations Treaty 
Series, Volume: 1155, Full text available on: 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.   
300300 International Law Commission, Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, Fragmentation 
Report, paragraph 224.  
301Crawford, J. (2002), The International Law Commissions’ Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text, and 
Commentaries, Cambridge University Press.  
302 ILC Article 41(1)). 
303 ILC Article 41(2).  
304 See for example: Tzanakopulos, A. (2012), Human Rights and United Nations Security Council Measures, in: De Wet, 
E. and Vidmar, J. (eds.), Hierarchy in International Law: The Place of Human Rights, Oxford University Press. ǀ 
International Law Commission, Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising 
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, Fragmentation Report, 
paragraph 11 / 129 / 152.  
305 De Wet, E. and Vidmar, J. (2013), ‘Conflicts between International Paradigms: Hierarchy versus Systematic 
Integration’ in: Global Constitutionalism, p. 4. 
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absolute prohibition rather than to the peremptory nature of the norm itself.306 In general, 
international judicial bodies have avoided significant references to jus cogens norms in the 
context of colliding norms.  
 
 Apart from jus cogens, the UN provides a hierarchical norm conflict approach in 
Article 103 of the UN Charter. By virtue of Article 103, an obligation under the Charter 
prevails over an obligation arising out of any other international agreement. In contrast to 
the value-based hierarchy of jus cogens, Article 103 of the UN Charter provides a source-
based hierarchy, in accordance with Article 38 ICJ Statute. As such, Article 103 of the UN 
Charter is not necessarily a rule of hierarchy as it merely holds that compliance with the UN 
Charter may lead to the non-application of other rules of international law. The International 
Law Commission confirmed this interpretation by referring to Article 103 UN Charter in its 
Fragmentation Report as “a means for securing that Charter obligations can be performed 
effectively and not [as a means for] abolishing other treaty regimes”307. Further, as evident 
from the judgement in the Al Jedda case, Article 103 of the UN Charter is often regarded as 
substantive for the protection of international peace and security.308  
 
 In 2007 the Swiss Federal Supreme Court ruled in the Nada case that UN Security 
Council decisions took precedence over human rights norms, in this case the right to a fair 
hearing.309 The court based its judgement on the interpretation of Article 103 UN Charter 
that normative hierarchy allows UN Security Council decision to prevail over human rights. 
This judgement was later reversed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)310. The 
ECtHR argued that the norm conflict between the UN Security Council resolution and human 
rights obligations, in this instance, did not constitute a norm conflict in which compliance with 
one norm leads to the breach of another. According to the ECtHR the Security Council 
resolution could have been interpreted in a human rights friendly way. Yet, the ECtHR 
stayed clear of a general argument that the UN Security Council cannot demand a violation 
                                                          
306 Van der Wilt, H. (2012), On the Hierarchy between Extradition and Human Rights, in: De Wet, E. and Vidmar, J. 
(eds.), Hierarchy in International Law: The Place of Human Rights, Oxford University Press. 
307 International Law Commission, Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, Fragmentation 
Report, paragraph 335.  
308 Statement by Lord Bingham of Cornhill (2007), R (on the application of Al Jedda) versus Secretary of State Defence, 
UKHL 58, 1 AC 332, ILDC 832, para. 34.  
309 Youssef Nada versus State Secretary for Economic Affairs and Federal Department of Economic Affairs, 
Administrative Appeal Judgement, BGE 133 II 450, IA 45 / 2007; ILDC 461, 14 November 2007. Paragraph 6.2.  
310 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (2012), case of Nada versus Switzerland.  
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of human rights.311 Such referrals to Article 103 of the UN Charter regarding normative 
hierarchy as an interpretative technique to solve norm conflicts remains limited in judicial 
practice. Despite formal acceptance, the practical application of jus cogens norms and 
Article 103 of the UN Charter in cases of norm conflict between two incontestable norms of 
international law remains restricted and uncertain. Most judicial bodies either refer to 
harmonious interpretation, or avoid any recognition of a norm conflict if possible. 
 
 
  
                                                          
311 De Wet, E. and Vidmar, J. (2013), ‘Conflicts between International Paradigms: Hierarchy versus Systematic 
Integration’ in: Global Constitutionalism, p. 13. 
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b. Systematic Integration 
Due to the horizontal nature and increased fragmentation of international law, various 
judicial bodies further developed paradigms of systematic integration to interpret norm 
conflict. The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and general principles of 
international law provide traditional conflict rules such as lex specialis derogat legi generali 
and lex posterior derogat legi priori. The principle of lex specialis means that, in case of two 
conflicting norms addressing the same subject matter, the more specific norm will prevail. 
Similarly the principle of lex posterior means that, in case of two conflicting norms of the 
same subject matter, the later norm will prevail. Yet, judicial practice has shown that neither 
of the two principles is able to solve the norm conflict of two incontestable norms of 
international law. The central problem lies in the requirement of norms that relate to the 
same subject matter. The norm conflict between the prohibition of the use of force and the 
problem of human rights is often defined as an inter-regime conflict in which norms affecting 
different subject matter collide.  
 
 However, it can also be argued that both norms form part of the same treaty, the UN 
Charter, which allows the interpretation of the norm conflict with the lex posterior principle. 
As evident from the judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,312 certain treaty 
provisions can have norm creating effect and lead to the formation of customary international 
law. Although the argument is highly controversial, a later norm of customary law, e.g. on 
the protection of populations abroad, should, in principle, be able to change the wide reading 
of Article 2(4) UN Charter. State practice may, therefore, lead to the development of 
customary international legal exceptions to the UN Charter regulating the use of force. The 
idea that customary international law may operate to supplement UN Charter norms was 
recognized by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case,313 and was reaffirmed 
in the Oil Platforms case.314 Evidence of a normative change to the UN Charter through 
customary law can be seen in the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine by the 
UN General Assembly in 2005, which shifted the intent of the UN Charter from a singular 
focus on the protection of peace and security between states to a broader focus that includes 
the protection of human rights. Yet, it can also be argued that the UN Charter by virtue of its 
                                                          
312 International Court of Justice (1968), North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Federal Republic of Germany versus the 
Netherlands), Judgment of 20 February 1969.  
313 Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 94–7. 
314 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Merits) [2003] ICJ Rep 1, [42]. 
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Article 103, or with respect to its normative and constitutional content deserves the 
attribution of a higher legal value. As such, the traditional wide reading of Article 2(4) UN 
Charter cannot be changed through emerging customary law on the external protection of 
human rights.  
 
 The VCLT further offers a principle of systematic integration of conflicting norms in 
Article 31(1)(c) VCLT. According to Article 31(1)(c) VCLT, any relevant rules of international 
law applicable to the norm conflict have to be considered, such as treaties, customary 
international law, and general principles of international law. More specifically, it demands 
an interpretation “whereby international obligations are interpreted by reference to their 
normative environment”.315 The idea of contextual interpretation reflects the principle of 
systemic integration.316 Article 31(3)(c) VCLT prohibited in its original wording the element 
of contemporaneity in the interpretation of treaties. The provisionally adopted text stated, 
inter alia, that the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of a treaty was to be determined 
“in the light of the general rule of international law in force at the time of its conclusion.”317 
Therefore, the provision was intended to reflect the general principle that “a judicial fact must 
be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it, and not of the law in force at the 
time when the dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled.”318 The question arises as 
to whether the UN Charter is to be interpreted in the light of the rules of international law in 
force at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, or those in force at the time of the 
interpretation. Although the principle of systematic integration according to Article 31(3)(c) 
VCLT is not often referred to explicitly in judicial decision, it is regularly applied.319 
 
                                                          
315 International Law Commission (ILC) (2006), Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, 
Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.832,13 April 2006, p. 413.  
316 McLachlan, C. (2005), ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention’ in:  
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, volume 54, p. 279; see also Combacau, Jean and Sur, Serge (2004), Droit 
International Public, Paris, Montchrestien, p. 175. Also one of the first to write on the topic of Article 31(3)(c) was 
French, D. (2006), ‘Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules’ in: International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, volume 55 , p. 281. 
317 Sinclair, I. (1984), The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, Manchester University Press, p. 136. 
318 Permanent Court of Arbitration, (1928), Island of Palmas Arbitration, Reports of International Arbitral Awards. vol. 
2 p. 845. │ Sinclair, I. (1984), The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, Manchester University Press, p. 139. 
319 See for example the Al Adsani Case. ǀ International Law Commission (ILC) (2006), Fragmentation of International 
Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission, paragraph 174.  
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 The International Law Commission (ILC) study on the fragmentation of international 
law and the interpretation of colliding norms defined systematic integrity of norms in 
international law as taking “into account, together with the context [of the treaty …] any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”320 In the 
context of the study on norm collision between the use of force and human rights protection, 
the principle of systematic integrity argues that both norms are part of international law and 
they need to be construed in such a way that they do not undermine the general integrity of 
international law. This argument is in line with the general conclusion drawn by the ILC to 
avoid collisions of norms and apply the principle of harmonization: “It is a generally accepted 
principle that when several norms bear on a single issue they should, to the extent possible, 
be interpreted so as to give rise to a single set of compatible obligations.”321 Yet, as state 
practice shows, there are instances, such as the collision between the traditional prohibition 
of the threat and use of force and the recent norm on human rights protection, which might 
not be interpreted in harmony. Literal interpretations of norm conflict in international law, 
based on hierarchy and systematic integration approaches by judicial bodies, rarely offer a 
general solution but rather reflect conflict avoidance or case by case decisions. As such it is 
ultimately up to a judicial or executive body, in this case the UN Security Council, to 
determine, on a case by case basis, the extent to which human rights norms can override 
the prohibition of the use of force.  
  
The ILC study offers a theoretical approach to the problem of colliding norms, pointing 
out the need for the systematic integrity of norms in international law. Systematic integrity 
means that the interpretation of colliding norms in international law shall take “into account, 
together with the context [of the treaty …] any relevant rules of international law applicable 
in the relations between the parties.”322 In the context of the study of norm collision between 
the use of force and human rights protection, the principle of systematic integrity argues that 
both norms are part of international law and they need to be construed in a way that does 
not undermine the general integrity of international law. This argument is in line with the 
general conclusion drawn by the ILC to avoid collisions of norms and apply the principle of 
                                                          
320 International Law Commission (ILC) (2006), Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, 
Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.832,13 April 2006. 
321 International Law Commission (ILC) (2006), Report on the Work of its Fifty-Eights Session (1 May – 9 June 2006), UN 
General Assembly Official Records, Fifty-Fifth Session, Supplement Number 10, UNGA (A/56/10), p. 408.  
322 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) (VCLT), article 31(3)(c).  
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harmonization: “It is a generally accepted principle that when several norms bear on a single 
issue they should, to the extent possible, be interpreted so as to give rise to a single set of 
compatible obligations.”323 Yet, as state practice shows, there are instances, such as the 
collision between the traditional prohibition of the use of force and the recent norm on human 
rights protection, which might not be interpreted in harmony. Since the 1990s, there have 
been increased attempts to overcome the norm collision inherent in humanitarian 
intervention through a legitimizing discourse. The most prominent examples include: 
 
 1992 Boutros Boutros-Ghali: An Agenda For Peace 
Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacemaking 
 2000 Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report) 
 2001 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
The Responsibility to Protect 
 2004 High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
A More Secure World – Our Shared Responsibility 
 2005 Kofi Annan: In Larger Freedom, Towards Development, Security and  
Human Rights for All. 
 
 Agenda for Peace Brahimi Report ICISS R2P-Doctrine 
Human Rights 
vs. State 
Sovereignty  
Human rights and the 
prohibition of the use of 
force are seen as equal 
rights. 
Limitation of State 
Sovereignty in case 
of Human Rights 
abuses.  
Human Rights are seen 
as an essential part of 
State Sovereignty.  
Right of 
Intervention 
No Not mentioned Right of Intervention by 
the UN 
Responsibility to 
Intervene 
No Not mentioned Not yet a responsibility 
but right to intervene.  
Use of Force Use of force as a last 
resort, emphasis on 
prevention. 
Use of force as a 
last resort. 
Use of force as a last 
resort, need to improve 
prevention methods.  
Approach Prevention Not mentioned Incorporation of the 
criteria mentioned in the 
just war theory. 
Efficiency Efficiency is subject to 
the decision making of 
the UN.  
Efficiency is subject 
to the decision 
making of the UN. 
Efficiency is subject to 
the decision making of 
the UN. 
                                                          
323 International Law Commission (ILC) (2006), Report on the Work of its Fifty-Eights Session (1 May – 9 June 2006), UN 
General Assembly Official Records, Fifty-Fifth Session, Supplement Number 10, UNGA (A/56/10), p. 408.  
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Although the discourse papers highlight the moral and practical implications following 
from the norm collision inherent in international law, the studies do not provide a workable 
legal solution to overcome norm collision in practice. In contrast, the ICISS study of the R2P 
doctrine emphasizes the controversial solution to the norm conflict where the UN Security 
Council holds the power to decide on the norm application. While the UN Security Council 
has increasingly used its Chapter VII power to authorize humanitarian intervention, and 
hence prioritize the protection of human rights over the prohibition of the use of force,324 
such authorization has been ambiguous and remains subject to the interests of the P5 
members of the UN Security Council. The following section examines in more detail the 
collision of norms, and their interpretation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
324 see appendix for a list of UN Security Council authorized interventions since the 1990s in comparison to unilateral 
and non-intervened cases of humanitarian crises.  
Colliding Norms in Humanitarian Intervention - PhD Thesis - Birte Ahlhaus 
 
86 | P a g e  
 
The Collision of the rule on the use of force and human rights  
 
“Law cannot and does not refuse to solve a problem because it is new and unprovided for; 
it meets such situations by resorting to a principle, outside formulated law … appealing to 
reason as the justification for its decision.”325 
 
Thomas Hobbes described the use of force as a feature of the anarchical, pre-political nature 
of the international ‘state of nature’ arguing that this ‘state of nature’ is a “war of everyman 
against everyman”326. Morgenthau portrayed the realist approach to war as a struggle for 
power, stating that states are “continuously preparing for, actively involved in, or recovering 
from organised violence in form of war”.327 Chapter 2 outlined the historical development of 
the prohibition of the use of force from a narrow prohibition which allows the use of force for 
a ‘just cause’328, to a restriction of the use of force in the Covenant of the League of 
Nations329 to a wide prohibition of the use and threat of force under the current UN Charter. 
According to Brierly, the norm conflict in international law could be solved by overcoming 
strict legal positivism and allowing for a legal interpretation, considering present social and 
moral circumstances. The central provision regarding the use of force in international 
relations is currently found in Article 2(4) UN Charter: 
 
“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purpose of the United Nations.” 
 
 The meaning of Article 2(4) UN Charter prohibits the unilateral use of force by a state 
against any other state. The intention goes along with the initial context and purpose of the 
UN Charter to prevent further recourse to war.330 The prohibition further prohibits state 
authority from declaring war331 by assigning the sole authority for a legal use of force to the 
UN Security Council. The lawfulness of UN Security Council authorized, and unauthorized, 
humanitarian intervention has long been a subject of academic discussion, stimulating a 
                                                          
325 Brierly, J.L. (1949), The Law of Nations, Clarendon Press, p. 24. 
326 Hobbes, T. (1968), Leviathan, in Macpherson, C.B. (ed.), Penguin Books, London, p. 187. 
327 Morgenthau, H. (1985), Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace, University of Michigan Press, p. 
52.  
328 Kelsen, H. (1945), General Theory of Law and State, in: Clarke, N.J. (ed.), The Law Book Exchange, p. 331. | Dinstein, 
Y. (2011), War, Aggression and Self-Defense, fifth edition, Cambridge University Press, p. 65.  
329 Egede, E. and Sutch, P. (2013), The Politics of International Law and International Justice, Edinburgh University 
Press, p. 260.  
330 Chesterman, S. (2001), Just War or Just Peace, Oxford University Press, p. 222. ǀ Cassese, A. (1986), The current 
legal regulation of the use of force, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 4. 
331 On just war theories see: Michael Walzer; John Rawls, and Jürgen Habermas (among others).  
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debate over whether or not a new norm of customary international law has emerged. It 
depends on how international law is interpreted, by whom it is evoked, and for what purpose. 
International law provides an international political order. Whether it is treaty, custom, or soft 
law, it is decided on by governments and diplomats. This means that sanctions are hard to 
impose and normative change is subject to the interests of states. Evans makes the point 
that: "So long as international law was designed to facilitate international order it was 
circumscribed in key ways: states were the political subjects and agents of international law; 
international law was concerned with the regulation of inter-state relations: and the scope of 
international law was confined to the question of order."332 In sum, whether or not 
international law is influential, is determined by state practice. The enforcement, following 
the spirit of international law, primarily rests with the states. There is no higher body that 
supersedes the member states with regard to international law.  
 
 The controversy over the legal status of humanitarian intervention, which is based on 
the norm collision between human rights and the prohibition of the use of force, further 
relates to different interpretations of the UN Charter provisions. According to Farer, there 
are two contrasting legal interpretations on the issue of humanitarian intervention: the 
classical approach and the realist approach. Within the classical interpretation, parties to a 
treaty “had an original intention which can be discovered primarily through textual analysis 
and which, in the absence of some unforeseen change in circumstances, must be respected 
until the agreement has expired according to its terms or been replaced by mutual 
consent.”333 In contrast, the realist interpretation argues that, the “[t]exts themselves are but 
one among a large number of means of ascertaining original intention”. Moreover, realists 
argue that original intention has no intrinsic authority: “The past is relevant only to the extent 
that it helps us to identify currently prevailing attitudes about the property of a government’s 
acts and omissions.”334 While the classical interpretation has the strongest foundation in 
international law doctrine and has been favoured by both the ICJ335 and the VCLT336, this 
                                                          
332 Evans, M. D. (2009), International Law Documents, ninth edition, Oxford University Press, p. 35. 
333 Farer, T. (1991), An inquiry into the legitimacy of Humanitarian intervention, in Damrosch, L. and Scheffer, D. (eds), 
Law and Force in the New International order, Boulder: Westview Press, p. 185. 
334 Farer, T. (1991), An inquiry into the legitimacy of Humanitarian intervention, in Damrosch, L. and Scheffer, D. (eds), 
Law and Force in the New International order, Boulder: Westview Press, p. 186. 
335 See for example ICJ judgement in the Fisheries Jurisdiction, ICJ reports (1973), p. 18. 
336 Sinclair, I. (1984), The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, Manchester University Press, p. 153. | Brownlie, I. 
(1998), Principles of Public International law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, fifth edition, p. 630.  
 
Colliding Norms in Humanitarian Intervention - PhD Thesis - Birte Ahlhaus 
 
88 | P a g e  
 
thesis adopts a more contingent interpretation, arguing that international law is a living 
instrument, which considers in its application aspects of prevailing historical and social 
circumstances.  
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Relevant Rules: Article 2(4) UN Charter 
 
The broad prohibition upon the threat or use of force in art. 2(4) UN Charter is described as 
the “cardinal rule” of international law and “cornerstone” of peaceful relations among 
states,337 and generally held not only to be treaty law and customary law but also jus cogens 
which has been acknowledged by the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case.338 Louis Henkin described 
the UN Charter’s prohibition of the use of force as “the principal norm of international law of 
[the 20th] century”.339 He further observed that “Article 2(4) clearly intended to outlaw resort 
to traditional war, but the framers obviously excluded also other uses of force … whether or 
not in declared war, whether or not in all-out hostilities.”340 The text of the UN Charter341, its 
drafting history,342 and the writings of jurists343 suggest that Article 2(4) UN Charter is 
generally understood to be comprehensive. This interpretation has been reaffirmed in the 
1970 UN General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and the 1974 Definition of Aggression. Article 2(4) UN Charter has also 
been the subject of many analyses and judicial scrutiny, including in the ICJ decision in the 
Nicaragua case in 1986 and the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons.344  
 
 There are only two exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force provided for in the 
UN Charter. The first, formed as a rule which gives the exception a strong legal character, 
is the right to self-defence under Article 51 UN Charter as a response to an armed attack. 
Any recourse to self-defence by a state has to be reported to UN Security Council and has 
to meet the requirements of the Webster Formula which was set out in the Nicaragua case, 
that is “a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and 
                                                          
337 Dixon, M. and McCorquodale, R. (1991), Cases and materials in international law, Blackstone press limited, third 
edition, p. 553. 
338 International Court of Justice (1986), Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
versus the United States of America). Merits, Judgement, p. 14, paragraph 190.  
339 Henkin, L. (1991), Use of Force: Law and US Policy, in: Henkin, L.; Hoffman, S. and Kirkpatrick, J. (eds.), Right versus 
Might: International Law and the Use of Force, second edition, Council on Foreign Relations, p. 37. 
340 Henkin, L. (1979), How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, Columbia University Press.  
341 Kelsen, H. (1950), The Law of the United Nations: A critical analysis of its fundamental problems, London: Stevens 
and Sons, p. 109. 
342 Goodrich, L. and Hambro, E. (1949), Charter of the United Nations, second edition, Columbia University Press, p. 
106. 
343 Sørensen, M. (1960), ‘Principes de Droit International Public’ in: Recueil des Cours de l’Academie de Droit 
International de la Haye, volume 3. ǀ Simma, B. (1999), ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’ in: 
European Journal of International Law, volume 10.  
344 International Court of Justice (ICJ) (1996), Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons.  
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no moment for deliberation”345. The second, formed as a standard which leaves the legal 
status open for interpretation, is an authorization to use force under Article 42 UN Charter; 
following a determination by the UN Security Council regarding Article 39 UN Charter that a 
threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression has occurred. Due to the authority of 
the UN Security Council on the decision to use force, Antonio Cassese observes that, “the 
Charter enforces a collective security system that hinges on a rule, collective action, and an 
exception, self-defence.”346 Yet, there is a further, albeit legally controversial third exception 
to the prohibition:  the Uniting for Peace Resolution, which enables the UN General 
Assembly in case of a breach of peace or act of aggression to recommend military action 
should the Security Council be paralysed due to a lack of agreement. In practice, however, 
there has been little reference to the third exception.  
 
 Further, the prohibition of the use of force refers to inter-state conflicts.347 There is 
disagreement whether or not the prohibition also refers to intra-state conflicts and allows the 
use of force for humanitarian intervention. Due to the change in the nature of conflicts over 
the years, moving from inter-state to intra-state conflicts, the literal interpretation of Article 
2(4) UN Charter has to include contextual implications. Something that had not been 
envisaged by the drafters of the UN Charter. The UN Charter does allow for Article 2(4) UN 
Charter to be interpreted in such a way as to respond to new conflicts, but it should be 
avoided as it narrows the prohibition to an extent that undermines the original intention of 
the Article. To find that middle way of interpreting Article 2(4) UN Charter in light of its 
collision with modern norms of coercive human rights protection is therefore difficult.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
345 International Court of Justice (1986), Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
versus the United States of America). Merits, Judgement. 
346 Cassese A. (1999), ‘Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian 
Countermeasures in the World Community?’ in: European Journal of International Law, volume: 10, p. 24. 
347 Gray, C. (ed.), The Use of Force and the International Legal Order, in: Evans, M.D. (2010), International Law, third 
edition, Oxford University Press, p. 615.  
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The Literal Interpretation of Article 2(4) UN Charter 
 
Most literal interpretations in international law focus on the condition added to the prohibition 
of the use of force that, “all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”348 In addition, 
one of the primary principles in international law is the inviolability of the territorial 
sovereignty of individual states.349 This means that the existing government is supreme 
within its territory, and no external force may interfere with that supremacy. The state can 
exert its influence, in any manner, over all persons and property within its boundaries.350 
According to Article 2(7) UN Charter,351 other states must respect this territorial sovereignty.  
 
 However, the justification of a humanitarian intervention has been selectively, yet 
repeatedly, used by states when another state perpetrates human rights abuses against its 
citizens, from the just war theory to the recent doctrine of a responsibility to protect. The 
prohibition of the use of force to intervene in another state has been supported by 
declarations made by the UN General Assembly as well as case decisions by the ICJ. In 
1949, the UN General Assembly passed resolution 375,352 on the Rights and Duties of 
States, followed by the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations353 and the 1987 Declaration 
on the Non-Use of Force.354 The ICJ discussed and judged the meaning of “territorial 
integrity and political independence of any state” in the Corfu Channel Case in a wide 
sense,355 as they feared a narrow interpretation might lead to a misuse of the norm. In fact, 
                                                          
348 Article 2(4) UN Charter, emphasis added. 
349 Shaw, M. (1991), International Law, third edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 276: “State 
governments are traditionally free to act without restraint within their borders. Id. "International law is based on the 
concept of the state. The state in its turn lies upon the foundation of sovereignty, which expresses internally the 
supremacy of the governmental institutions and externally the supremacy of the state as a legal person." 
350 Starke, J.G. (1984), Introduction to International Law, ninth edition, London: Butterwirths Publishers, p. 152. 
351 Article 2(7) UN Charter: "[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene 
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." 
352 UN General Assembly, Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, annexed to UNGA Res 375.  
353 UN General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, annexed to Un GA Res. 2625, adopted 
on 24 October 1970.  
354 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the 
Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, UN Doc. A/Res/42/22, adopted on 18 November 1987.  
355 See the ICJ judgment on the Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom versus Albania), Judgment of 9th April 1949 
(merits), ICJ Report (1949), p. 4. The case is based on an incident in which an Albanian battery fired at a British warship 
which was sweeping mines in the Corfu Channel. Albania claimed that the British warship violated Albania’s 
sovereignty by passing through their waters. The British claimed that the warship neither threatened the territorial 
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the ICJ noted that respect for the territorial sovereignty of a state is an essential foundation 
of international relations.356 The decision by the ICJ, on the wide interpretation of Article 2(4) 
UN Charter, is further reinforced by UN resolutions and declarations. In 1965, the UN 
General Assembly adopted a Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention.357 The UN 
General Assembly declares, in this declaration, that all forms of intervention in the internal 
or external affairs of states are prohibited. Interventions in the domestic or external affairs 
of states are, furthermore, described in paragraph 3 of the declaration as against the spirit 
and purpose of the UN. The 1965 General Assembly Declaration is followed and supported 
by the 1970 Declaration on the Principles of International Law,358 which emphasizes and 
repeats both Article 2(4) UN Charter and the prohibition of interventions in states internal 
and external affairs as stated in the 1967 Declaration. The final provision in Article 2(4), “or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”359, was again not 
intended to restrict the interpretation of the overall article, but rather to reinforce the 
prohibition on the use of force.360 Furthermore, the travaux préparatoires of the Charter did 
not envision a narrow interpretation because this would open more uncertainties in state 
relations. On the contrary, Article 2(4) was meant to cover all legal rights of a state, 
especially because it was also meant to give specific guarantees to small states.361  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
integrity nor the political independence of Albania. The ICJ concluded that the British violated the sovereign rights of 
Albania.   
356 ICJ judgment on the Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom versus Albania), Judgment of 9th April 1949 (merits), ICJ 
Report (1949), p. 35.  
357 UN General Assembly Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the 
Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, GA Res. 2131 (XX), adopted 21st December 1965.  
358 UN General Assembly Declaration on the Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA res. 2625, adopted 24th October 
1970.  
359 Charter of the United Nations, article 2(4).  
360 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their 
Independence and Sovereignty GA Resolution 2131 (XX), adopted 21 December 1965   
361 Brownlie, I. (1963), International Law and the Use of Force by States, New York and London: Oxford University 
Press, p. 267-268   
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The Contextual Interpretation of Article 2(4) UN Charter 
In addition to the literal interpretation offered above, Article 2(4) UN Charter must be 
examined in the light of any “subsequent agreement” or contexts in which the norm is applied 
in consideration of other “relevant rules of international law.” Considering only the UN 
documents mentioned above on the principle of non-intervention, the conclusion must be 
that humanitarian interventions are in breach of international law as well as with the intent 
of the UN Charter.  
 
 However, following the increased awareness for humanitarian crises since the 1990s 
the ICJ proved itself more open to changes in state practice and customary international 
law. In the 1986 Nicaragua Case362 the ICJ judged that customary law continues to exist 
alongside treaty law and admitted that international law is not static, but state practice 
accompanied with opinio juris can change it: 
 
“Reliance by a state on a novel right or any unprecedented exception to the principle [of 
non-intervention] might, if shared in principle by other states, tend towards a modification of 
customary international law”363 
 
More specifically, after analysing the customary and treaty law provisions on non-
intervention and the permissible use of force, the Court reached the conclusion that non-
intervention “forbids all States or group of States to intervene directly or indirectly in internal 
or external affairs of other States.”364 The ICJ further commented in the Nicaragua case that 
“[t]he UN Charter…by no means covers the whole area of the regulation of the use of force 
in international relations”365 and that international law has developed under the influence of 
the UN Charter to such an extent that “a number of rules contained in the Charter have 
acquired a status independent of it.”366 Following the ICJ decision in the Nicaragua Case, 
but not necessarily based on it, states seemed more willing to collectively intervene in cases 
                                                          
362 ICJ Judgment (1986), Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua versus the United 
States), ICJ Report.  
363 ICJ Judgment (1986), Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua versus the United 
States), ICJ Report. paragraph 207. 
364 International Court of Justice (1986), Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
versus the United States of America). Merits, Judgement, p. 205. 
365 International Court of Justice (1986), Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
versus the United States of America). Merits, Judgement 
366 International Court of Justice (1986), Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
versus the United States of America). Merits, Judgement. 
Colliding Norms in Humanitarian Intervention - PhD Thesis - Birte Ahlhaus 
 
94 | P a g e  
 
of mass human rights abuses. In addition, the UN Security Council adopted several 
resolutions on human rights violations in different countries and not only condemned the 
human rights abuses but authorised member states to “use all means necessary to […] 
restore international peace and security”.367 The following graph shows interventions since 
1990 and outlines which have been authorized by the UN Security Council and which have 
been conducted unilaterally.368 
 
 
 
The significance of the collective and continuous interventions since the 1990s can 
be seen as a soft law development in international law, challenging the prohibition of the use 
of force as evident in Article 2 (4) UN Charter. Decisions by the ICJ, UN General Assembly 
and UN Security Council on the necessity of the use of force for humanitarian intervention, 
only demonstrates a gradual approval of humanitarian interventions when and for so long 
as these interventions are authorised by the Security Council itself. This development of a 
soft law of humanitarian intervention is an attempt to overcome the inherent norm collision 
and, by itself, does not necessarily undermine the integrity of international law, as states 
continue to recognize the prohibition on the use of force.  
 
                                                          
367 See for example: UN Security Council Resolution 678 (1990), paragraph 2.  
368 For a detailed list please see the relevant table in the appendix at the end of the thesis. 
Humanitarian Intervention and Non-Intervention 
1990 - 2013
UN Security Council
authorization and UN
Mandate
UN Security Council
authorization and
delegated Mandate
Intervention without UN
Security Council
authorization
Humanitarian Conflict with
no Response
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The selective authorization of humanitarian intervention by the UN Security Council, 
however, can be seen as undermining the integrity of international law. This has become 
more apparent since 2011. While the UN Security Council was able to authorize a 
humanitarian intervention in Libya within a few days, the UN Security Council was 
deadlocked over Syria. As an executive organ of the UN, vested with the right to authorise 
the use of force, the UN Security Council should provide guidance in the practical application 
of colliding norms. Yet, it is evident that the UN Security Council authorization of 
humanitarian intervention is subject to great power politics. This means that even in a case 
of extreme humanitarian suffering an authorisation may not be attainable. One of the core 
ad hoc concerns of legalising humanitarian intervention is the lack of institutional capacity 
to control and regulate such legal intervention. The following section looks at how authorised 
humanitarian intervention developed into soft law over time, and its implications for state 
practice and international law.  
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Exceptions to Article 2(4) UN Charter 
 
Within the UN Charter, two exceptions can be found to the general prohibition of the use of 
force. First, the UN Security Council is able to authorize the use of force through adopting a 
resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Specifically, Article 42 UN Charter states 
that the UN Security Council “may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be 
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.”369 The second exception 
is the right to self-defence as outlined in Article 51 of the UN Charter: 
 
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such 
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.” 
  
Based on the principle of sovereignty, states have the right to defend themselves in 
case of an imminent threat to their nation state. However, this exception is limited to the ICJ 
decision that self-defence has to be both necessary and proportionate.370 Former US 
Secretary of State, Daniel Webster argued in the 1837 Caroline incident that under 
customary international law, the legal exercise of self-defence needs to fulfil the criteria of 
an imminent threat, or necessity, and proportionality.371 Since the 2001 terrorist attacks on 
the US there has been increased debate about the legality of pre-emptive and preventive 
self-defence as an anticipatory exercise of the right.372 Another issue arising from Article 51 
UN Charter is whether the relevant attack necessarily has to be conducted by a state. While 
Article 51 UN Charter generally interprets an armed attack as being conducted either by or 
on behalf of a state, the increase in international terrorism since 2001 extended the scope 
of an armed attack to include attacks by non-state actors.373  
                                                          
369 UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 42 and 51. 
370 On the right to self-defense see the Caroline Incident / Webster Principle. In 1837 British officers destroyed the 
Caroline steamboat which was located in an American Port at that time. The US Secretary of State argued that the 
British had to demonstrate the necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no 
moment for deliberation.   
371 Egede, E. and Sutch, P. (2013), The Politics of International Law and International Justice, Edinburgh University 
Press, p. 265. 
372 High Panel Report on Threats (2004), Challenges and Change, para. 189.  
373 Cassese, A. (2001), ‘Terrorism is also disrupting some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law’ in: European 
Journal of International Law, volume 12, issue 5, p. 993. | Trapp, K. (2007), ‘Back to Basics: Necessity, Proportionality 
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The use of force under the authority of the UN Security Council, as outlined in Article 
41 UN Charter, is a further exception allowing for the collective use of force to maintain 
international peace and security. Under Article 39 UN Charter, the UN Security Council has 
the authority to determine necessary actions to maintain international peace and security, 
although the wording is nowhere defined in the Charter and remains subject to the UN 
Security Council’s interpretation. The power given to the UN Security Council in Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter is highly influenced by great power politics due to the frequent use of the 
veto by the P5 members; which has, in several, cases prevented the UN Security Council 
from effectively applying international law. A recent example is the inability of the UN 
Security Council to act in respect to the crisis in Syria while it was, in contrast, quick to take 
action in a similar case in Libya. This is due to Russia and China, allies of the current Assad 
regime in Syria, using their veto power to stop collective military intervention in the on-going 
civil conflict.  
 
In 1950 the UN General Assembly adopted the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution to 
overcome the deadlock on the UN Security Council through enabling the UN General 
Assembly to adopt appropriate measures. However, as seen during the recent Syria crisis, 
UN decisions regarding the coercive protection of international peace and security remain 
with the UN Security Council. In 2004, the UN High Level Panel endorsed the power of the 
UN Security Council to authorise humanitarian military intervention as a last resort in cases 
of massive human rights abuses within the territory of states. The UN Security Council 
further endorsed the R2P doctrine, reiterating the need to protect civilians from human rights 
abuses by their own states. Yet, despite the recently gained authority of the UN Security 
Council to authorize humanitarian intervention the application of this power remains 
ambivalent and subject to power politics. The lack of a consistent application of the UN 
Security Council authority to authorize humanitarian intervention increases the practical 
implications of the norm conflict as it forces states to act outside the legal use of force.  
 
 
                                                          
and the Right to Self-Defense against Non-State Terrorist Actors’ in: International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
volume 50, issue 1, p. 141. | Tams, C. (2009), ‘The Use of Force against Terrorists’ in: European Journal of International 
Law, volume 20, issue 2, p. 359. | Steenberghe, R. van (2010), ‘Self-Defense in Response to Attacks by Non-State 
Actors in the Light of Recent State Practice: A Step Forward?’ in: Leiden Journal of International Law, volume 23, p. 
183. 
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The Legal Status of Article 2(4) UN Charter 
 
As outlined in the historical overview in chapter 1 of this thesis, customary international law 
permitted the use of force for the purpose of humanitarian intervention; although this 
principle was not accepted before the nineteenth century.374 Toward the end of the 
nineteenth century, most scholars favoured the idea that humanitarian intervention was an 
exception to the non-intervention principle and permissible under customary international 
law. The UN Charter introduced a new legal norm in the international sphere: the prohibition 
on the unilateral resort to force unless permitted under Articles 42 and 51, although it did 
not expressly condemn humanitarian intervention. According to the ICJ judgement in the 
Nicaragua Case,375 as well as a the opinion of a number of legal scholars, UN General 
Assembly documents and other soft law instruments can be seen as evidence of opinio juris 
and do not necessarily need to be accompanied by consistent state practice. In contrast the 
ILA claims in a report on the Committee on the Formation of Customary Law,376 that in cases 
where the norm in question is neither old nor established, the focus on opinio juris and de-
emphasis of consistent state practice inhibits debates and decisions over the actual 
behaviour of states.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
374 Lillich, R.B. (1993), ‘Humanitarian Intervention through the United Nations: Towards the Development of Criteria’ 
in: Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Heidelberg Journal of International Law, volume 53, 
p. 559. | Fonteyne, J.P. (1974), ‘The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current 
Validity under the UN Charter’ in: Californian Western Journal of International Law, volume 4, p. 206.   
375 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua versus US), Merits, ICJ Rep 1986, p. 14 at 
99-104.  
376 Committee on the Formation of Customary International Law, American Branch of the International Law 
Association (ILA) (1989), The Role of State Practice in the Formation of Customary and Jus Cogens Norms of 
International Law, p. 7.  
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Relevant Rules: International Human Rights Law 
 
Human rights law is, together with the prohibition of the use of force, one of the key 
achievements of post-war treaty developments.377 In the aftermath of the Second World 
War, human rights treaties became the principal instrument through which states tried to 
constrain the ways in which they could treat their own citizens. For the most part, the way a 
state treats its citizens does not have tangible cross-border consequences.378 Although the 
philosophical basis for human rights encompasses human dignity in all respects, generating 
agreements on specific standards is difficult, especially since the conflict between ethnic 
traditions and international law is at a high point in the area of human rights. Nevertheless, 
international human rights law has developed as a new customary law, and, most strikingly, 
as a subset of non-derogable and peremptory human rights norms. Theodore Meron refers 
to this development as the “humanization of international law”379. It is these two iconic and 
peremptory norms of international law, which has increasingly become the subject of norm 
collision.  
 
The abuse of human rights within states became an increasing threat to national, 
regional, and international peace and security after the end of the Cold War. The 
development of human rights law reflects a global consensus on the necessity to protect the 
human dignity of individuals within and outside national borders due to the mass atrocities, 
which occurred in Europe and the South Pacific during the Second World War. The idea of 
the necessity to protect human rights globally, began long before the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. Chapter 1 offered a detailed historical review of the legalisation of human 
rights and the aspect of humanity in international law and international relations. The 
concept of human rights can be related to the idea of natural right because the idea of natural 
right, like human rights, are beyond the authority of any government or international body.  
 
Other perspectives suggest the understanding of human rights as a deliberative 
concept arising out of societal agreement which attempts to establish mutual-co-existence; 
as a way of redressing injustices and changing the status quo through protest; or as a 
                                                          
377 Egede, E. and Sutch, P. (2013), The Politics of International Law and International Justice, Edinburgh University 
Press, p. 178.  
378 There are, of course, exceptions to this. Large scale human rights violations can create refugee problems for 
neighboring countries, for example.  
379 Meron, T. (2006), The Humanization of International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague. 
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concept which only exists discursively, i.e. at the level of analytical discussion.380 In 
international law, human rights law has the status of customary international law based on 
documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Efforts to protect persons 
from slavery, genocide, apartheid, and the fall-out of war are also predecessors of 
international human rights law. On the domestic level, significant landmarks of equal and 
mutual rights protection include documents such as the Magna Carta 1215, the Petition of 
Right 1628, the US Declaration of Independence 1776, the US Constitution 1787, and the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen 1789.  
 
Yet, it wasn’t until the end of the Second World War that an international account of 
human rights and their protection became part of international law. The atrocities committed 
by Nazi Germany during the war caused widespread concern and interest in the protection 
of peoples.381 Human rights law has rapidly evolved on the international, regional, and 
national level since including various aspects of human dignity and the use of international 
adjudication to challenge human rights violations. Harris points out that the evolution of 
international human rights law has been one of the more remarkable features of the 
development of international law since 1945.382 Human rights are only loosely based on 
philosophical reasoning and natural right assumptions, but as Wellman notes, instead 
emerge from the concrete experiences, especially the suffering, of human beings.383 
 
On the international level, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a 
milestone document in the evolution of human rights because it was drafted by 
representatives from different cultural backgrounds from all regions of the world. In 
December 1948, the UN General Assembly proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights as a common standard for all peoples and all nations. The many universal and 
specialised international treaties, the plethora of Charter and other treaty based human 
rights institutions, the regional instruments, and the gradual judicialisation of international 
human rights law support the interpretation of certain human rights law as peremptory norms 
in international law. Yet, the legalization of human rights norms in treaty and customary 
                                                          
380 Dembour, M.B. (2010), ‘What Are Human Rights? Four Schools of Thought’ in: Human Rights Quarterly, volume 32, 
number 1, February 2010, p. 16.  
381 Menke, C. and Pollmann, A. (2007), Philosophie der Menschenrechte, Hamburg: Junius, p. 42 
382 Harris, D. (2010), Cases and Materials on International Law, Thomas Reuters, London, p. 536 
383 Wellman, C. (1997), The Proliferation of Rights: Moral Progress or Empty Rhetoric? Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press. 
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international law remains restricted. While human rights are widely accepted principles, their 
international implementation mechanisms are generally very weak. The result is a system 
of national implementation of international human rights.384  
 
As Moravcsik notes, human rights law is different from most other forms of 
institutionalized international cooperation385 because it challenges the traditional 
understanding of state sovereignty. Although sometimes non-binding and without clear 
enforcement mechanisms, international human right norms today are comprised of complex 
and constraining rules targeted at the domestic legal system.386 Human rights law is affected 
by compliance and enforcement problems similar to the ones affecting international law as 
a whole. This is due to the relative reluctance of states to bind themselves to legal obligations 
and, even more so, to agree to institutions with power to oversee compliance. Human rights 
treaty law differs from other treaties in international law because they do not reflect a 
compromise of opinions between states. Instead they declare ideals of state conduct that, 
in relation to some rights387, no state can fully achieve. In the words of the Universal 
Declaration, human rights treaties reflect a ‘common standard of achievement’, towards 
which states parties are obligated to move.388 The idea of human rights law is to be a 
progressive advancement. States won’t comply with all their commitments all the time, but 
have to work towards them by improving their social policies and systems. As a result the 
political consequences for nation states are generally high in terms of constraints on state 
autonomy in policy decisions. The lack of independent institutions (outside the Council of 
Europe and the American system) supervising the compliance of human rights causes a 
lack of enforcement. This is because states are reluctant to point at each other in terms of 
a breach due to the potential of the other state finding a breach by the state that accused it. 
 
The evolution of human rights law is moreover problematic in three ways. First, 
understanding human rights as natural rights, which are pre-legal, is a contentious 
                                                          
384 Donnelly, J. (2003), Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, Second Edition, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 
and London, p. 496 
385 Moravcsik, A. (2000), ‘The Origins of International Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in post-war 
Europe’ in: International Organizations, Volume 54, Issue 2, p. 217 
386 Helfer, L. R. (1999), Forum Shopping for Human Rights, in: University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Volume: 148, p. 
285 
387 Negative rights, such as the prohibition of genocide, slavery, and torture can be achieved by a state. Positive rights 
such as the right to social security, health, and education are more difficult to achieve and measure. 
388 Evans, M. D. (2010), International Law, third edition, Oxford University Press,  p. 804. 
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assumption because there is no consensus on the exact list of rights within the regime of 
human rights.389 Second, human rights derive from states ratifying international legal texts. 
However, these texts list, rather than define in detail, human rights and as a result of the 
evolution of human rights in different legal texts, rights often overlap and sometimes 
contradict each other. Third, while the incorporation of human rights into public international 
law has increased, there is still a general lack of compliance and enforcement mechanisms.  
 
The evolution of human rights law can be interpreted as a highly politicized process, 
which interacts with the conclusion that the legal implications of these developments are 
limited; whereas the political implications for nation states are high. The linkage of human 
rights and human security, which sees severe human rights abuses within a state’s territory 
as a threat to international peace and security, supports the idea of evaluating a 
normalization of humanitarian intervention within the context of international human rights 
law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
389 Freeman, M. (2004), Putting Law in its Place: An interdisciplinary evaluation of National Amnesty Laws, in: Working 
Paper No. 7, University College London, p. 15. 
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The Literal Interpretation of International Human Rights Law 
The UN Charter includes both principles in favour of humanitarian intervention and 
prohibitions for interventions which increasingly conflict. Article 1 UN Charter, states the 
promotion of respect for human rights and justice as a fundamental mission for the UN. This 
statement has been further supported by the subsequent adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. In 2005, the UN high level panel adopted in its Outcome 
Document390 the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P),391 which has been 
developed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). 
The Outcome Document recognizes, in paragraph 138, the responsibility of states to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. 
Following the UN General Assembly’s adoption of the R2P agenda by the ICISS, the UN 
Security Council made its first reference to the agenda in 2006, within Resolution 1674 on 
the protection of civilians in armed conflict.392 The adoption by the UN General Assembly 
and UN Security Council of the R2P agenda reflects a growing recognition that state 
sovereignty finds its limits in the protection of human rights. The literal interpretation of 
human rights, and its status in international law, is significant because the kind of 
interpretation adopted determines value judgements; not only on the types of claims 
classified as fundamental human rights, but also the compliance and enforcement 
standards.393 The literal interpretation of international human rights law is not only important 
to the philosophical debate about human rights, but also to the legal and practical 
implications of the norm conflict between human rights and the prohibition on the use of 
force.  
 
Legal and political consequences of the evolution of law protecting individuals follow 
from the basic idea of human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that, 
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”394 which shifts the traditional 
understanding of state sovereignty. States, party to a human rights treaty, like any other 
international treaty, have specific obligations, which are to respect, to protect, and to fulfil 
                                                          
390 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1.  
391 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001), The Responsibility to Protect, 
International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada.  
392 UN Security Council Resolution 1674, from 28 April 2006, para. 4. 
393 Bilder, R. (1969), ‘Rethinking International Human Rights: Some Basic Questions’ in: Wisconsin Law Review, volume 
171, issue 1, p. 174.  
394 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 1, 1948. 
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the rights contained in the treaty. Failure to perform any of these obligations constitutes a 
violation of such rights. Even though states may seem reluctant to commit themselves to 
such obligations it is important to distinguish inability from unwillingness. The UN system 
has a responsibility to support state efforts to move towards the implementation of these 
obligations, in case of a lack of resources available to the state. Article 2(1) of the 
International Covenant of Economic Social and Cultural Rights states that: “[s]ates have to 
undertake steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, to the 
maximum of their available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognize”395.  According to international law there are specific norms 
within international human rights law that constitute peremptory norms (for example, the 
prohibitions of genocide, slavery, and torture). A breach of these core human rights 
obligations authorizes the international community of states to act in accordance with 
international law to bring an end to the breach. Large scale violations of human rights no 
longer fall under the internal affairs of a state but are regarded as erga omnes and jus 
cogens norms, giving other states the right to intervene on behalf of the people. Conceiving 
international human rights law as a “common understanding of the peoples of the world 
concerning the universal, inalienable and inviolable rights of all members of the human 
family, constituting an obligation for the member states of the international community”,396 
the question remains as to whether human rights law evolved as a political instrument to 
measure the degree of respect for and compliance with human rights or as a legally binding 
peremptory norm?  
 
According to the International Law Commission’s (ILC) report on the Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,397 some breaches of international law not only 
trigger a right, but also a certain obligation of states to react to such breaches of international 
law. The ILC further states that a breach of peremptory norms allows for a positive obligation 
of states “to cooperate to bring the serious breach to an end through lawful means”398 and 
                                                          
395 The International Covenant of Economic Social and Cultural Rights, article 2(1). 
396 International Conference on Human Rights (1968), Proclamation of Teheran, Final Act of the International 
Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 22 April to 13 May 1968, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41, p. 3.  
397Crawford, J. (2002), The International Law Commissions’ Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text, and 
Commentaries, Cambridge University Press.  
398 International Law Commission (2001), Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, New York: United 
Nations, Article 41(1)). 
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a negative obligation of states not to accept a breach of peremptory norms as lawful and not 
to support a state in maintaining the breach of such a norm.399 In fact, Shaw notes that:  
 
“international law permits freedom of action for states, unless there is a rule constraining this 
… such freedom exists within and not outside the international legal system and it is 
therefore international law which dictates the scope and content of the independence of 
states and not the states themselves”.400  
 
The traditional view, arguing that state sovereignty is inviolable, has been eroded by 
the development of international human rights law. In fact, with regards to articles 6 to 8 of 
the Rome Statute,401 crimes such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity can 
be said to be jus cogens norms, which are hierarchical and superior to ordinary norms of 
international law.  
 
Interpreting international human rights law as jus cogens, which would make human 
rights superior to other norms of international law, is problematic since there is no clear 
account of what counts as fundamental human rights. A literal interpretation of human rights 
law, therefore, has to consider the idea of dividing human rights into “three generations”.402 
According to Vasak Karel, the first generation encompasses civil and political rights, 
including the right to life; liberty; freedom from torture, and cruel, inhumane or degrading 
treatment; freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention; freedom of movement and residence; 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of expression; freedom of association; 
and the right to a fair and public trial. These rights reflect the rights listed in Articles 2-21 of 
the UDHR and a number of those in the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).  
 
The second generation rights reflect economic, social and cultural rights. These 
include the right to work; the right to join and form unions; the right to education; the right to 
rest and leisure; the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
self and family; and the right to food. These rights reflect the rights listed in Articles 22-27 of 
                                                          
399 ILC Article 41(2).  
400 Shaw, M. (1997), International Law, fourth edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 150 
401 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, entered into force on 2 July 2002.  
402 Vasak, K. (1977), ‘Human Rights: A Thirty-Year Struggle: the Sustained Efforts to give Force of law to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights’ in: UNESCO Courier, volume 30, issue 11, Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization. 
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the UDHR and the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR).  
 
The third generation rights include solidarity rights such as the right to self-
determination; the right to development; and the right to peace. These rights are mainly 
found in regional instruments such as the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.  
 
However, Burns warns that the division of human rights into generations is merely “a 
simplified version of an extremely complex historical record”403. In fact, there is controversy 
as to whether second and third generation rights are part of international human rights law 
or merely “social goals that are not justiciable”;404 as the US has classified the later 
generation of rights. Although the UN, as the main driver of the promotion and protection of 
human rights in contemporary international law, it stays clear of a division of human rights 
and reiterates the “importance of ensuring the universality, objectivity and non-selectivity of 
human rights.”405 It can be argued that only the first generation of human rights is interpreted 
as jus cogens and peremptory law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
403 Burns, H.W. (1984), ‘Human Rights’ in: Human Rights Quarterly, volume: 6, at p. 262. 
404 UN Document A/40/C.3/36, p. 5.  
405 Steiner, H.J.; Alston, P. and Goodman, R. (2008), International human rights in context: Law, politics, morals, third 
edition, Oxford University Press. 
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The Contextual Interpretation of International Human Rights Law 
 
The philosophical base of international human rights law is evaluated by considering the 
evolutionary mechanisms through which human rights have evolved. International human 
rights law might give an incentive to governments and multi-national organizations to work 
towards a legalization and legitimation of humanitarian intervention, but cannot effectively 
eliminate the abuse of human rights in specific cases on the ground through jurisprudence. 
International human rights law fails to define criteria, which legalize and legitimize the 
conduct of humanitarian interventions due to the lack of political will to define a legal basis. 
International human rights law does not fail in its most basic function to secure human dignity 
because it does include specific rights and duties and raises awareness of human rights 
abuses in states of concern.  
 
 In order for human rights to evolve at the international level, states’ have to commit 
themselves to compliance. Hence, for a human rights regime to be substantial it needs 
national commitment, cultural community, and hegemony.406 National commitment means 
the political will of a state to comply with a specific human rights norm. Shue argues that the 
evolution of specific human rights principally reflect threats to human dignity.407 Yet, not 
every kind of threat leads to a recognized right. Politics largely determines whether a 
particular right is recognized. Emmerich de Vattel maintained that, while states may agree 
on certain aspects and ratify legal agreements, international law is limited by states’ ability 
to develop it beyond essential and general norms.408 However, as Hugo Grotius noted, the 
development of international law is based on states’ commitment and so far reflects states’ 
sense of solidarism. More recently, Nicholas Wheeler argues that an international norm is 
emerging for the conduct of humanitarian intervention due to states’ sense of solidarity with 
other states’ citizens.409 This understanding of the evolution of human rights implies a 
changing character, which alters in response to social and technological advance.410 Human 
rights law can, therefore, be understood as a living instrument that reacts to change in 
                                                          
406 Donnelly, J. (2003), Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, Second Edition, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 
and London, p. 152 
407 Shue, H. (1980), Rights in the Light of Duties, in: Brown, Peter G. and MacLean, Douglas, Human Rights and US 
Foreign Policy, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, p. 29. 
408 Sutch, P. and Elias, J. (2007), International Relations: the basics, Routledge, Oxon, p. 79. 
409 Wheeler, Nicholas, J. (2000), Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
410 Donnelly, J. (2003), Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, Second Edition, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 
and London, p. 57. 
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international and national systems. Human rights law evolves through treaties, even though 
compliance and enforcement of the treaties still depends upon states themselves following 
the treaties they have signed. This can be seen, for example, by looking at recorded human 
rights implementation by states such as China or Russia. While human rights abuses 
repeatedly occur in these states, the international community does not react or intervene. 
To a large extent, the disregard of human rights abuses in these states is due to economic, 
political and security factors that the international community cannot influence. The legal 
consequences of the evolution of human rights law are thus limited by power realities. 
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The Legal Status of Human Rights 
 
International human rights law has been legalized in international relations through treaty 
law and other institutional instruments,411 but some scholars have also argued that human 
rights, especially those recognized in the UDHR are part of customary international law.412 
Simma, Alston and Lillich further maintain that certain fundamental human rights, such as 
the right to life, self-determination, prohibition of torture, prohibition of genocide, and 
prohibition of racial discrimination have attained the status of jus cogens.413 Furthermore, 
the ICJ stated, in its Advisory Opinion on the Reservations to the Genocide Convention, that 
“the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized 
nations as binding on states, even without any conventional obligation.”414 This view has 
previously been adapted by Judge Tanaka in the South West Africa cases (Ethiopia v. South 
Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) arguing that:  
 
“[if] we can introduce in the international field a category of law, namely jus cogens, recently 
examined by the International Law Commission, a kind of imperative which constitutes the 
contrast to jus dispositivum, capable of being changed by way of agreement between states, 
surely the law concerning the protection of human rights may be considered to belong to the 
jus cogens.”415  
 
 Judge Tanaka’s argument points out the far reaching practical implications of the 
norm conflict inherent in humanitarian intervention as well as the lack of a generally 
accepted legal status for human rights in international law. The central problem of the norm 
conflict between the prohibition of the use of force and human rights then seems to lie in the 
ambiguous legal status of human rights. While there seems to be some agreement on 
fundamental human rights, whose breach may shock the conscience of mankind, the exact 
rights that fall under this category are not yet agreed. States are, to varying degrees, hesitant 
to define a set of fundamental rights as jus cogens as this would limit sovereignty. 
                                                          
411 Egede, E. and Sutch, P. (2013), The Politics of International Law and International Justice, Edinburgh University 
Press, p. 191. 
412 Sohn, L. (1977), ‘The Human Rights Law of the Charter’ in: Texas International law Journal, volume 12, p. 133.  
413 Simma, B. and Alston, P. (1988), ‘The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens and General Principles’ in: 
Australian Yearbook of International Law, volume 12, p. 82. | Lillich, R. (1995), ‘The Growing Importance of Customary 
International Human Rights Law’ in: Georgia Journal of International Law and Comparative Law, volume 25, p. 1-30. | 
See also: Bianchi, A. (2008), ‘Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens’ in: European Journal of International Law, 
volume 19, issue 3, p. 491. | Parker, K. (1988), ‘Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights’ in: Hastings 
International Law and Comparative Law Review, volume 12, p. 411.  
414 ICJ Report (1951) 15, p. 23.  
415 ICJ Report (1966) 6, p. 298. 
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Consequently, soft law offers a way to bypass states’ hesitation and allow fundamental 
human rights to gain the status of jus cogens in cases of severe humanitarian crises. The 
following section considers the idea of soft law as a practical approach to overcome the 
norm collision in more detail.  
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Avoiding Norm Collision: Humanitarian Intervention as Soft Law  
 
“Reliance by a state on a novel right or an unprecedented exception to the principle might, 
if shared in principle by other states, tends towards a modification of customary 
international law”416 
  
“Soft law” refers to international norms that are deliberately non-binding in character but still 
have legal relevance, located “in the twilight between law and politics.”417 The value of soft 
law is that it can provide clear and authoritative guidelines in given areas, without the need 
to negotiate new binding norms. Soft Law norms play an important part in the interplay 
between international relations and international law. International soft law refers to legal 
norms, principles, codes of conduct and rules of state practice that are recognised in either 
formal or informal multilateral agreements.418 Soft law therefore bridges the gap between 
international legal rules and global norms. Creating hard law can be time-consuming and 
often threatens national sovereignty. Soft law can reduce contracting costs and threats to 
sovereignty, while still providing a number of benefits.419 It provides a way to enter into a 
relationship, while still protecting a state's sovereignty. For example, soft law may include 
escape clauses, vague wording, or may avoid delegating disputes to independent third 
parties. These strategies provide the opportunity of allowing for a relationship without 
threatening state sovereignty. In general, this means that the states involved do not intend 
to be bound by international law.  
 
 Soft law, in contrast, has a much greater subjective component than harder law does. 
The fact that soft law cannot be enforced by public force does not mean that it necessarily 
lacks normativity.420 In spite of the lack of enforcement mechanisms, the addressees of soft 
law norms can perceive it as binding and, even if they do not, they may choose to abide by 
it on their own accord. Yet, soft law norms exhibit varying degrees of normativity. Some soft 
law norms are softer than others. This is no different from the situation with hard law rules. 
Some hard law rules are harder than others. There are a number of theories that explain 
                                                          
416 International Court of Justice (1986), Nicaragua Case, ICJ Reports, paragraph 207, p. 14. 
417 Thürer, D. (2000), Der Kosovo Konflikt im Lichte des Völkerrechtes: von drei – echten und scheinbaren – Dilemmata, 
in: Archive des Völkerrechtes pp. 452–454. 
418 Wellens, K.C. and Borchardt, G.M. (1989), ‘Soft Law in European Community Law’ in: European Law Review, volume 
14, p. 276.  
419 Abbott, K.W. and Duncan S. (2000), ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ in: International Organization, 
volume 54, pp. 421-56. 
420 Kaufmann-Kohler, G. (2010), ‘Soft Law in International Arbitration: Codification and Normativity’ in: Journal of 
International Dispute Settlement, volume 16, p. 1-17.  
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why states enter into soft law agreements and how these agreements influence state 
behaviour and advance the international rule of law. One explanation of soft law is the claim 
that states prefer soft law because states are risk averse, and thus generally prefer to avoid 
entering binding obligations.421 Emphasis is, furthermore, given to the facilitative and 
coordinating role that soft law norms can play. Yet, it is also of importance to look at the 
legal limits of soft law norms in comparison with international hard law, and the way in which 
soft law norms can be altered into binding hard law.  
 
Although not legally binding in itself, or part of the recognized sources of international 
law according to Article 38 ICJ Statute, this thesis interprets soft law as influencing state 
behaviour and reflecting states’ interpretation of rules of international law. The question of 
whether there is a soft law in international law has been the subject of recent debate. This 
thesis recognizes that soft law is not part of international law per se, but argues that soft law 
has a limited normative force, even though those norms would not be enforceable by an 
international court or other international organ.  
 
International soft law is, in many respects, heterogeneous in nature. Its substantial 
convergence does not necessarily create a new binding rule of, for example, international 
environmental law. However, it reflects the emergence of law from practice. In doing so, soft 
law creates rules as they should be, while international law is made of rules as they must 
be, which often the fragmentary result of compromised consensus is.  
 
Professor Weil states, for example, that these obligations “are neither soft laws nor 
hard law: they are simply not law at all.”422 Yet, virtually all legal scholars would agree that 
they are not simply politics either. Language included in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the Helsinki Final Act, the Basle Accord on Capital Adequacy, decisions of the UN 
Human Rights Committee are thought to impact states because of their quasi-legal 
character. It would also be a misconception to envisage the future of a legal rule concerning 
the use of force for humanitarian intervention solely driven by humanitarian interests of 
states, and loosely framed by soft law instruments. However, it would equally be a 
                                                          
421 Guzman, A.T. and Meyer, T. L. (2009), Explaining Soft Law, UC Berkeley: Berkeley Program in Law and Economics, 
available at: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/7796m4sc  
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misconception to envisage a future in which international law, effectively counteracting the 
use of force by states to intervene in other states. The border between soft law and hard law 
is vague and the distinction is not well-explored in the existing literature. Thus, for example, 
if a leader makes a promise in a public speech, is this soft law or mere politics? Soft law is 
best understood as a continuum, or spectrum, running between fully binding treaties and 
fully political positions that can be changed. Viewed in this way, the thesis seeks to propose 
a way in which soft law offers solutions to the norm collision debate inherent in any 
humanitarian intervention.  
 
The UN Security Council is now the single organ vested with the power to authorize 
collective humanitarian intervention. Yet, the authorization of the coercive protection of 
human rights abroad is arbitrary and subject to power politics. There are several reasons 
why a state sometimes prefers to avoid a given international commitment altogether. States, 
especially middle power states, examined in the next Chapter, emphasise a UN Security 
Council authorization to conduct humanitarian intervention. The UN Security Council should, 
therefore, provide soft law guidelines which formalize the authorization and conduct of 
humanitarian intervention. There have been various attempts to amend the UN Security 
Council’s decision making in cases of human rights abuse, such as the prohibition of the 
use of the veto. Yet, none of these approaches has been successful in providing an effective 
framework for the practical solution to norm collision in humanitarian intervention.  
 
A soft law commitment to the use of force for humanitarian ends allows a state to 
selectively engage in such interventions, rather than being bound to provide military force. 
It is more difficult to understand why states would enter into a consensual exchange of 
promises on the commitment to humanitarian intervention, but at the same time declare 
these promises to be non-binding. Although the UN Charter does not explicitly ban 
humanitarian intervention, the use of force to intervene in another country for any means is 
regarded as illegal423 if the UN Security Council does not authorize the intervention and self-
defence cannot be invoked.  
                                                          
423 Authors who argue that humanitarian intervention remain illegal under international law include: Brownlie, I. 
(1974), Humanitarian Intervention, in: Moore, J.N. (ed), Law and Civil War in the Modern World, p. 217. | Kartashkin, 
V. (1991), Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention, in: Damrosch, L.F and Scheffer D.J. (eds), Law and Force in 
the New International Order, Boulder: Westview Press. ǀ Jhabvala, F. (1981), ‘Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and 
International Law’ in: Indian Journal of International Law, volume 21, p. 208.| Schachter, O. (1984), ‘The Right of 
States to Use Armed Force’ in: Michigan Law Review, volume 82, p. 1620. 
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This thesis hypothesizes that the current status of the normalization of humanitarian 
intervention is best described in terms of soft law, remaining in a state of potential legal norm 
development. This view is based on the fact that UN resolutions increasingly support 
humanitarian intervention in order to comply with the UN Charter’s intent to protect human 
rights obligations. The publication of the R2P doctrine by the ICISS, and its partial 
implementation by the UN General Assembly in its 2005 World Summit Outcome Paper, 
supports the argument that humanitarian intervention can be interpreted as a soft law norm 
influencing legitimate conduct.  
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Conclusion 
 
Contemporary international law imposes only limited positive duties on states. The positive 
duty to protect human rights is generally limited to the state’s territory and does not include 
intervention in other states’ internal affairs. The focus on state sovereignty and non-
intervention has been supported by declarations made by the UN General Assembly as well 
as case decisions by the ICJ. In 1949, the UN General Assembly passed resolution 375,424 
on the Rights and Duties of States, followed by the 1970 Declaration on Friendly 
Relations,425 and the 1987 Declaration on the Non-Use of Force.426 In the Nicaragua 
Case,427 the ICJ supported the UN General Assembly interpretation of a broad reading of 
the principle of the prohibition of the use of force and non-intervention. The ICJ repeated, in 
its decision on the Nicaragua Case, an earlier statement made in the Corfu Channel Case, 
that “the principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign state to conduct 
its affairs without outside interference”.428 Such state immunity with regard to their internal 
affairs is based on customary international law. However, as UK judges stated in the 
Pinochet case, sovereign immunity has not yet reached the status of jus cogens whereas 
the prohibition of torture, being a rule of jus cogens, acts in the international sphere and 
deprives the rule of sovereign immunity.429 In addition, the Genocide Convention430 affirms 
the jus cogens character of rights and obligations mentioned in the convention. The literal 
and contextual interpretations of the colliding rules in humanitarian intervention shows that 
neither Charter based interpretation methods (Article 103 UN Charter), nor external 
theoretical approaches to the norm collision, such as Article 31(c) VCLT, or principles such 
as lex posterior or lex specialis, are able to overcome the practical implications of norm 
collision leading to a selective conduct of humanitarian intervention. The selective 
authorization of humanitarian intervention by the UN Security Council in particular has the 
power to undermine the integrity of international law as it falls short in providing a general 
guideline to deal with norm collision between two peremptory norms of contemporary 
                                                          
424 UN General Assembly, Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, annexed to UNGA Res 375.  
425 UN General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
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426 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the 
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427 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua versus The United States) (Merits), 
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428 Ibid, 1986, para. 202. 
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international law. While the increasing normative weight of external and coercive human 
rights protection does not, in itself, require the reconstruction of international law. The 
arbitrary authorization of the UN Security Council increases the practical implications of the 
norm collision forcing states to act against the law if necessary.  
 
Thus, soft law is a useful response to practical problems of norm collision and to find 
out how these norms can be adapted to formalize humanitarian intervention. One such 
solution is still unexplored, but it is potentially very important for international peace and 
security: it is the extent to which soft law may legitimize extraterritorial use of force for 
humanitarian intervention. In this chapter, it was posited that there is a soft law normalization 
of humanitarian intervention based on the fact that states have repeatedly, yet selectively, 
engaged in military humanitarian interventions since 1990 due to a shared view of human 
security and human rights. Yet, owing to humanitarian intervention violating international 
law, the question remains whether this soft law normalization can be incorporated into 
international law in order to avoid the abuse of the norm and to create general guidelines. 
In bargaining over the design of international agreements, states have multiple concerns. It 
is thus perhaps not surprising that no single theory can explain why states employ different 
degrees of legal formality in their international commitments.  
 
This thesis interprets soft law (as the term implies) as a specific category of 
international law. In this sense soft law encompasses international texts and agreements 
that are, on the one hand, not legally binding in an ordinary sense, but on the other hand, 
are not completely devoid of a legal character either. In fact, soft law provides a range of 
benefits to states. Highly legalized relationships (hard law) often involve substantial costs 
that may be higher than the benefits. Softer law, in contrast, may provide many of the 
benefits of hard law at a much lower cost. Whether a state chooses to use hard or soft law 
depends on the balance of costs and benefits that each type of law provides. In many cases, 
soft law may be better suited to the interests of states.431 It seems that soft law norms can 
provide standards upon which a legal norm of humanitarian intervention could be based. 
However, states remain reluctant to legalize humanitarian intervention. This might be 
explained on the basis that states aim at protecting the legal prohibition of the use of force 
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and prefer humanitarian intervention to be a soft law exception to international law. In this 
way, a soft law norm of humanitarian intervention may cope with the challenging choice 
between the prohibition of the use of force and humanitarian aid more efficiently than "hard" 
law. However, the long term status of soft law in international law and international relations 
remains ambiguous as it is a moral force rather than an enforceable obligation. In fact, the 
idea of soft law re-enforces the aspect of realpolitik in international law as it allows the 
powerful states to pick and choose when and how to apply international law. As such, soft 
law cannot be an effective long term solution but may enhance the discussion and 
development of legally binding frameworks to overcome the norm conflict. 
 
While human rights abuses raise complex issues that are not amenable to simple 
solutions; the application of the international human rights approach helps to ensure that 
attention focuses on protecting civilians rather than intervening in the internal affairs of a 
state. Perhaps the most important source of added value in the human rights approach is 
the emphasis it places on the accountability of states that are the duty holders of human 
rights. Rights imply duties, and duties demand accountability. It is, therefore, an essential 
feature of the human rights approach that appropriate judicial and non-judicial mechanisms 
for ensuring accountability are employed, and built into any normalization attempt of 
humanitarian intervention. International human rights law does not fail its function by not 
including a specific norm of humanitarian intervention. Various UN bodies confirm that states 
have a duty to respect and protect human rights. Core obligations arising from the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent Covenants establish a minimum threshold; 
both for states to provide minimum essential levels for a dignified life for its citizens and for 
the international community to assist civilians in a foreign state. International human rights 
law might fail in preventing the abuse of human rights due to a lack of legal or legitimizing 
frameworks allowing for humanitarian interventions in severe cases, but it does not fail in 
encompassing the most basic function of defining a duty holder. The end of human rights 
abuses will not come about through the rhetoric of whether or not a human right has been 
violated by a state, and whether this allows for a third state to intervene, but rather through 
focusing on developing a universal norm that legitimizes multilateral humanitarian 
intervention. Such interventions, however, need to comply with general principles of 
international law and should therefore be as a last resort, authorized by an international 
organization and explicitly designed with regard to the specific conditions of each case.  
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Moreover, there is not yet enough evidence to confidently state that humanitarian 
intervention in general succeeds in protecting civilians from the effects of violence and 
conflict. The use of force to protect civilians from being exposed to force is controversial. 
Assuming that human rights law includes a right of humanitarian intervention to protect 
civilians from mass atrocities; the success of each intervention is likely to depend on the 
context, mandate, and main objective of the intervention. In order to determine whether a 
normalization of humanitarian interventions can achieve a jus cogens status depends on the 
practice of states and the general opinio juris- the states’ intentions behind the interventions. 
The development of a normalization of humanitarian interventions towards a jus cogens 
norm requires a comprehensive and critical analysis of both state practice and opinio juris 
which will be given in the following chapter. Humanitarian intervention needs to be regulated 
to govern state action in order to create a collective opinio juris and minimise abuse. 
Furthermore, humanitarian intervention should only be employed in accordance with Article 
33 UN Charter – as a last resort after all non-forcible actions have failed.  
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Chapter 4: Middle Powers’ Human Security in Practice 
  
“The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory 
from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global 
security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states 
than to people … who sought security in their daily lives. For many of them, security 
symbolizes protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social 
conflict, political repression and environmental hazards.”432 
 
A key aspect in international law and international relations scholarship on norm collision in 
humanitarian intervention is state practice and opinio juris, states’ perception and the 
interpretation of binding norms. When it comes to the interpretation, making, and changing 
of international law, international relations scholars have largely focused on the normative 
influence of great power states433 that have shaped the underlying structure of the 
international system to sustain their national interests. Such scholarship provides useful 
insights into state interests in humanitarian intervention, offering various, and at times 
contradictory, explanations ranging from realist power politics accounts of states pursuing 
national interests, veiled in humanitarian justifications, to constructivists approaches 
highlighting the influence of international norms and values on shaping state behaviour. This 
approach, however, is limited to a narrow set of states in the international system.  
 
 In contrast to previous studies, this research looks at middle power engagement in 
humanitarian intervention from 1996-2013. More specifically it examines middle power 
states that actively pursue a human security policy, despite limited material and financial 
resources to implement such policies. Since the 1990s, international relations scholarship 
increasingly engaged in research on how middle power states respond to the international 
system created by great powers and their attempt to influence or change it.434  Middle power 
states have more to gain from an international legal order in which they can exercise power 
multilaterally. Yet, as Slagter pointed out, there has been little “attempt to tease out the 
                                                          
432 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (1994), Human Development Report, New York. 
433 Scholarly literature has recognised that great powers, particularly hegemonic powers, influence and change 
regional and global norms. See for example: Ikenberry, G.J. and Kupchan, C. A. (1990), ‘Socialization and Hegemonic 
Power’ in: International Organisation, volume 44, issue 3, p. 289. | Nevers, R. D. (2007), ‘Imposing International 
Norms: Great Powers and Norm Enforcement’ in: International Studies Review, volume 9, issue 1, p. 54. 
434 Neack, L. (2000), Middle Powers Once Removed: The Diminished Global Role of Middle Powers and American Grand 
Strategy, paper presented at the 41st Annual Convention of the International Studies Association. Los Angeles, CA, p. 
2: | Cooper, D. (2011), ‘Challenging Contemporary Notions of Middle Power Influence: Implications of the 
Proliferation Security Initiative for “Middle Power Theory”’ in: Foreign Policy Analysis; volume 7, issue3, p. 321. | 
Acharya, A. (2010), Whose ideas matter? Agency and power in Asia, in: Singapore: ISEAS Publishings, p.159. 
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precise relationship between international norms and middle powers”.435 This chapter 
explores the relationship between international norms and middle powers. This is done by 
focusing on case studies where one of the colliding norms is based on a human rights 
obligation, more specifically the incorporation of human rights in a middle power foreign 
policy, and the other norm focused upon a traditional peremptory norm at the heart of the 
UN Charter – the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of non-interference.  
 
 Middle power states are classified as states that have sufficient size and capacity to 
play notable roles on the international stage, but are not strong enough to impose their 
positions or solutions unilaterally. They can exercise persuasive influence, but rarely are a 
deciding force. Even if not considered middle powers in terms of military or other basic 
strength or in terms of international rank, they can play a significant role as norm 
entrepreneurs. According to Wiseman, small and middle powers are often regarded as a 
source of international innovation. In particular, recent middle power literature suggests that 
innovation and learning are more likely to be located in states such as Canada and Australia, 
promoting internationalism, norm construction, and soft power.436 Indeed, Australia, 
Canada, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian states are often referred to as middle 
powers in a normative sense. According to Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, in Relocating 
Middle Powers, it is more accurate to say that certain states can act as middle power states 
in certain circumstances and in certain subject areas.437  
 
Middle power states, that define themselves as rule followers and norm 
entrepreneurs, and that follow a human security policy, find themselves in a specific dilemma 
when it comes to the question of engagement in humanitarian interventions. Andrew F. 
Cooper argues that middle powers states have become increasingly active leaders in the 
development of normative agendas in select areas where they have specialized interests 
and task related experience.438  
 
                                                          
435 Slagter, T. (2004), International Norm Entrepreneurs: A Role for Middle Powers? International Studies Association, 
Montreal, Quebec, Canada, p. 3. 
436 Wiseman, G. (2004), Polylateralism and New Modes of Global Dialogue, in Joenson, C. and Langhorn, R. (eds), 
Diplomacy, volume III: Problems and Issues in Contemporary Diplomacy, p. 46.  
437 Cooper, A. F., Higgott, R. and Nossal, K.R. (1994), Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing 
World Order, Melbourne University Press, p. 7. 
438 Cooper, A.F. (1997), Niche diplomacy: middle powers after the Cold War, Palgrave Macmillan: Hampshire, p. 6. 
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This research therefore focuses on a core group of middle power states, which have 
repeatedly demonstrated a capacity to adapt their collective diplomatic actions to take 
advantage of the opportunities provided by regimes and institutions, to support a human 
security policy based on the normalization of humanitarian intervention. In fact, middle power 
states are most often noted as having achieved significant success in second and third 
agenda items including economic, environmental and human rights cases.439  
 
While the role of middle power coalitions has been explored by a number of scholars, 
the conclusions reached have not been fully explored in the context of normalizing 
humanitarian intervention in politics and international law. Due to humanitarian intervention 
violating international law, the use of force for humanitarian security means they need either 
to amend the relevant rules of international law, or remain in a selective breach of 
international legal obligations determined by the interests of the more powerful states. 
Solutions to the dilemma are various and often shaped by ideological or emotional factors. 
Despite middle power aims to normalize humanitarian intervention, humanitarian 
intervention remains, to some extent, a tool of national interest and subject to selectivity as 
to where humanitarian intervention occurs, regardless of need.  
 
  
                                                          
439 Cooper, A.F. Higgot, R. and Nossal, K.R (1993) refer to 'second agenda' items as economic issues and 'third agenda' 
items as the environment and human rights in Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World 
Order, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. | Rudderham, M.A. (2008), ‘Middle Power Pull: Can Middle 
Powers use Public Diplomacy to Ameliorate the Image of the West?’ in: YCISS Working Paper Number 46, p. 18, 
available on: http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-02880.pdf.  
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The Tragedy of Middle Power Politics  
 
“The powerful do as they will and the weak do as they must”440. 
 
 
This thesis evaluates case studies of middle power soft law entrepreneurship in the 
normalization process of humanitarian intervention. The case studies are aimed at testing 
the relationship between middle power human security policy and its support for 
humanitarian intervention. To do this, this thesis uses a qualitative research design to 
conduct an interpretative analysis of the cases. The risk of applying a qualitative method is 
that the influence of values may affect the interpretation of the cases. Analysing the conduct 
of human security from a political and legal viewpoint rather than focusing exclusively on the 
normative study of human security policies may help to reduce such bias. This thesis 
analyses three case studies: The Canadian planned intervention in Zaire in 1996, The 
Australian intervention in East Timor in 1999, and the Norwegian engagement in 
Afghanistan after 2001. The case studies were selected for specific reasons. First, each 
initiative represents a policy shift towards a more active human security policy of the middle 
power. All three states emphasise human security in their foreign policies but, at the same 
time, are limited in the exercise of such policies by commitments to strategic alliances, 
security interests and economic constraints. Second, all three initiatives emphasised the UN 
Security Council authorization of the intervention. The addition of the legal analysis 
highlights the states’ regard for compliance with traditional international law, while, at the 
same time, promoting a more active human security agenda. Third, there is a variation 
between the initiatives in terms of their underlying motives to intervene. A contextual 
analysis of the interventions reveals the significance of the political and social context in the 
lead up to each intervention. While these case studies of middle power human security 
policies cannot be classified as norm entrepreneurship in the strict sense – as they emphasis 
compliance with existing rules of international law and multilateralism – they can be 
interpreted as norm entrepreneurship in a prudential way by applying moral reasoning to 
specific cases. 
 
                                                          
440 Thycidides on the Peleponesian War, cited in: Ingebritsen, C. (2002), ‘Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role in 
World Politics’ in: Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, volume 37, issue 1, 
p.11. 
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 By critically evaluating middle power led humanitarian interventions in Zaire, East 
Timor, and Afghanistan this thesis intends to demonstrate the normative pull of middle power 
leadership in human security issues whilst, at the same time, expressing their practical limits. 
Canada’s plan to intervene in Zaire in 1996, Australia’s intervention in East Timor in 1999, 
and Norway’s whole of government approach to Afghanistan since 2001, are evaluated by 
adopting the parameters of the 3D concept (defence, diplomacy and development) which 
has been extended by Andrew Cooper’s theory of the 3Ns (norms, niches and networks). 
The 3D concept is also known as the comprehensive approach or the whole of government 
approach and is commonly applied to (post) conflict states or ‘fragile states’. Cooper441 
discussed the 3Ds in relation to Canadian foreign policy decisions regarding humanitarian 
intervention and extended these principles by adding 3Ns [niches, norms and networks]. 
According to Cooper, “security is not only defensive in nature, that is to say, simply a means 
of reacting to crises, but a forward-thinking mechanism with a strong dimension designed to 
prevent or ward off sudden disasters.”442 Humanitarian crises, mass atrocities, and civil wars 
not only generate regional instability but also pose unique foreign policy challenges since 
the end of the Cold War. Being a product of complex political, economic, and social forces, 
civil wars, and mass atrocities within a nation state demand new policy outlines. The 
Canadian 2005 policy statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World declared that 
“an integrated 3D approach, combining diplomacy, defence and development, is the best 
strategy for supporting states that suffer from a broad range of interconnected problems.”443 
The new emphasis on intra-state conflicts not only addresses complex political emergencies 
in conflict states but also highlights a significant normative shift. While foreign policy used to 
protect the national sovereignty and safety of states, the emergence of concepts like human 
security now indicates new understandings of the rights and responsibilities of states. One 
approach to the new foreign policy challenges is to view foreign policy responses as 
interconnected by merging security (defence, diplomacy and development) and normative 
(norms, niches and networks) aspects to address such complex political emergencies. 
  
                                                          
441 Cooper, A.F. (2005), Adding 3Ns to the 3Ds: Lessons learnt from the 1996 Zaire Mission for Humanitarian 
Interventions, Working Paper on Fragile and Weak States, The Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), 
Ontario, Canada.  
442 Cooper, A. F. (2005), Adding 3N’s to the 3D’s: Lessons learnt from the 1996 Zaire Mission for Humanitarian 
Interventions, Working Paper on Fragile and Weal States no. 4, Centre for International Governance Innovation.  
443  Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2005), A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, 
Ottawa, Canada, p. 20. 
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 In contrast to previous studies, this research does not apply the 3D and 3N policy 
approach to examine the cooperation between government departments in response to a 
civil conflict. The concept of the 3D and 3N approach is applied instead to the foreign policy 
analysis of middle power states in order to compare and evaluate the weight of traditional 
security policies (3Ds) and normative policies (3Ns) in human security policies and state 
practice.  
 
 While normative aspects increasingly appear in foreign policy outlines, the 
implementation of such policies by middle power states remains selective. The meaning and 
application of a norm is contentious in international relations. According to constructivism, 
norms play a central role in state behaviour.  Realism, in contrast, is sceptical of the role of 
norms in international relations. Yet, within heuristic realism, norms are considered as 
influencing international relations arguments. Yet, norms are not seen as influencing state 
practice. As such, heuristic realism adopts a casuistic approach which analyses the exercise 
of norms in state practice.444 A casuistic approach recognizes that cases can make a 
significant difference to a normative argument. As such, a significant aspect of casuistry is 
the analysis of circumstances. According to Toulmin and Jonson “The casuists incessantly 
called these circumstances to attention: they insisted that ‘circumstances make the case’ 
and inevitably modified moral argument about it”.445 In other words, casuistry re-
contextualizes an ethical problem by examining the application of norms in specific cases. 
It also draws attention to the aspect of timeliness of action in international relations; meaning 
that the success and effectiveness of an act depends on the precise timing of an action. 
Casuistry, thus, supplements other ethical approaches and principles by considering how to 
relate them to cases. The approach in this thesis will consider both, the moral reasoning by 
states, in terms of human security policies, and the application of the same moral reasoning 
in specific cases. It is important to note that any policy may fail due to unforeseen changes 
to circumstances on the ground or in the actions of partners. As Canada, Australia, and 
Norway are rarely the sole actor involved in a crisis, success must be evaluated in both the 
national and international contexts. Applying the 3D and 3N parameters to Canadian, 
Australian, and Norwegian foreign policies with regards to their respective engagement in 
                                                          
444 Beitz, C.R. (1979), Political Theory and International Relations, Princeton University Press. 
445Jonson, A.R. and Toulmin, S. (1988), The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning, University of California 
Press,  p. 254 
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humanitarian intervention is valuable for both political and legal conclusions drawn from the 
norm collision of human rights with the prohibition of the use of force. 
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Human Security Policy  
 
“This human security perspective on the use of force, grounded in the belief that the rights 
of people, not states, are the bedrock of a just and secure world, has found its voice in the 
concept that states have a responsibility to protect civilians within their jurisdiction.”446 
 
 The concept of human security was first elaborated by the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) in the 1994 edition of its annual Human Development Report.447 The goal 
of the UNDP was to improve the quality of human life by ensuring that people live their lives 
in free and safe environments. Yet, the political idea of human security can be traced back 
to the Enlightenment, when notions of individual liberty and freedom developed. The idea of 
human security disappeared with the emergence of the nation state in the nineteenth 
century, following the peace of Westphalia. Since the end of the Cold War, the policy of 
human security has returned as an effect of the increased institutionalisation of human rights 
law. The concept of human security goes beyond the traditional idea of state sovereignty 
and preoccupation with the territorial integrity of nation states, and highlights concerns for 
the individual – such as human rights, gender equity and a minimum social entitlement – as 
significant aspects of international peace and security. Lloyd Axworthy, the former Canadian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, argued that human security includes security against economic 
privation, an acceptable quality of life and a guarantee of fundamental human rights.448 
Human security, furthermore, promotes global peace through arms control and 
disarmament. In 2003, the Human Security Commission Report449 defined human security 
as a core strategy for the UN system of conflict intervention. As a strategy for conflict 
intervention, human security is based on the protection and empowerment of human rights, 
humanitarian laws but also wider socio-political issues and development.  However, 
according to the Commission Report, human security does not apply to UN peace 
operations dealing with violent conflict. 
 
                                                          
446 Seybold, T.B. (2007), Humanitarian Military Intervention: Conditions for Success and Failure, Oxford University 
Press.  
447 Hay, W. (1999), ‘Geopolitics of Europe’ in: Orbis, volume 47, issue 2, pp. 295-310.  
448 Axworthy, L. (1997), ‘Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership’ in: International Journal, volume 52, 
issue 2, p. 184. 
449 Commission on Human Security (2003), Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering 
People, Commission on Human Security, New York. 
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 Middle power states have embraced human security issues as niche areas of their 
foreign policies450 through means such as multilateral cooperation. While much middle 
power collaboration is dealt with through the UN, the 1998 Lysoen Declaration451 created a 
multilateral institution for human security issues which now includes thirteen middle power 
states as well as numerous NGOs.452 Such flexible multilateralism involves recognizing that 
formal multilateral institutions are less able to resolve inter-state disputes and suffer from 
coordination problems due to consensus rules. Flexible multilateralism is also driven by 
cooperation among smaller groups of states based on shared interests and goals, and a 
problem-solving approach free of the burden of universal and consensus-based diplomacy.  
 
 Having established the normative basis of the norm conflict of human rights and the 
prohibition of the use of force from a legal perspective, this thesis now looks at state practice 
in more detail. More specifically it examines the 1996 Canadian planned intervention in 
Zaire; the 1999 Australian led intervention in East Timor, and Norway’s engagement in the 
2012 Afghanistan war. Australia, Canada, and Norway differ greatly in their geo-political 
position and political history. While Canada and Australia are both part of the 
Commonwealth and APEC, the three states do not hold significant security or trading 
arrangements with each other. Even their human security policies differ in scope and outline 
since key influences on each country’s foreign policy are embedded in their individual 
national history. Yet, closer study of their engagement in coercive humanitarian intervention 
suggests more similarities in their human security policies than expected, while, at the same 
time, revealing significant and diverse national interests. While human security policies differ 
from state to state, middle power human security policies emphasise the protection of 
populations over the protection of sovereign rights of states. As such, specific emphasis is 
given to human rights protection across borders, which, in some instances, collides with the 
international law on the prohibition of the use of force if peaceful means to protect 
populations fail.  
 
                                                          
450Behringer, R.M. (2003), Middle Power Leadership on Human Security, paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
Canadian Political Science Association, Halifax, Nova Scotia, p. 3. 
451 Lysöen Declaration: a bilateral partnership for action on human security issues signed by Canada and Norway in 
May 1998. The agreement was expanded into a multilateral arrangement with the creation of the Human Security 
Network in September 1998 through which thirteen middle power states, as well as numerous NGOs work together.  
452 Small, M. (2001), Case Study: The Human Security Network, in: McRae, R. and Hubert, D. (eds) Human Security and 
the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace, pp. 231-235. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press. 
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 Thus, Australia actively engaged and lead UN support missions in East Timor in 
1999, and the Solomon Islands in 2003 to prevent atrocities and protect civilians. Canada 
has taken on leadership roles in human security agendas such as the deliberations on small 
arms trade and trafficking, the 1997 Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines - better known as 
the Ottawa Treaty - the institutionalisation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and 
implemented the Responsibility to Protect doctrine in Darfur. Norway changed its traditional 
foreign security policy in 1948, and has since militarily engaged in selected UN 
peacekeeping missions.453 A Norwegian foreign policy document released in 2008 was 
called “Norwegian Humanitarian Policy”. The use of the term humanitarian intervention for 
the case studies evaluated here is subject to criticism as the cases can be seen as ‘peace 
making’ or ‘peace enforcement’ missions rather than ‘intervention’ due to the fact that each 
case was legal in terms of UN Security Council authorization and/or invitation from the 
intervened state. However, the term humanitarian intervention is nevertheless used on the 
basis that the cases employed, or planned to employ, coercive military force and, hence, 
technically do not differ from the broad definition of humanitarian intervention outlined in the 
introduction.  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Many similar considerations govern the foreign policies of the three states. Like most 
middle power states, Australia, Canada, and Norway seek to comply with international law 
and are committed to multilateral co-operation through the UN and regional organizations. 
As none of the states belongs to a political organization that requires policy compliance 
                                                          
453 As of March 2005.  
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(other than the UN), Australia, Canada, and Norway have, in theory, greater freedom to 
implement independent policies such as human security. In practice, they possess strong 
alliance with the US through NATO and ANZUS commitments. This security alliance with 
NATO and the UN may explain why Australia, Canada and Norway contributed to UN 
peacekeeping missions after 1948.454 A closer look at UN peacekeeping missions from 1990 
– 2014 demonstrates that, Australia, and Canada actively engage in international missions. 
In contrast, Norway selectively engages in military international humanitarian missions. To 
better understand differences in middle power engagement in humanitarian intervention, 
and to evaluate whether middle power humanitarian interventionism supports a right to 
intervene, the following section analyses and compares the human security polices of 
Australia, Canada, and Norway. 
 
 There are certain conditions which may be necessary for middle power leadership to 
achieve human security objectives in the post-Cold War era.455 First, a middle power-led 
initiative should not appear threatening to the core principles of the superpower. Second, no 
middle power is capable of undertaking an initiative on its own. The tendency to resort to 
multilateralism is a key feature of middle power activity. Third, middle power states benefit 
from their close working relationship with NGOs. Due to their ‘humane internationalist’ 
orientations and less exploitative historical relations, middle power states are frequently 
viewed by NGOs as more trustworthy partners than major powers. A middle power-led 
campaign will be much stronger if it has the determined will of the international or 
transnational civil society behind it. Finally, a human security campaign may be successful 
if there is a widespread recognition that its objectives are beneficial. In practice, then, niche-
diplomacy can be effectively conducted by middle power states if it’s (a) covering a specific 
niche which represents a mutually perceived threat and (b) is in accordance with principles 
of international relations, especially the security and constitutional interests of the United 
States of America.  
 
                                                          
454 Out of the 68 UN peacekeeping missions between 1948 and 2013 Australia engaged in 30 missions, Canada 
engaged in 33 missions, Norway engaged in 25 missions and Japan engaged in 8 peacekeeping missions and 10 
international humanitarian relief and monitoring missions. For more information see list of UN peacekeeping missions 
1990 – 2014 in the appendix to this paper.  
455 Behringer, R.M. (2003), Middle Power Leadership on Human Security, paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
Canadian Political Science Association, Halifax, Nova Scotia, pp. 20-22. 
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Chapter 5: The 1996 Canadian Intervention in Zaire 
 
“Canada may not be a superpower but we are a nation that speaks on the international 
scene with great moral authority … now is the time to use that moral authority to stop 
suffering, avert disaster.”456 
 
Canada assumed leadership roles in various humanitarian endeavours in the international 
arena. Since the 1990’s, the concept of human security has been institutionalized in 
Canada’s foreign policy. It is to a large extent based on the 1994 UNDP concept,457 
especially in terms of the focus on individuals and the threats they face. In the 1990s, 
Canada developed a distinct foreign policy and national identity, based on the aim of being 
a good international citizen, a norm entrepreneur and a rule follower.458 Former Canadian 
Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy later subsumed these characteristics under the term human 
security. The Canadian Department for Foreign Affairs argued in relation to the adoption of 
a human security policy that “the litmus test for determining if it is useful to frame an issue 
in human security terms is the degree to which the safety of people is at risk.”459 Indeed, 
former Canadian Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy defended Canada’s implementation of 
human security policies, stating that “as borders become increasingly porous, and Cold War 
threats fade, foreign policy practitioners deal increasingly with issues directly affecting the 
lives of individuals: crime, drugs, terrorism, pollution, human rights abuses, epidemics, and 
the like.”460 This leadership is particularly significant when Canadian initiatives are 
undertaken in response to humanitarian crises. As the above quote by former Prime Minister 
Jean Chrétien shows, Canada places a higher priority on protecting the human security of 
individuals and groups than on protecting national sovereignty.461  
 
                                                          
456 Chrétien, J. Press Conference by the Prime Minister, 12th November 1996, Transcript, CBC Newsworld.  
457 Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, 
in Canada’s Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future (Ottawa: The Committee, 1994). 
458 Compare for example: Cohen, A. (2003), While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World, Toronto. | 
McClelland, S. and Welsh, J. (2004) At Home in the World: Canada’s Global Vision for the 21st Century, Toronto, 
HarperCollins. 
459 Government of Canada (1995), Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World, Ottawa: Dept. of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, p. 5.  
460 Axworthy, L. (1998), US Urged to Bolster Weak Support for UN, Human Security, and World Criminal Court, in: 
Canadian Speeches No. 12, 3 from June 1998, pp: 8-12. 
461 Leaning, J. (2000), Human Security: A Framework for Assessment In Conflict and Transition, published by: USAID 
Complex Emergency Response and Transition Initiative, directed by Tulane University, New Orleans, LA. 
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 According to Debiel and Werthes, the implementation of the human security doctrine 
informs Canada’s foreign security policy.462 Canada, as a nation, has a long history of 
involvement in international responses to new and emerging conflicts. As an example of 
this, of the fifty-nine United Nations peacekeeping missions to date, Canada participated in 
fifty,463 representing a participation rate of 84.7 per cent. Furthermore, Canada has 
participated in a range of other stability and observer missions, including the International 
Commission for Control and Supervision of South Vietnam, Observer Team Nigeria, 
Multinational Force Observers Sinai Peninsula Egypt, International Commission for 
Supervision and Control, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and the European Community 
Monitoring Mission in Yugoslavia. More recently, Canada participated in Operation Desert 
Storm in Iraq, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and NATO’s on going 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.  
 
 The 1996 planned Zaire intervention changed Canada’s foreign security policy with 
regard to its human security agenda by opening the way for a more active interventionist 
policy. It has been used as both a normative and practical framework for Canada’s foreign 
policy. Normatively Canada engaged and led international humanitarian initiatives such as 
the 1999 land-mine ban treaty and the Rome Treaty for the creation of an International 
Criminal Court. Practically Canada offered to lead the 1996 humanitarian intervention in 
Zaire. 
 
 This chapter examines the Canadian implementation of its human security policy in 
the context of the 1996 civil conflict in Zaire. In 1999, Canada defined its human security 
policy as emphasizing the protection of individuals from violence.464 In 2001 the Canadian 
government further stated that it permitted the use of military force for humanitarian 
intervention to protect civilians, and engaged in peacekeeping operations, in conflict 
prevention and peace-building, strengthening governance and accountability to foster 
                                                          
462 Debiel, T. and Werthes, S. (2006), Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas, in: Institute for Development and 
Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen, INEF Report 80/2006, available online at: 
http://www.inef.uniduisburg.de/page/documents/Report80.pdf  
463 Participation in the various 50 UN missions included the deployment of small and large military forces, diplomatic 
contributions to missions and federal, provincial and municipal police deployments to assist in establishing law and 
order and training missions. See 
www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp and www.forces.gc.ca/commelec/brhistory/anxa_e.htm  
464 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada 1999. 
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democracy and human rights, and in countering transnational organized crime.465 In fact, 
the International Development Research Centre’s publication Beyond Development 
Cooperation,466 the 1994 Special Joint Committee’s report on Canada’s foreign policy,467 
and policy statements by then Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, interpreted the concept of 
human security as an ethical guide to foreign policy. These Canadian initiatives contrast with 
international initiatives governed by the self-interest of the intervening state and determined 
by realism rather than morality.  
 
 The aim of this case study is to critically evaluate Canada’s role and intentions in the 
1996 planned Zaire intervention in the context of its foreign policy norms. The case study is 
aimed to analyse whether the Canadian human security policy in the case of the 1996 Zaire 
intervention was effective and how it had been legally justified. To link this back to the 
conceptual analysis of this thesis which proposes a prudential interpretation of the legal 
status of humanitarian intervention in international law, the case study needs to reveal a) 
that the intervention was based on defendable moral grounds, b) the intervention was 
successful and c) the intervention was seen as justifiable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
465 Fukuda-Parr, S. and Messineo, C. (2012), Human Security: A critical Review of the Literature, in:  Centre for 
Research on Peace and Development (CRPD), Working Paper No. 11, January 2012, p. 11.  
466 Moore, F.A. (1994), Beyond Development Cooperation: Toward a New Era of Global and Human Security, IDRC 
report on a conference organized by the Society for International Development, 15-16 October 1993 (Ottawa: 
International Development Research Centre, 1994). 
467 Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, 
in Canada’s Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future (Ottawa: The Committee, 1994). 
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Genocide and Mass Atrocities at the Rwandan border with Zaire in 1996 
 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo, named Zaire from 1971 – 1996 under the 
government of Mobutu Sese Seko, is one of the largest countries in Africa, sharing borders 
with nine countries—Sudan, the Central African Republic, the Republic of the Congo, 
Angola, Zambia, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. This might explain its 
identification with the cross-Africa “war zone” identified by Filip Reyntjens.468 Corruption and 
a lack of compliance from the army contributed to the outbreak of civil war in 1996. The 
corruption of the Mobutu regime exaggerated the civil conflict.469 In fact, the klepto-kratic 
government used public resources, including public offices, for private gain that reflected a 
continuing competition for power between President Mobutu and any Prime Minister Mobutu 
was forced to appoint by the political opposition. Mobutu sought to undermine any command 
initiated by the Prime Minister and the army. Mobuto ruled Zaire from 1965 but started to 
face increasing opposition after the 1994 Rwandan genocide when militant Hutus and the 
subsequent overthrow of the Hutu regime by Rwandan Tutsi warlord Paul Kagame. 
 
 Following an initial UN intervention in 1960 (operation ONUC), the mid 1990s saw a 
civil conflict arising on the eastern border with Rwanda. Complex ethnic and historical factors 
caused the 1996 civil conflict on the border between Zaire and Rwanda. Ethnic conflicts in 
neighbour states, especially in Rwanda and Burundi, escalated in ethnic tensions in Zaire 
after 1996. During the 1990s the government in Zaire struggled to exert central control over 
the vast country. This resulted in the emergence of sub-state actors, led by rebel groups, 
especially around the Rwandan border. The majority of refugees in Zaire were Hutus, some 
former soldiers and some who had committed genocide in Rwanda and had been forced to 
flee following the defeat of the Rwandan Hutu army and militias by Paul Kagame’s RPF. 
Bruce Jones explained that “by late fall 1994 and certainly by 1995, the aid agencies were 
aware that they were feeding génocidaires and refuelling a genocide movement, but there 
was little choice but to remain in place.”470 By the start of November 1996, the border 
between Zaire and Rwanda faced an escalating conflict with cross border implications. 
Additionally, the ethnic conflict increased an already grave refugee crisis. Lindsey Hilsum 
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argued that the media coverage of the Rwandan genocide saw the dilemma of refugees 
overshadow the enormity of the killings that took place.471 Hutu military groups, who had 
played a pivotal role in the Rwandan Genocide, took control of the camps and the conflict 
between Hutu and Tutsi intensified on the Zaire border. Ian Stewart described the situation 
as follows:  
 
“both Tutsis and Hutus—groups who no longer considered each other human—were living 
as refugees in Zaire. When rebel leader Laurent Kabila set his sights on ousting Mobutu, he 
used Mobutu’s apparent favoritism toward the Hutus to coax Tutsis into his ranks. Kabila 
recruited hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Tutsis into his ranks … First as Zaire and later 
as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central Africa’s largest country had become a powder 
keg waiting for a spark.”472  
 
 René Lemarchand considered the traditional ethnic and colonial influences on the 
crisis in Zaire to be a “chain of causality between past and present atrocities.”473 The crisis, 
complex as it was, was further complicated by the situation of the Bayamulenge (ethnic 
Tutsis living in Eastern Zaire). They increasingly came under attack from the Hutu military 
groups, from the refugee camps, and in 1996, the government in Zaire further intensified the 
situation by giving the Bayamulenge two weeks to leave the country. In late 1996, some of 
Mobutu’s rivals formed the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Zaire (ADFL) 
with support from Rwanda and Laurent D. Kabila as leader.474 The ADFL, supported by the 
Rwandan Patriotic Army and Ugandan forces, weakened the militant Hutu tribes in East 
Zaire’s refugee camps and advanced further to the capital Kinshasa, forcing Mobuto to flee 
the country.475 On May 17, 1997, Kabila declared himself president, establishing an 
authoritarian regime, and renamed the state the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
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On 16 November 1996, the international community authorized a humanitarian 
intervention in Zaire in the form of “Operation Assurance”. Yet, the fact that the majority of 
refugees in Zaire were Hutus, who had committed genocide in Rwanda and had been forced 
to flee following the defeat of the Rwandan Hutu army, overshadowed the authorization of 
a humanitarian intervention in Zaire. Initially France was the driving force behind the 
authorization of Operation Assurance. Yet, due to France’s questionable interests in the 
intervention and its historical relations with and support of the Hutu government in Rwanda, 
France was not considered a neutral force. Further, some commentators argued that France 
had a national interest in the intervention – the preservation of Francophonie influence in 
Africa.476 In fact, the Nairobi African summit on 5 November 1996 refused France a leading 
role since impartiality was a requisite for the operation.477 Further, any French participation 
was rejected by Rwanda. As Rwanda warned the international community, any initiative to 
permit France a military presence in eastern Zaire would be met by a military initiative on its 
own part. The United States was also reluctant to become involved in the civic conflict due 
to conflicting political relations with the Tutsi government and the so-called ‘Mogadishu 
Syndrome’ following the failed intervention in Somalia, which still influenced United States 
decision making. Great Britain and South Africa were likewise reluctant to become involved 
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in an intervention in Zaire.478 Essentially, the UN authorized Operation Assurance, - 
according to UN Security Council Resolution 1080 from 15th November 1996 - was to contain 
military forces from the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and France, later to be 
augmented by African forces, under command of a bilingual Canadian, General Maurice 
Baril. The mandate authorized by the UN Security Council was limited. Massey points out: 
“to use commensurate force to secure specific humanitarian objectives—the ‘effective 
provision’ of aid to refugees and the local population, and the ‘voluntary and orderly 
repatriation’ of the refugees.”479 Despite the background, the UN Security Council decision 
to authorize an intervention was controversial because the situation in Zaire meant the 
intervention would support an ethnic group that had earlier committed genocide.  
 
 Canada took a leading role in forming the UN multinational force to provide aid and 
protection to the refugees as it soon became clear that neither the United States nor France 
would agree to lead a military mission. African leaders supported Canada’s leadership role 
in the intervention due to the fact that Canada had no colonial or political history in the region; 
in contrast to the US and European states. It was the first time Canada lead a UN Security 
Council Chapter VII operation. Canada was neither a former colonial power nor a power 
player on the international scene. Although Canada contributed in the previous UN led 
UNUC intervention in central Africa in the 1960s, it had no direct political or economic 
relationship with Zaire.  
 
 Thus, the initiative taken by Canada was consistent with its previous efforts to move 
from being a middle power to taking on a role which used that power to advance its 
humanitarian priorities. In fact, Canada was perceived as an impartial third party not 
motivated by larger strategic interests. Canada was also a member of both the 
Commonwealth and la Francophonie. From a humanitarian perspective, Canada was geo-
politically ideally placed to address the conflict. 
 
 The Canadian plan for Zaire reflected Canada’s foreign policy intentions, as a rule 
follower and norm entrepreneur. Canada’s human security policy sought to overcome the 
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collision of international legal norms on the principle of non-intervention and the protection 
of human rights. Moreover, with the Zaire intervention taking place prior to the ICISS 
publication of the R2P doctrine, Canada justified its intervention primarily on moral and 
humanitarian grounds. Additionally, Canada pushed for a UN Security Council authorization 
for the intervention, reflecting a multilateralist approach to foreign policy and the aim to be a 
good international citizen.480  
 
 However, neither the governments of Zaire or Rwanda, nor the Zairian rebel leader 
Laurent Kabila, were willing to cooperate with any external intervention in the regions they 
controlled. In fact, shortly before the UN Security Council decision was taken, Rwandan 
rebel troops attacked refugee camps. The original mission, set out in UN Security Resolution 
1080, was never deployed, since the majority of refugees returned to Rwanda and others 
fled into Zaire and neighbouring countries. If the multinational military intervention had gone 
forward, it would also have been militarily opposed by African governments and rebel 
leaders. According to Delvoie, the actual preparations for the proposed Zaire mission also 
revealed two further fundamental flaws in the Canadian intervention; firstly Canada did not 
have the military capabilities, especially the logistical capabilities, to lead a mission in such 
a distant and unfamiliar theatre of operations; secondly Canada lacked detailed and reliable 
information about the situation on the ground in Eastern Zaire, and depended upon 
intelligence from the United States and Great Britain.481 According to Kofi Annan “We have 
learned, contrary to past hesitation, that intelligence is necessary and that we need to have 
solid political analysis to be able to, if not determine, then envision how the crisis is likely to 
develop and how we would act if it went in one direction or the other.”482 Yet, the intelligence 
and information about the situation on the ground was problematic. France provided much 
of the intelligence reports to the UN despite its questionable relationship with the Rwandan 
Hutu. In fact, Canada lacked any independent strategic intelligence capability making it 
reliant on allies. This brought with it the danger of data manipulation or distortion for political 
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reasons as became evident during the debate over refugee numbers.483 With the last 
refugee camps closed by December 1996, the Rwandan government informed the UN that 
the MNF was no longer welcome to operate on its territory.484 Reacting to the Rwandan 
demand for the MNF to leave, General Baril wrote to the Chief of the Defence Staff that, “we 
are dealing with big players in a very complex situation without the tools or knowledge 
necessary to control either specific events or the general situation”485. He judged the risk of 
being trapped by events beyond Canadian control increasing daily and, therefore, 
recommended cessation of the operation. Over 600,000 refugees returned to Rwanda but 
an unknown number (still subject to debate) fled deeper into Zaire. When Canadian Foreign 
Minister Lloyd Axworthy continued to press for an intervention, the Rwandan government 
responded, “We don’t need them. Unless they are edible, they won’t be much good.”486 The 
Canadians downgraded Operation Assurance to an airdrop mission. Yet, according to 
Michael Hennessy, “Despite this turn of events, the Canadian Forces learned valuable 
lessons in attempting to generate and lead a large multi-national force (MNF) in an other-
than-war humanitarian relief operation.”487  
 
 The UN, Canada, and several European countries held a regional summit in Nairobi 
in November 1996, and called for the establishment of safe corridors and temporary 
sanctuaries inside Zaire, renewed access to humanitarian aid, and steps to facilitate the 
return of refugees to Rwanda. In cooperation with the UN Security Council, these actions 
were supposed to be reinforced by an international neutral force. While some argued that 
the return of the refugees to Rwanda marked an end of the crisis, others argued that the 
crisis instead spread over a much larger area and reached an even greater degree of ethnic 
complexity.  
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Canadian Human Security Policy: Between Ethics and Competencies  
 
Canada responded to a changed political global environment in the 1990s following the end 
of the Cold War. While the international community of states faced fewer interstate wars 
after 1990, the number of civil conflicts and ethnic wars within states increased. While 
military spending was cut due to a decrease of conventional military threats, the human 
security agenda saw Canada acting as an active norm entrepreneur and good international 
citizen.488 The financial means to implement the agenda, however, were reduced. In fact the 
1990s and early 2000s saw a twenty-five per cent cut in the foreign affairs budget489 while, 
at the same time, the percentage of Canadian development aid was cut from 0.46 per cent 
at the beginning of the 1990s to 0.24 per cent in 2002/03 as a percentage of the national 
budget490. The military budget was also reduced by twenty-three per cent between 1993 and 
1998, and in 2002 ranked third last among NATO countries. 
 
Canada’s middle power initiatives in human security issues were thus overshadowed by 
the decreased Canadian participation in UN peacekeeping operations and significant budget 
cuts in the foreign ministry and in Canada’s official development aid. It is doubtful, though, 
that financial cuts caused decreasing political support for the human security orientation, as 
is shown by its 1996 decision to lead a multinational support mission to Zaire. The intention 
of Canada’s foreign security policy can perhaps be best described as a diplomatic process 
rather than active interventionism. Axworthy argued in 1999 that:  
 
“Human security is going to have to be reconciled with the principle of non-intervention in 
the internal affairs of states. Kosovo illustrates this particular contradiction well. … The norm 
of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states remains basic to international peace 
and security, and the intervention in Kosovo must not be held as a precedent justifying 
intervention anywhere, anytime, or for any reason. However, in cases of extreme abuse, as 
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we have seen in Kosovo and Rwanda, among others, the concept of national sovereignty 
cannot be absolute.”491 
 
In trying to address this norm collision of non-intervention and the need for intervention 
in cases of gross human rights violations, Canada has held three distinctive foreign policy 
orientations: imperialism, isolationism, and internationalism at different times in its history.492 
Since the end of the Second World War, Canada’s foreign policy orientation can be 
characterized as liberal internationalism. From a foreign security perspective, the 1990s saw 
a continuation of the allegiance to NATO and to the United Nations, recognizing that the 
tasks for these organizations had changed since the end of the Cold War and was now more 
political and economic rather than military. Nevertheless, ethnic civil conflict, transnational 
crime, terrorism, among others, posed new and lethal threats to security. The Liberal 
government in Canada presented a Red Book prior to the 1993 election, outlining a 
commitment to multilateralism.493 Yet, the Defence White Paper494 in 1994, and the 
Government Statement on Foreign Policy entitled Canada in the World in 1995,495 also 
pointed out the limits of Canadian engagement in multilateral security missions. Recognizing 
the need for Canada to adjust its foreign and security policies to a rapidly changing post-
Cold War world. With regard to the changing international security context, the foreign policy 
white paper Canada in the World noted that:  
 
“....the threats to security now are more complex than before. A whole range of issues that 
transcend borders including mass migration, crime, disease, environmental degradation, 
overpopulation, and underdevelopment - have peace and security implications at the 
regional or global level.”496  
 
Since the 1990’s, Canada has been practising a de facto internationalist foreign policy, 
limiting its global engagement to specific niche areas such as human security. This reflects 
domestic circumstances (e.g. financial limitations) and emphasis on humanitarian norms 
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along with international constraints. More specifically, peacekeeping in the post-Cold War 
has been the Canadian military’s primary contribution to international security. Yet, budget 
cuts to military spending and disappointing peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Rwanda have brought Canada’s military capability for peacekeeping and 
the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in general under question.  
 
The 1994 foreign and defence policy White Papers thus took account of the changed 
international and domestic environments in which Canada found itself and, with reference 
to this environment, provided a blueprint for Canada’s engagement in the world by offering 
peacekeeping as a niche policy. The Defence White Paper, with its emphasis on multi-
capable combat forces, and the Government Statement on Foreign Policy, with its focus on 
the need for global stability, promoted both Canada’s commitment to international peace 
and security and as an active supporter of human security. Indeed, both papers suggested 
a re-orientation of Canadian defence policy towards international peacekeeping, preventive 
action, and peace building, and away from its existing multi-purpose mandate, which was in 
accordance with Janice Stein’s report, Canada 21: Canada and Common Security in the 
Twenty-First Century. The idea of niche picking by middle power foreign policy also 
accorded with political interests of states, in a generalized way. Jack Granatstein, a 
Canadian historian, argues that “peacekeeping at the same time somehow smacked of 
independence from the United States” and that peacekeeping became “the ideal role for 
Canada: responsible, useful, inexpensive and satisfying.”497 In a similar way, Alex Morrison 
maintains that peacekeeping has provided Canadian governments with an opportunity to 
put functional principle into practice and to exercise leadership at the international level.498 
He adds that peacekeeping has enjoyed the support of the Canadian public and allowed 
Canada to gain international respect. 
  
 Canada’s foreign policy review of 1995, Canada in the World, interprets Canada’s 
role in the international community of states as;  
 
“Successful promotion of our values ‐ respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law, 
and the environment ‐ will make an important contribution to international security in the face 
of new threats to stability. Acceptance of such values abroad will help safeguard the quality 
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of life at home: Canada is not an island able to resist a world community that devalued 
beliefs central to our identity”.499 
 
The document further states that; 
 
 “International Assistance also contributes to global security by tackling many key threats to 
human security, such as the abuse of human rights, disease, environmental degradation, 
population growth and the widening gap between rich and poor. Finally, it is one of the 
clearest international expressions of Canadian values and culture ‐ of Canadiansʹ desire to 
help the less fortunate and their strong sense of social justice ‐ and an effective means of 
sharing these values with the rest of the world”.500  
 
Canada thus demonstrated and increasing commitment to multilateralism and the 
rule of law in international affairs, which is reflected in Canada’s demand of a mandate from 
the UN to conduct the intervention. As such, the Canadian Government sought to ensure 
that the mission be cast as a humanitarian initiative501 and that the rules of engagement 
were formalized.  
 
The planned Zaire intervention demonstrates then Canada’s interest and 
commitment to human security. Yet, by looking closer at Canada’s interest in the intervention 
in Zaire it also shows that its response to humanitarian crises is also accorded to its political 
commitments and strategic interests. The lack of military and fiscal resources of middle 
power states means that crises have to be chosen specifically in order to allow an 
appropriate allocation of resources. According to Bernard Kouchner the head of Médecins 
Sans Frontières, and later former French President Sarkozy’s foreign minister, “if there was 
not an outside rescue mission …what would be needed would not be doctors without 
borders but gravediggers without borders.”502 From this perspective, the intervention was 
perceived as a rescue effort based on the values of human security. In fact, then liberal 
Prime Minister Jean Chrétien observed that “Canada may not be a superpower but we are 
a nation that speaks on the international scene with great moral authority… now is the time 
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to use that moral authority to stop suffering, avert disaster.”503 The reality is, though, that the 
Canadian government’s human security policy and humanitarian interventions have not 
been devoid of interest calculations or an awareness of enlightened national interests. In 
fact, as Canadian foreign minister André Ouellet argued “we believe that our involvement in 
peacekeeping operations over four decades is a concrete reflection of our basic security 
and foreign policy interests.”504  
 
This change in Canadian foreign policy on peacekeeping took place under Prime 
Minister Mulroney in the early 1990s. Mulroney disapproved of the traditional doctrine of 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states, and made the case for Canadian 
and international interventionism in the interests of saving lives in domestic conflicts. Yet, 
his policy review with regard to Canada’s humanitarian interventionism and its underlying 
intentions remained vague. The 1994 Defence White Paper505 further blurred the policy 
framework and humanitarian intentions by changing the use of the term peacekeeping to 
multilateral operations which encompassed the full range of military activity, from preventive 
deployments to all-out war. Further the paper stated that the purpose of these operations 
should address not only “genuine threats to international peace and security” but also 
“emerging humanitarian tragedies.”506 However, instead of committing itself to a policy of 
global interventionism in support of its human security principle, the government’s conduct 
of humanitarian intervention remained selective. While being actively involved in 
multinational interventions in Haiti, Somalia, and Rwanda, Canada criticized interventions in 
Algeria and Nigeria.  
 
Subsequently, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gordon Smith, played a 
critical role in formulating a conceptual framework for Canada’s foreign security policy that 
rested on three pillars.507 The first pillar, assumed that prosperity for Canadians was 
anchored in global economic and trade growth [development]. Secondly, security for 
Canadians had to reflect the geo-political certainties of the cold war [defence]. Thirdly, 
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Canadian values [diplomacy] must reflect the changed post-Cold-War environment and, 
thus, promote human security. Moreover, the concept of security increasingly focused on 
the needs of the individual, supporting the development of a human security based foreign 
policy. The promotion of values such as respect for democracy, the rule of law, human rights, 
and the environment were seen as essential parts of a human security policy.  
 
Yet, the main interest behind the promotion of global peace was its contribution to 
national and international economic growth and development which remained at the heart 
of the government agenda. Indeed, both Canadian participation and Canada’s capacity for 
participation in human security or humanitarian intervention actually declined in the early 
1990s due to budget cuts. In 1996, then Foreign Minister of Canada Lloyd Axworthy 
described his interpretation of human security as follows: “There has been recognition that 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, the right to live in dignity, with adequate food, 
shelter, health and education services, and under the rule of law and good governance, are 
as important to global peace as disarmament measures”.508 Axworthy provided a more 
specific human security analysis in his 1997 assessment of Canada’s foreign policy agenda: 
 
 “human security is much more than the absence of military threat. It includes security 
against economic privation, an acceptable quality of life, and a guarantee of fundamental 
human rights. This concept of human security recognizes the complexity of the human 
environment and accepts that the forces influencing human security are interrelated and 
mutually reinforcing”.509 
 
 Axworthy successfully negotiated the Ottawa Treaty for the ban on land mines510 
and supported the creation of the ICC. In his 1997 article Canada and human security: the 
need for leadership, Axworthy argued that “Canada and a small number of like‐minded 
countries such as Norway and the Netherlands began to reassess the traditional concept of 
security in order to identify those variables beyond arms control/disarmament which affect 
                                                          
508 Axworthy, L. (1996), Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy to the 
51st General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, September 24, 1996. 
509 Axworthy, L. (1997), ‘Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership’ in: International Journal, volume 52, 
issue 2, pp. 183–184. 
510 Although Axworthy does not regard the ban of land mines as an aspect of human security, the engagement in the 
Ottawa Treaty reflects Canada’s role as a good international citizen and norm entrepreneur. Axworthy stressed that 
aspect when he told his audiences that de‐mining was the primary objective of Canada’s policy. See: Axworthy, L. 
(1996), Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy at the Closing Session of the International Strategy 
Conference Towards a Global Ban on Anti‐Personnel Mines, Ottawa, Ontario, October 5, 1996. 
Colliding Norms in Humanitarian Intervention - PhD Thesis - Birte Ahlhaus 
 
145 | P a g e  
 
peace and stability. From this reconsideration emerged the concept of human security”.511 
With regard to the financial limits, Neufeld argues that “in the internationalized state, the 
function of Foreign Affairs is neither to participate in the international(ized) decision‐making 
process nor to act as a transmission belt into the domestic economy, but rather to provide a 
legitimating discourse in support of an increasingly fragile domestic hegemony”.512 As a 
matter of fact, the human security agenda itself has not been criticised for its intention, yet 
in contrast, there has been broad supported for a soft law normalization of humanitarian 
intervention. However it is the means by which human security is achieved, in times of civil 
conflicts, that is controversial and hinders a legal normalization of humanitarian intervention 
to accommodate the soft law normalization.  
 
Canada’s implementation of human security policy can, thus, be interpreted as a 
niche policy. The human security agenda implemented by Canada from the 1990s focussed 
upon the security of people rather than states, seeking to identify international norms to 
govern humanitarian intervention.513 Such policies contrast with historical realism, which is 
driven by the national interest calculation of the intervening state rather than purely 
humanitarian motives. At the same time, Canada is confronted with the collision of its policy 
interest in being a norm entrepreneur and rule follower in human security issues. Since 
humanitarian intervention collides with state sovereignty - the prohibition of the use of force 
and non-intervention - Canadian interventionism would have to be purely humanitarian in 
order to serve as legal evidence for a normalization of humanitarian intervention in 
international law. The case of Canada’s leadership of the planned Zaire intervention is 
therefore helpful to analyse how conflicting norms may or may not be reconciled.  
 
Historically, Canadian foreign policy has been studied through the lens of the ‘North 
Atlantic Triangle’ (the US, Great Britain and Canada). According to John Brebner’s North 
Atlantic Triangle, the US, Canada, and Great Britain were characterized by common 
strategic, political and economic interests.514 Yet, it was also obvious that the triangle was 
                                                          
511 Axworthy, L. (1997), ‘Canada and human security: the need for leadership’ in:  International Journal, volume 52, 
issue 2, pp: 183‐196. 
512 Neufeld, M. (2004), ‘Pitfalls of Emancipation and Discourses of Security: Reflections on Canada’s ‘Security with a 
Human Face’ in: International Relations, volume 18, issue 1, p. 120. 
513 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, (ICISS) (2001), The Responsibility to Protect, 
Ottawa: International Development Research Centre. 
514 Brebner, J. B. (1945), North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain, New 
Haven. | English, J.A. (1996), Not an Equilateral Triangle: Canada’s Strategic Relationship with the United States and 
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not balanced but reflected a unique interplay of foreign policies between states. Although 
the interpretation of the North Atlantic Triangle and its influence on foreign policy decisions 
varies, the analysis is tied together by the attention given to political and strategic concerns. 
The political relationship with the US was, and continues, to be central to Canada’s foreign 
policy, although the relationship was tested notably after 2003 as Canada pursued interests, 
which at times conflicted with the interests of the United States. Examples include, Canada’s 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and its efforts to establish an International Criminal Court 
(ICC). Following distinct policy interests at the international level occasioned an identity 
crises with regard to Canada’s foreign policy objectives. The identity crises led to an 
inconsistent human security policy under the Chrétien government (1993 – 2003), notably 
pushed by foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy. In order for Canada to live up to its ambitious 
human security policy, Canada tried to promote policy initiatives; such as the Ottawa Treaty 
on anti-personnel landmines and the creation of the ICC,515 and to build diplomatic coalitions 
with like-minded states. Such like-minded coalitions of states were institutionalized in 1998 
by the Lyösen Declaration516 between Canada and Norway and in 1999 by the Human 
Security Network.517 As such, Canada has worked with states like Australia, Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark, and Norway on various human security issues.  
 
In the Zaire case, former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien called for a greater 
formalization of this type of middle power coalition building.518 Yet, for a successful 
intervention Canada required the support of a militarily and financially powerful state in order 
to provide the resources. While supporting the Canadian led intervention in the beginning, 
the US pulled out when it no longer suited its interests and undermined the Canadian 
leadership. Louis Nastro and Kim Nossal state that: “In Zaire, Canada was sandbagged by 
                                                          
Britain, 1939–1945, in McKercher, B.J.C. and Aronson, L. (eds.), The North Atlantic Triangle in a Changing World: 
Anglo-American-Canadian Relations, Toronto, pp. 147–183. | Finlay, J.L. (1975), Canada in the North Atlantic Triangle. 
Two Centuries of Social Change, Toronto. 
515 International Criminal Court. 
516 The Lysøen Declaration in 1998 which focused on issues both countries perceived as a vital part of a human 
security agenda such as disarmament and human rights/rule of law issues: the effort to create an International 
Criminal Court, the role of human rights and international humanitarian law, especially in the context of organized 
violence. Furthermore, other agenda topics such as child soldiers, small arms, and gender-related issues in peace 
building were related to conflict prevention. 
517 Member states include Canada, Austria, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Slovenia, 
Switzerland, Thailand, and South Africa (as observer).  
518 Branswell, H. (1996), PM urges Cooperation, in: Halifax Chronicle Herald from December 3rd 1996.  
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its British and American allies, who simply withdrew their support in mid-initiative”.519 This 
statement points out the limits of middle power leadership in humanitarian intervention due 
to a lack of resources and dependency on super power support.  
 
Another aspect of Cooper’s approach to Canada’s foreign security policy is the idea 
of norms. This is of specific importance as it highlights Canada’s motivations behind the 
intervention and what role international law plays in Canada’s foreign policy decisions. The 
following section will examine in more detail the aspect norms, with regard to Canada’s 
compliance with international law, in Canada’s decision to intervene in Zaire.  
 
 
Criteria   Application 
 Defence White Paper 
1994 
Policy White 
Paper 1995 
 
Defence Re-orientation of 
Canadian defence 
policy towards 
international 
peacekeeping, 
preventive action, and 
peacebuilding. 
  
Diplomacy Rhetorical commitment 
to multinational 
cooperation.  
Protection of 
Canadian security 
within a stable 
global framework. 
Projection of 
Canadian values 
and culture. 
 
Development Total force concept: 
Multipurpose combat 
capability. 
Promotion of 
prosperity and 
employment. 
 
Niches Peacekeeping520 Focus on 
promoting 
international 
cooperation, 
building stability 
and on preventing 
conflict. 
Peace keeping 
Peace building 
                                                          
519 Nastro, L. and Nossal, K. (1997), ‘The commitment-capability gap: Implications for Canadian foreign policy in the 
post-Cold War era’ in: Canadian Defense Quarterly, volume: 26, issue: 2, p. 21.  
520 Peacekeeping as the central focus of a future Canadian Defence policy, including the Canada 21 Council. Canada 
21: Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century, See: Rioux, J.F. and Hay, R. (1997), Canadian Foreign 
Policy: From Internationalism to Isolationism?, Discussion Paper no. 16, in The Norman Paterson School of 
International Affairs, Carleton University Ottawa, Ontario p. 34.  
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Norms Collective defence, 
collective security 
Internationalist 
defence architecture 
that takes account of 
modern-day threats to 
security. 
Human Security 
Promotion of 
democracy and 
good governance, 
of human rights, 
and the rule of 
law. 
Creation of the ICJ 
Ottawa Treaty  
Networks The protection of 
Canada, defence 
cooperation with the 
United States, 
peacekeeping and 
involvement in other 
types of multilateral 
international security 
operations undertaken 
by the UN or NATO. 
Selective 
participation. 
1998 Lysøen Declaration 
1999 Human Security Network  
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Legal Approach to the Zaire Intervention 
 
On 16 November 1996, the UN Security Council authorized a multinational military 
intervention in order to stop the humanitarian crisis in the refugee camps in eastern Zaire 
and the border with Rwanda (UNSC Resolution 1080/1996). UN Security Council Resolution 
1080 allowed a multinational force under Canadian command to use commensurate force 
to secure specific humanitarian objectives – the ‘effective provision’ of aid to refugees and 
the local population, and the “voluntary and orderly repatriation” of the refugees.521 Following 
the UN’s inaction during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the international community of states 
felt morally compelled to react to another ethnic conflict in the region. The choice of Canada 
to lead the operation, initially designated Operation Phoenix Tusk later called Operation 
Assurance, recognised both the issue of neutrality as well as supplying a bilingual command. 
A further concern of the UN Security Council resolution was the participation of African 
states in the mission. Although they did not take part in the initial multinational force, they 
were supposed to form the backbone of the intervention.522  
 
 However, due to the financial constraints of the operation, whose costs were 
supposed to be covered by the participating member states, it was unlikely that an African 
lead force could be deployed quickly. Despite the fact that the multinational humanitarian 
intervention in Zaire, under Canadian leadership, never took place in its intended form; the 
intervention would have been, from a purely legal perspective, legal based on UN Security 
Council Resolution 1080. Nevertheless, the intervention under Canadian leadership has 
been subject to both, legal and political criticism. The central criticism is that the political 
agenda outweighed the supposed humanitarian intent. The claim is underlined by both the 
ill-preparedness of the Canadian armed forces, and the muddled misinterpretation of the 
required mandate for the operation.523 Kagame announced publicly on the BBC, following 
his ousting of Mobuto: “We used communication and information warfare better than anyone 
. . . our strength was to keep information from them [Western humanitarian organizations 
and the international media].”524 Furthermore, it has been argued by NGOs that Tutsi rebel 
                                                          
521 See: UN Security Council Resolution 1080,  
522 See: UN Security Council Resolution 1080, the African states support included troops from Cameroon, Congo, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mali and Senegal.  
523 Massey, S. (2000), ‘Operation Assurance: The greatest intervention that never happened’ in: Journal of 
Humanitarian Assistance, 3 June 2000. 
524 Gowing, N. (1998), New Challenges and Problems for Information Management in Complex Emergencies: Ominous 
Lessons from the Great Lakes and Eastern Zaire in late 1996 and early 1997, paper presented at the conference 
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forces carried out widespread massacres in Eastern Zaire, while denying investigators 
access to the sites of the atrocities.525 Meanwhile, in the UN Security Council, France and 
the US clashed. Neither France nor the US wanted the other to intervene because these 
two permanent members of the Council supported opposing sides. France was sympathetic 
to the Rwandan Hutu groups and had even led a mission (Opération Turquoise) in 1994 to 
protect their withdrawal from Rwanda following the genocide of militant Hutu groups of ethnic 
Tutsi tribes. The US, by contrast, had long-standing links with the Tutsi groups that had 
ousted the Hutus in 1994 in Rwanda. Although the refugee situation at the border had been 
only partially ameliorated, the US decided to back down, and Canada reluctantly followed 
suit.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
‘Dispatches from Disaster Zones: The Reporting of Humanitarian Emergencies’, London, 27–28 May 1998, p. 15. 
Available online at http://www.usip.org/events/past-events?filter0=1998.  
525 Human Rights Watch (1997), What Kabila is Hiding: Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo, Report 9/5, pp.28–34. 
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Conclusion 
 
The aim and intention of an outside humanitarian intervention in civil conflict, as recently 
outlined by the ICISS,526 is to save lives and reduce human suffering without interfering in 
political or governmental disputes. Yet, a closer analysis of the practice of humanitarian 
justified interventions shows that the decision to militarily intervene in a civil conflict can 
never be neutral, nor is it done for purely humanitarian motives. Intervening in an ethnic, 
civil or cultural conflict from the outside always has political ramifications. In particular, civil 
conflicts in central Africa have experienced an unparalleled history of humanitarian and civil 
crises that are deeply rooted in cultural and ethnic divisions. A central aspect of the interior 
wars in African states is the number of civilian deaths. Thus, the crisis in Angola between 
1975 – 2002 caused 650,000 deaths; the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 
1996 caused 3 million deaths; the war in Sudan between 1983 – 2005 caused 2.5 million 
deaths; the violence in Rwanda in 1994  resulted in 1 million deaths; the conflict in Burundi 
between 1993 – 2005 caused 300,000 deaths; the crisis in Liberia between 1989 – 1997 
caused 250,000 deaths; the war in Sierra Leone in 1997 caused 75,000 deaths; and the 
violence in Uganda since the 1980s  caused 40,000 deaths.527 In other words, close to eight 
million people died in civil conflicts in Africa alone since the end of the Cold War.  
 
 In early November 1996, Canada secured promises of peacekeeping troops from 
other nations. On 15 November 1996, the Security Council mandated a Canadian-led 
Multinational Force (MNF). Canada’s intention to lead a multinational military intervention in 
Zaire in 1996 demonstrates the difficulty of offering impartial support to civilians in an ethnic 
conflict. Both parties in the civil conflict in eastern Zaire had committed crimes against 
humanity and caused widespread human suffering. Any kind of outside intervention would 
mean taking a side in the conflict and, hence, legitimating one party’s crimes. Both, the US 
and France were aware of this implication due to their colonial and historical past and 
influence in the region. Although Canada was largely perceived as neutral, neither Rwanda 
nor Zaire were interested in an outside intervention in the civil conflict along their border.  
 
                                                          
526 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001), The Responsibility to Protect. 
Ottawa: International Development Research Centre. 
527 Levitt, J. (2005), ‘The Law on Intervention: Africa’s Path breaking Model’ in: Global Dialogue, Winter/Spring 2005, p. 
50.  
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The Zaire intervention, therefore, offers a good case for the analysis of the 
normalization of humanitarian intervention by middle powers not only because it was led by 
Canada as a middle power, but also because the Zaire intervention shows the policy and 
legal conflict between ethics and security. Generally, humanitarian crises receive either little 
or no attention from the international community of states; or at the other extreme, are 
characterized by a military intervention aimed at imposing a new regime on the state. Yet, 
due to a change in the nature of international conflicts, moving away from interstate wars to 
intrastate crises, the meaning of security and ethics in foreign policies has been increasingly 
debated.528  
 
In the study of international relations, and foreign policy specifically, constructivist 
scholars, in the 1990s, asserted that the importance of values, norms, or ethics in shaping 
the processes of decision making. The context of shared values and norms is used to 
legitimize certain foreign policy decisions and provide behavioural guidelines. Thus, the 
2001 ICISS doctrine of the responsibility to protect draws on the shared values of human 
rights protection to legitimize the conduct of humanitarian intervention as a last resort. 
International law also draws on norms and values, specifically within customary international 
law. In order for a customary international rule to come into existence two elements, an 
objective one, the repeated behaviour of States (diuturnitas), and a subjective one, the belief 
that such behaviour depends on a legal obligation (opinio iuris sive necessitatis) need to be 
fulfilled. Opinio iuris is, by definition, an opinion, a conviction, or a belief of a state on the 
existence of a rule of law that is often influenced by specific values or norms. Ultimately, 
Zaire showed the dependency of middle power led humanitarian intervention humanitarian 
intervention on political and historical contingencies such as the interests of powerful states 
and unforeseen events in the conflict state.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
528 See, for example: Krause, K. and Williams, M. (1997), Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, in: Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. | Buzan, B., Waever, O. and De Wilde, J. (1989), Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. | Booth, K. (1991), ‘Security and Emancipation’ in: Review of International 
Studies volume 17, issue 4, pp: 313-26.| Tuchman Mathews, J. (1989), ‘Redefining Security’ in: Foreign Affairs volume 
68, issue 2 (Spring 1989), pp: 162-77. 
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Zaire Fulfilled Criteria Absent Criteria  
Severe Abuse of Human Rights 
Final Resort 
Right Intention 
Proportional Means 
Reasonable Prospect 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
Chapter VII Authorization 
International Engagement 
X 
X 
 
Conclusion 5 2 
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Chapter 6: The Australian 1999 East Timor Intervention 
 
“Australia is a significant middle power which will be listened to – and is listened to – when 
it advances informed and reasonable views”.529 
 
Just as the 1996 Zaire intervention showed a change in Canada’s foreign policy goals, the 
1999 Australian led intervention in East Timor shifted Australian foreign policy towards a 
more interventionist stance. The East Timor intervention demonstrates a significant change 
in Australia’s foreign policy because it ended a long term Jakarta First Policy. In the 1999 
East Timor intervention, Australia provided the leadership and infrastructure for the 
intervention. Australia’s military engagement and leadership in the East Timor intervention 
posed challenges both for Australia’s foreign policy and its military capabilities. In fact, 
Australia’s involvement in INTERFET constituted the largest overseas deployment by the 
ADF since the Vietnam War.530 Former Prime Minister John Howard described Australia's 
involvement in East Timor from 1998 as "the most positive and noble act by Australia in ... 
international relations in the last 20 years".531 By contrast, Hugh White, former Australian 
Defence Department and Clinton Fernandes, former Australian Army intelligence analyst, 
arrived at different views on Australia’s role and interests in the East Timor intervention. 
White argued that Australia was “remiss in not trying to do more” to secure a pre-referendum 
peacekeeping force532.Somewhat differently, Fernandes maintained that the Australian 
Government “worked assiduously” to prevent a peacekeeping force.533  
 
 Moving away from the practical analysis of the 1999 East Timor intervention, this 
chapter looks at the national interests and strategic goals which motivated Australia. There 
were a range of factors that led to the Australian decision to lead the intervention in East 
Timor. Whether one, by itself, would have been sufficient to result in the intervention is 
unclear, but the situation in 1999 changed in a way that called for an intervention. Overall, 
the geo-strategic  realities that Australia and South-East Asia faced by late 1998 were quite 
                                                          
529 Fraser, M. (1980), Parliamentary Debates - Hansard, ed. Department of Parliamentary Services, Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia, p. 1199. 
530 Kelly, M.J., McCormack, T.L.H., Muggleton, P. and Oswald, B.M. (2001), ‘Legal aspects of Australia's involvement in 
the International Force for East Timor’ in: International Review of the Red Cross, no. 841.  
531 Commonwealth of Australia (2001), East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge, Canberra: 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.  
532 White, H. (2008), The Road to INTERFET: Reflections on Australian Strategic Decisions Concerning East Timor, 
December 1998-September 1999, in: Security Challenges, volume 4, issue 1 (Autumn 2008), p. 86. 
533 Fernandes, C. (2008), ‘The Road to INTERFET: Bringing the Politics Back In’ in: Security Challenges, volume 4, issue 3 
(Spring 2008), p. 83. 
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different from those of 1975, when civil conflict in East Timor started following the Indonesian 
annexation of the former Portuguese colony. Factors affecting the increased need for 
intervention included: firstly, the magnitude of human rights abuses taking place in East 
Timor reported by the media, which caused public support for an Australian led mission to 
East Timor; secondly, the Australian government perceived the intervention as legitimate 
and legal. This was based on the facts that the Indonesian annexation of East Timor had 
never been recognized legally by the international community as a whole, though, ironically, 
it had been recognized by Australia. Further, the Indonesian government gave its permission 
to the intervention in East Timor. A vital factor was the potential impact of civil conflict in 
East Timor on regional stability. 
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The Battle for Independence in East Timor in 1999 
 
Timor was divided into a western part, a former Dutch Colony and now part of Indonesia, 
and an eastern part, a former Portuguese Colony. While the Dutch ended their colonial rule 
in the East Indies and recognized West Timor as part of Indonesia in 1949, East Timor 
remained under Portuguese rule until 1975 when a military coup in Portugal altered this 
relationship. East Timor’s independence in 1976 only lasted nine days before Indonesia 
occupied the new state. Even before the Indonesian military intervention the clash between 
the Uniao Democratica Timorense, who favoured some form of continued association with 
its former colonial power Portugal, and the communist orientated Frente Revolucionaria 
Timor Leste Independence (FRETILIN), who supported complete independence, threatened 
the integrity of the new state. In 1975, Operation Komodo, launched by then Indonesian 
President Suharto occupied the Eastern part of Timor Island following the civil unrest and 
growing calls for independence. According to Subroto, Indonesia used the turmoil that 
accompanied the withdrawal of Portuguese imperial rule to intervene and subsequently 
occupy the country.534 On this pretext, Indonesia occupied the eastern part of the Island. 
Significantly, and somewhat ironically, the Indonesian government described the 
intervention in East Timor as a ‘humanitarian’ following civil unrest.535 Yet the Indonesian 
intervention further aimed to infiltrate and undermine the coalition formed by the two most 
prominent pro-democracy parties —the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor 
(FRETILIN) and the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT).536 
 
 Although the occupation of East Timor was never recognized by the UN, US, or UK 
governments, they accepted Indonesia’s invasion and subsequent occupation of East 
Timor. Australia meanwhile first gave de facto recognition to Indonesia’s annexation of East 
Timor, followed by a de jure recognition in 1979.Like the New Order government in Jakarta, 
western powers feared that that independence might result in East Timor becoming a 
“Trojan horse” for external powers, particularly international communism in the context of 
the Cold War.537 As Smith argued: “the impetus for Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 
                                                          
534 Subroto, H. (1997), Eyewitness to Integration of East Timor, Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan. 
535 Toohey, B. and Marian Wilkinson, M. (1987), The Timor Papers, in: The Book of Leaks, Sydney: Angus &Robertson, 
p. 143-195. 
536 Pilger, J. (2000), The Invasion of East Timor in 1975, in Death of a Nation: The Timor Conspiracy, London: Carlton 
Press. | Jardin, M. (2002), East Timor: Genocide in Paradise, Berkeley, CA: Odonian Press.  
537 Smith, A.L. (2005), ‘Constraints and Choices: East Timor as Foreign Policy Actor’ in: New Zealand Journal of Asian 
Studies, volume 7, issue 1, p. 18. 
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1975 was the perception that East Timor might become a Cuba of the South Pacific, 
potentially even involving external communist powers.”538  
 
However, during the succeeding twenty-four years of Indonesian occupation nearly twenty-
five per cent of the East Timor population was killed.539 Although estimates vary, it is thought 
that around 10,000 Indonesian soldiers were killed by the rebels and as many as 230,000 
East Timorese died as a result of direct Indonesian action or the malnutrition and disease 
that accompanied it.540 After the 1999 referendum, East Timor-based, Indonesian supported 
militias destroyed much of the infrastructure and perpetrated violence in East Timor in which 
many hundreds were killed.541 In fact, Operation Clean Sweep undertaken by the Indonesian 
military killed at least 1500 people.542 The Indonesian military destroyed the capital city Dili 
and hundreds of thousands of people fled into the mountains.543 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
538 Smith, A.L. (2005), ‘Constraints and Choices: East Timor as Foreign Policy Actor’ in: New Zealand Journal of Asian 
Studies, volume 7, issue 1, p. 18.  
539 Mann, M. (2007): Die dunkle Seite der Demokratie – Eine Theorie der ethnischen Säuberung [The Dark Side of 
Democracy – A Theory of ethnic cleansing], Hamburger Edition HIS Verlagsgesellschaft, p. 727. | Bricmont, J. (2009), 
Humanitärer Imperialismus – die Ideologie von der humanitären Intervention als Rechtfertigung für imperialistische 
Kriege [Humanitarian Imperialism – the Ideology of Humanitarian Intervention as a Justification for Imperial Wars], Kai 
Homilius Verlag, p. 32.  
540 Dee, M. (2001), ‘Coalitions of the willing and Humanitarian Intervention’ in: International Peacekeeping, volume 8, 
issue 3, pp: 1-20. | Schwarz, A. (1994), A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s, Sydney: Allen and Unwin. 
541 Schwartz, E. (2001), The Intervention in East Timor: Report for the National Intelligence Council December 2001, p. 
1.  
542 Kiernan, B. (2007), Blood and Soil – a World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur, Yale 
University Press, p. 581. | Chopra, J. (2000), ‘The UN´s Kingdom of East Timor’ in: Survival, volume 42, number 3, The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 27. 
543 Bricmont, J. (2009), Humanitärer Imperialismus – die Ideologie von der humanitären Intervention als Rechtfertigung 
für imperialistische Kriege [Humanitarian Imperialism – the Ideology of Humanitarian Intervention as a Justification for 
Imperial Wars], Kai Homilius Verlag, p. 24. 
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Prior to the 1999 East Timor Intervention, the Australian – Indonesian relationship 
between 1949 and 1999 altered through different periods of cooperation and conflict. After 
decolonisation, Indonesia developed as a non-aligned state. During the 1950s, Australian – 
Indonesian relationships were characterised by deepening suspicion and tensions. As 
Indonesia’s first leader, Sukarno, became assertively anti-western in the course of the 
1960s, the relationship deteriorated into open hostility due to the Indonesian occupation of 
the former Dutch colony of West New Guinea and Indonesia’s declaration of ‘confrontation’ 
(konfrontasi) with the newly formed Malaysian federal government in 1963.544 Australia, in 
contrast, supported the new Malaysian government and entered a state of covert war 
against Indonesia, but it nevertheless continued to give aid to the country in order to protect 
economic ties with Indonesia545. The Australian policy towards Indonesia during the 1960s 
ran the risk of being pulled into a deepening regional conflict in South East Asia. Then 
Indonesian president Habibie refused his agreement to an international peace mission at 
that time.546  
 
                                                          
544 Dee, M. (2005), Australia and the Formation of Malaysia: 1961-1966, Barton. │ Dennis, P. and Grey, J. (1996), 
Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950-1966, St Leonards. │ 
Edwards, P. and Pemberton, G. (1992), Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia’s Involvement 
in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1965, Sydney. │Woodard, G. (1998), Best Practice in Australia’s Foreign Policy: 
“Konfrontasi”, in: Australian Journal of Political Science, volume 33, pp.85-99. 
545 Van der Eng, P. (2008), Konfrontasi and Australian Aid to Indonesia during the 1960s, in: Working Papers in 
Economics and Econometrics, Working Paper Number 493, Australian National University, Canberra.  
546 Nevis, J. (2005), A Not so Distant Horror: Mass Violence in East Timor, New York, Cornell University Press.  
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Indonesia’s reaction was not entirely surprising as the Australian demand for an 
international peacekeeping force to support East Timor’s independence referendum 
reflected a dramatic policy change in the Australian-Indonesian relationship. In 1978, under 
Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser and Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock, Australia accorded 
de facto recognition of Indonesian rule over East Timor. Despite public opposition, the 
Australian government decided that:  
 
“On an early occasion the Government [should] announce that it fully accepts the reality that 
East Timor is part of Indonesia and that all future Government action [will] be based on the 
acceptance of the proposition that Indonesia exercises sovereign power so far as that 
territory is concerned...”547 
 
Australia was one of the few countries that de jure accepted Indonesia’s rule over 
East Timor and, by 1989, had signed an economic treaty with Indonesia jointly to exploit 
offshore natural resources in the Timor Gap. In 1995, the Keating government, prioritizing 
the Indonesia first policy, signed a defence treaty with the Suharto regime. 
 
 Consequently, when  in 1999, Australia decided to dispatch troops to the Northern 
Territory so they might be deployed if the security situation in East Timor deteriorated, 
Jakarta interpreted this action as a breach of treaty obligations. By contrast, Australia’s 
Ministry of Defence undertook such a state of preparedness in order to provide the 
government with different courses of action including the possibility of joining an international 
military force.548 The UN established the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) 
to organize and conduct the referendum.549 The referendum, on 30th August 1999, 
supported East Timor’s independence with seventy-nine per cent550 of the votes in favour. 
The UN announced the results of the ballot on 4th September 1999. President Habibe 
accepted the outcome and directed Indonesian security forces to maintain order in East 
Timor. Yet, immediately after the results were announced, pro-integration militias, covertly 
supported by the Indonesian military, destroyed the county’s public infrastructure and 
                                                          
547 Australian Cabinet Minute dated 17th January 1978, Decision No. 4485. 
548 Australia’s Ministry of Defense (1999), Government Announces Increased Readiness (September 6, 1999), available 
online at: 
 http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/timor/index.html. 
549 SC Res. 1246, UN Doc. S/RES/1246 (15 June 1999). 
550Mann, M. (2007): Die dunkle Seite der Demokratie – Eine Theorie der ethnischen Säuberung [The Dark Side of 
Democracy – A Theory of ethnic cleansing], Hamburger Edition HIS Verlagsgesellschaft., p.727. | Kiernan, B. (2007), 
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Colliding Norms in Humanitarian Intervention - PhD Thesis - Birte Ahlhaus 
 
160 | P a g e  
 
targeted pro-independence supporters as well as civilians. The civil conflict took the lives of 
at least 1500 people,551 displaced as many as 250,000 East Timorese,552 and destroyed 
about 70 per cent of East Timor’s basic infrastructure.553 As Traub notes, the militias fanned 
out to every village and town, looting and burning every house and building.554 
 
 Civil unrest in East Timor attracted significant international attention.  In 1991, when 
271 unarmed East Timorese civilians were killed and 382 wounded by the Indonesian army 
during a pro-independence march in Dili.555 In response to the burgeoning conflict, Australia, 
in protest, cancelled joint military exercises with Indonesia and reviewed its general defence 
ties.556 Subsequently, however, Australia continued and extended bilateral relations with 
Indonesia and signed a mutual defence treaty with then President Suharto in 1995. 
 
 Moreover, despite the developing crisis in the wake of the 1999 referendum, US 
President Clinton initially declared in September, that Indonesia was responsible for peace 
and security in East Timor and any intervention would interfere in Indonesia’s internal 
affairs.557 However, following mounting domestic pressure, Clinton subsequently agreed to 
support the UN-Intervention International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) under Australia’s 
leadership.558 INTERFET troops entered East Timor in September 1999 under the command 
of Australian Defence Force commander Major-General Peter Cosgrove, before handing 
over to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in March 
2000. INTERFET’s mission was to halt the violence in East Timor and establish the rule of 
law in order to allow for a transition to a UN administration that would facilitate the move to 
independence. On 7 September 1999, Indonesia imposed martial law in East Timor and 
                                                          
551 Kiernan, B. (2007), Blood and Soil – a World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur, Yale 
University Press, p. 581. | Chopra, J. (2000), ‘The UN´s Kingdom of East Timor’ in: Survival, volume 42, number 3, the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 27.  
552 Crosette, B. (1999), UN Begin Taking Refugees Home to East Timor this Week, in: The New York Times (October 5, 
1999). 
553 Emerson, D. (2000), Will Indonesia Survive?, in:  Foreign Affairs, volume 79, issue 3, pp: 95-106. 
554 Traub, J. (2000), Inventing East Timor, in: Foreign Affairs, volume 79, issue 4, pp: 74-89. 
555 Cotton, J. (2001), Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention, in: Survival, volume 43, issue 1, p. 134. 
556 Kelly, M.J., McCormack, T.L.H., Muggleton, P. and Oswald, B. M. (2001), ‘Legal aspects of Australia's involvement in 
the International Force for East Timor’ in: International Review of the Red Cross, No. 841. 
557Bricmont, J. (2009), Humanitärer Imperialismus – die Ideologie von der humanitären Intervention als Rechtfertigung 
für imperialistische Kriege [Humanitarian Imperialism – the Ideology of Humanitarian Intervention as a Justification for 
Imperial Wars], Kai Homilius Verlag, p. 24. 
558Chopra, J. (2000), ‘The UN´s Kingdom of East Timor’ in: Survival, volume 42, number 3, The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, p. 28. 
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agreed to accept the assistance of the international community to restore peace and security 
in East Timor and to implement the result of the referendum. Following the deployment of 
INTERFET, Indonesia lifted martial law and withdrew from the territory on 24 September 
1999. On 26 October 1999 the United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAET) was 
established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1272. INTERFET formally transferred 
its responsibilities under Resolution 1264 to UNTAET on 23 February 2000. UNTAET was 
given authority to “exercise all legislative and executive authority including the administration 
of justice”. 
 
 Indonesian President Habibie’s decision in January 1999 to hold a referendum on 
East Timor’s independence clearly affected Australia’s strategic environment and 
demanded a new approach. In an interview with Ian Henry in 2012, former Australian Prime 
Minister Howard and his foreign minister Alexander Downer agreed that Australia had little 
choice but to accept Habibie’s decision as a fait accompli. Australia’s new strategic objective 
was to see the ballot not just occur, but to see it occur credibly.559 Examining summary 
records of meetings between the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(DFAT), Ashton Calvert, and American Assistant Secretary of State, Stanley Roth, in 
February 1999, Calvert contended that the international community could “induce East 
Timorese and Indonesian leaders to work towards an orderly and peaceful transition and to 
avert the need for recourse to peacekeepers”.560 Nevertheless, the Australian Department 
of Defence prepared for a variety of worst-case scenarios.  
 
 The 1999 East Timor intervention is widely regarded as a successful humanitarian 
support mission561 due to its quick and efficient counteraction of violence and instability. 
Indeed, it took only five days from the adoption of the resolution for the troops from twenty-
two countries to be assembled. Four days later, Indonesia began to pull-out its military and 
left East Timor after twenty-four years of occupation. According to McDougall, humanitarian 
                                                          
559 Henry, I. (2013), ‘Playing Second Fiddle on the Road to INTERFET:  Australia’s East Timor Policy Throughout 1999’ 
in: Security Challenges Journal, volume 9, issue 1, p. 90.  
560 Lyons, J. (1999), The Secret Timor Dossier, in: The Bulletin, 12 October 1999. 
561 Weis, T. (2007), Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action, Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press; Australian 
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer has unabashedly suggested that they be made as a model for future humanitarian 
interventions, See: Wheeler, N.J. and Dunne, T. (2001), ‘East Timor and the new Humanitarian Interventionism’ in: 
International Affairs, volume 77, issue 4.  
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intervention would not have been possible without Australian leadership.562 Australia’s offer 
to lead and organize a multinational force and its willingness to fund most of the costs were 
crucial factors in the success of the intervention. 
 
 Significantly, Wheeler and Dunne claim that the move by Australia to risk its troops 
was based on moral impulse, and not supported by strong national interests, which were, to 
some extent, used to defend the decision to save the people of East Timor.563 By responding 
to the humanitarian crisis, they contend that the Howard-led Australian government acted 
as a “good international citizen”. Yet, because the UN did not fully include the East Timor 
public in the government building process new unrest started to spread soon after the 
INTERFRET mission left East Timor in February 2000.564  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
562 Mc Dougall, D. (2002), ‘Australia’s Peacekeeping Role in the Post-Cold War Era’ in: Contemporary Southeast Asia, 
volume 24, issue 3, pp: 590-608. 
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Affairs, volume 77, issue 4. 
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Australian Foreign Policy: Between Ethics and Strategic Policies 
 
Wheeler and Dunne notwithstanding, in order to assess Australia’s interest and engagement 
in the East Timor civil conflict in 1999, it is necessary to look at the broader historical context 
of Australian foreign policy and its political relationship with South East Asia, and Indonesia 
in particular. According to Dunne,565 Australia possesses a limited range of tools it can pull 
out of the foreign policy toolkit. This evidently qualifies Australia as a middle power state. 
When Foreign Minister (1988 – 1996), Gareth Evans defined Australia as a middle power, 
he emphasised that “the kind of foreign policy we have been crafting and implementing in 
recent years was middle power diplomacy with an Asia Pacific orientation”.566 Kevin Rudd 
reiterated this statement in 2010 arguing that Australia was a “middle power with profound 
regional interests”.567 Commentators often note that “Australia’s two major parties seldom 
diverge significantly in their foreign policies”.568 I 
 
  Australia’s foreign policy has also been constrained by public opinion. Certain policy 
norms, such as the centrality of the US alliance and economic relations with Asia would not 
be questioned by any government that wishes to be re-elected. From an Indonesian 
perspective, Rezasyah argued that in the 1990s, “Australian foreign policy changes from 
one regime to another are largely incremental, not radical' because both major political 
parties are willing to cultivate a cordial relationship with Indonesia, regardless of the latter's 
position on East Timor. They remain steadfast in their attitude even though local 
backbenchers and the media are pushing for tougher Australian measures against 
Indonesia.”569 Australia’s strategic interests further included the objectives of supporting 
Indonesia’s developing democracy and maintaining the Australia-Indonesia bilateral 
relationship. 
 
                                                          
565 Dunne, T. and Gifkins, J. (2011), ‘Libya and the State of Intervention’ in: Australian Journal of International Affairs, 
volume 65, issue 5.  
566 Quoted by Rudd, R. (2011), Australia’s Foreign Policy Interests in the Middle East, available online at: 
http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2011/kr_sp_110222.html  
567 Rudd, K. (2010), Australian Foreign Policy Looking West, available online at: 
http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2010/kr_sp_101112.html   
568 Cotton, J. and Ravenhill, J. (2012), Middle Power Dreaming: Australia in World Affairs 2006-2010, Oxford University 
Press.  
569 Rezasyah, T. (1996), Uncovering Australian Foreign Policy Making: The Prevalence of a Dominant Bureaucracy, in: 
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 Yet, there are also significant differences in the approaches the two parties have 
taken to achieve these shared foreign policy goals. While the Australian Labour Party (ALP) 
has been more internationalist and activist in promoting Australia as a middle power, 
coalition governments – particularly under John Howard – relied more on bilateral ties. Such 
bilateral relationships, especially with Great Britain and the US, developed as a “uniquely 
advantageous alignment”570.  
 
 In world affairs, Australia’s active policy and role as a norm entrepreneur in the region 
and globally has often been overlooked in the literature or downplayed by identifying it as 
reliant571 on the great powers, Great Britain until 1942 and the US after that. Thus, Duncan 
argues Australian foreign policy has little room for creativity and independence.572  
 This, however, ignores many cases of Australian policy entrepreneurship. Examples 
include former foreign minister H.V. Evatt’s contribution to shaping the United Nations 
founding conference after 1945,573 Gough Whitlam’s reform of Australia’s standing in the 
Asia-Pacific after 1972, Malcolm Fraser’s influence on the end of apartheid in South Africa 
and the independence of Zimbabwe,574 and, of course, the 1999 East Timor intervention. 
These examples support the view of Australia as an active and creative middle power. From 
the Whitlam government (1972-75), Australia sought to conduct itself as a moral foreign 
actor on the world stage.575 The government under Malcolm Fraser endorsed this policy, 
arguing that “that Australia is a significant middle power which will be listened to – and is 
listened to – when it advances informed and reasonable views”.576 Despite his high regards 
for human rights protection, development aid for the Third World and acceptance of regional 
refugee flows into Australia,577 Malcolm Fraser also accepted Indonesia's de jure 
                                                          
570 Cotton, J. and Ravenhill, J. (2012), Middle Power Dreaming: Australia in World Affairs 2006-2010, Oxfor University 
Press, p. 9. 
571 Wesley, M. (2009), The Rich Tradition of Australian Realism, in: Australian Journal of Politics and History, volume 
55, issue 3, p. 332. 
572 Duncan, M., Leigh, A., Madden, D. and Tynan, P. (2004), Imagining Australia: Ideas for our Future, Allen & Unwin, 
Sydney, p. 225.  
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Sydney, p. 30. 
574 Renouf, A. (1986), Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, Australian Professional Publications, Sydney, p. 
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575 Renouf, A. (1986), Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy, Australian Professional Publications, Sydney, p. 
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576 Fraser, M. (1980), Parliamentary Debates - Hansard, ed. Department of Parliamentary Services, Canberra: 
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sovereignty over East Timor. In his position as Foreign Minister Gareth Evans relied on 
Australia’s recognition of Indonesia’s de jure sovereignty over East Timor in 1989 in order 
to negotiate access to oil and gas resources in the Timor Gap with Indonesia. The Timor 
Gap Treaty between Indonesia and Australia was signed in December 1985 by the Hawke 
government which had formerly rejected the recognition of Indonesia’s occupation of East 
Timor.   
 
 Such de jure recognition, however, can be seen as jeopardizing Australia’s aim to be 
a rule follower, as Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor was not recognised 
internationally as a legal occupation.  John McCredie highlighted the amorality of the policy 
of economic security, arguing that, “Indonesian absorption of Timor makes geopolitical 
sense. Any other long term solution would be potentially disruptive of both Indonesia and 
the region. Its [absorption] would help confirm our seabed agreement with Indonesia. It 
should induce a greater readiness on [Jakarta’s] part to discuss Indonesia’s ocean policy.”578 
It wasn’t until 1997 that a senior figure in the mainstream political parties openly criticised 
the Indonesia first policy when Laurie Brereton, a former Minister under Keating’s 
government raised concerns over the civil situation in East Timor under Indonesian 
occupation and argued for self-determination for the East Timorese. Yet, the Leader and 
Deputy Leader of the Opposition (Kim Beazley and Gareth Evans) opposed any policy 
change regarding Australia’s relationship with Indonesia and East Timor. Due to increasing 
civil conflicts in the Indonesian occupied East Timor region, Australian foreign policy 
interests of protecting strategic ties with Indonesia and promoting human rights in East Timor 
began to collide. The Australian Government found itself in a difficult position, where 
Australia’s humanitarian interests, the need to respond to a civil conflict, conflicted with 
Australia’s long-term strategy of Indonesia first. 
 
 As with Canada, Australia’s foreign and defence policies were restructured during the 
1990s, as a response to a changed international system at the end of the Cold War. These 
included changes in security alliances with countries in the Asia Pacific region.  Former 
Foreign Minister Gareth Evans announced in 1989 that the new strategic policy was 
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Place, volume 9, issue 4, p. 34-48.  
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multidimensional, extending beyond traditional military capabilities and included improved 
diplomacy, economic and trade relations.579 Australia’s defence policy in the 1990s reflected 
Australia’s general commitment to multilateralism. In this context, in 1995, Australia and 
Indonesia signed the Indonesia-Australian Agreement of Maintaining Security.  
 
 Another objective in the 1990s foreign security policy agenda was the concern to 
promote human security. This objective was acknowledged in the 1993 Strategic Review 
and was further developed in the 1994 Defence White Paper Defending Australia. The 
1990s, thus, saw a growing foreign policy emphasis on operations beyond traditional 
defence policies. According to the 1994 White Paper, “Planning for the defence of Australia 
takes full account of our broader strategic interests”580. “Australia,” it seemed now  had  
“important interests beyond the direct defence of our own territory, and the ADF will be called 
upon in the future, as it has in the past, to undertake activities and operations elsewhere in 
our region, and in other parts of the world in cooperation with neighbours, allies and 
international institutions, particularly the United Nations.”  581As such, Australia’s Strategic 
Policy, published in 1997 by the Howard Government, developed new defence objectives. 
The paper addressed the explicit question regarding the “uncertainties about the direction 
Indonesia will take when President Suharto eventually leaves office”.582 In particular; the 
paper gave attention to the objective of supporting global interests. The objective was based 
on two elements in Australia’s  new strategic environment: first, the increasing importance 
of non-traditional military tasks including peacekeeping and humanitarian operations; and 
second, the growing importance of global security interests, including the need to support 
both the United States and the United Nations in their emerging roles as supporters of 
stability in the post-Cold War world.  
 
 Australia’s subsequent defence paper Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, 
published in December 2000, was influenced in important ways by the experience of East 
Timor in late 1999. Chapter 4 of Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force sets out 
Australian strategic interests and objectives. These interests covered not only the defence 
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of the continent and its direct approaches, but the stability of the immediate neighbourhood, 
the security of Southeast Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific, and support for global security. 
They provided the foundation for the statement of strategic tasks for the ADF in Chapter 6 
of that paper, which included not only defending Australia but contributing to the security of 
the immediate neighbourhood. The developments within Australia’s strategic foreign and 
defence policies during the 1990’s reflected the state’s general foreign policy objectives of 
multilateralism and good international citizenship,  whilst maintaining, somewhat 
contradictorily, a bilateral approach to trade and regional architecture.  
 
  Indonesia’s acceptance of the Australian led intervention and a UN Security Council 
mandate gave Australia the legal basis to intervene in coalition with UN Security Council 
member states, particularly the UK. Due to the fact that, at least 1500 people had been 
killed583, as many as 250,000 East Timorese584 civilians had been displaced, and about 70 
per cent of East Timor’s basic infrastructure585 had been destroyed, some authors justify the 
intervention on grounds of genocide.586 This is supported by the argument that most of the 
victims were civilians rather than armed insurgents. According to Article 3 of the Genocide 
Convention, the act of genocide is defined as the “deliberate inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”.  
 
Yet, looking more closely at Australian foreign policy interests and developments in 
Indonesia at the time of the East Timor intervention, it becomes clear that strategic and 
national interests also governed Australia’s decision to lead the humanitarian intervention in 
East Timor. As Linklater points out, Australia’s aim to be a good international citizen and 
protect international human rights did not involve Australia endangering its vital strategic 
and security interests.587 Although East Timor is regarded as a successful intervention, the 
moral intention behind Australia’s leadership may be questioned.  
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Humanitarian intervention generally takes place within the context of advancing 
broad national foreign policy goals. Thus, Ayoob and Miller argue that, in general, 
humanitarian intervention is a tool often used by more powerful states to extend their 
influence over weaker states.588 Indeed, Walzer contends that national leaders have both 
the right and the duty to prioritize the interests of their own people even when in pursuit of a 
humanitarian objectives.589 Mearsheimer even observes that “states are rarely willing to 
expend blood and treasure to protect foreign populations from gross abuses including 
genocide.”590 Despite debate over the extent to which humanitarian intervention can be 
purely humanitarian, there is general agreement that it should at least be primarily based on 
humanitarian motives, allowing   for some degree of subsidiary “mixed motives”.591  
 
Australia certainly had mixed motives in its approach to Eat Timor. It was the only 
western state to accept de jure the Indonesian annexation of East Timor in 1979. For 
Australian policy makers, the suppression of East Timor’s autonomy was seen as more 
beneficial to overall Australian national interests during the Suharto era. Australian interests 
lie both in a stable and safe geo-strategic environment and regional economic growth. 
According to Shuja, a weak Indonesia would be a security threat to Australia.592 More 
specifically, Shuja argued that independence for East Timor could result in the balkanization 
of Indonesia by encouraging other separatist movements to demand independence from 
Jakarta.  
 
A further Australian concern was economic growth. The Timor Sea is rich in oil and 
natural resources. It can be argued that Australia’s recognition of Indonesian sovereignty in 
East Timor was not only a way of maintaining stability in the region, but also a means through 
which Australia was able to negotiate a favourable commercial agreement. In fact, in the 
1989 Timor Gap Treaty Indonesia and Australia agreed to share East Timor’s offshore 
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natural resources.593 According to Aubrey,594 Australia’s de facto and de jure recognition of 
Indonesia’s illegal occupation of East Timor seems to have been in exchange for securing 
an agreement on seabed rights and oil exploration off the East Timor coast.  
 
Alan Renouf, former DFAT secretary, explained Australia’s foreign policy as pursuing 
two great objectives: “The first objective of Australia’s foreign policy should be to preserve 
the country from attack and the threat of attack. A complementary objective should be to 
safeguard Australia’s independence as a sovereign state… The second objective should be 
to advance the people’s economic and social well-being insofar as this can be achieved by 
foreign policy.”595 Due to Australia’s geo-strategic location, the country depends on political 
and economic development in the Asia-Pacific region. The 1997 Defence Strategic Review 
(Australia’s Strategic Policy) pointed out that: “Within the next 20 years, Indonesia's 
economy will likely become the biggest in our close region. Indonesia's gross national 
product will likely overtake Australia's in that same period, as will its defence budget… 
President Suharto … has strengthened Indonesia’s cohesion and prosperity.”596 Australian 
foreign policy was, thus, focused on an Indonesia first policy approach.   
 
Yet, a year later in 1998, Indonesia’s President Suharto resigned, opening the way 
for reform and democratization in Indonesia. At the same time, Indonesia’s economy was in 
decline, and its cohesion came under severe threat in Aceh, West Papua and East Timor. 
At the same time, Australia’s policy approach towards South East Asia began to change. In 
1997 the opposition Labour Party’s spokesperson on foreign relations, Laurie Brereton, 
criticised the consensus towards Indonesian rule over East Timor, calling for a “right of self-
determination.”597  
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Criteria Application 
Defence Regional defence and bilateral defence agreements with 
Indonesia  
Diplomacy Bilateral relationships (Indonesia First Policy) 
Promotion of Prosperity 
Development Regional economic and strategic integration 
1989 Timor Gap Treaty (TGT) 
Niche Asia Pacific regional security and economic integration 
Norms Strategic security  
Networks UN 
ANZUS  
1992 ASEAN 
1995 Indonesia-Australian Agreement of Maintaining Security. 
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Legal Approach to the 1999 East Timor Intervention 
 
“Determining that the present situation in East Timor constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security; and Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
Authorizes the establishment of a multinational force under a unified command structure 
with the following tasks: to re-store peace and security in East Timor; to protect and 
support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks; and, within force capabilities, to facilitate 
humanitarian assistance operations; and Authorizes the States participating in the 
multinational force to take all necessary measures to fulfil this mandate.”598 
 
Turning to the criteria for a legal and legitimate humanitarian intervention, any intervention 
in the domestic affairs of another country needs to be authorized by the UN Security Council. 
For the UN Security Council to authorize the use of military force in a state, the humanitarian 
crisis has to be defined as a threat to international peace and security by UN Security 
Council member states. Further, although it is not required for a resolution adopted under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it is better if the intervened state’s government agrees to the 
intervention. UN Security Council Resolution 1264 authorised Australia to lead a 
humanitarian intervention in East Timor to which Indonesia, under pressure from the US 
government of economic sanctions, agreed.599 The international community of states agreed 
to the intervention or at least didn’t disagree with the decision to intervene. Moreover, the 
military presence of the UN was proportionate600 considering that the pro-Indonesian militias 
killed at least 1500 people,601  displaced as many as 250,000 East Timorese,602 and 
destroyed about 70 per cent of East Timor’s basic infrastructure.603 In addition, the political 
agreement prior to the military intervention with the Indonesian government can be 
interpreted as an indicator of a reasonable prospect for success604. Although the 1999 East 
Timor intervention has been regarded as an example of a successful multinational support 
                                                          
598 UN Security Council Resolution 1264, 15 September 1999 [emphasis added]. 
599O´Connor, P. (2009), Der australische Imperialismus: die Intervention in Osttimor im Jahr 1999 und die so genannte 
‚Linke’ [Australia’s Imperialism: The East Timor Intervention and the so called ‘Left’], online article in WSWS from 21. 
November 2009, available at: http://www.wsws.org/de/2009/nov2009/timo-n21.shtml. 
600 O´Connor, P. (2009), Der australische Imperialismus: die Intervention in Osttimor im Jahr 1999 und die so genannte 
‚Linke’ [Australia’s Imperialism: The East Timor Intervention and the so called ‘Left’], online article in WSWS from 21. 
November 2009, available at: http://www.wsws.org/de/2009/nov2009/timo-n21.shtml.  
601 Kiernan, B. (2007), Blood and Soil – a World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur, Yale 
University Press, p. 581. | Chopra, J. (2000), ‘The UN´s Kingdom of East Timor’ in: Survival, volume 42, number 3,The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 27. 
602 Crosette, B. (1999), UN Begin Taking Refugees Home to East Timor this Week, in: The New York Times (October 5, 
1999). 
603 Emerson, D. (2000), ‘Will Indonesia Survive?’ in:  Foreign Affairs, volume 79, issue 3, pp: 95-106. 
604 O´Connor, P. (2009), Der australische Imperialismus: die Intervention in Osttimor im Jahr 1999 und die so genannte 
‚Linke’ [Australia’s Imperialism: The East Timor Intervention and the so called ‘Left’], online article in WSWS (World 
Socialist Web Site), from 21. November 2009, available at: http://www.wsws.org/de/2009/nov2009/timo-n21.shtml. 
Colliding Norms in Humanitarian Intervention - PhD Thesis - Birte Ahlhaus 
 
172 | P a g e  
 
mission605, the analysis of the legality of the intervention is complex and has to consider 
several additional factors: firstly, the sovereign rights, if any, of Indonesia over East Timor 
and the recognition, if any, by members of the INTERFET coalition of those rights; secondly, 
the residual rights, if any, of Portugal as the former colonial power; thirdly the effect of the 
de facto control of East Timor by Indonesia as recognized by the 5 May 1999 agreements 
between Indonesia, Portugal and the UN; fourthly the effect of the unilateral move by the 
People’s Consultative Assembly of Indonesia on 20 October 1999 to withdraw Indonesian 
claims to sovereignty over East Timor; and finally the effect of UN Security Council 
Resolutions 1264 and 1272. 
 
The legal status of the 1999 East Timor intervention under the Australian led 
multinational force was further complicated by the special political and economic ties 
between Australia and Indonesia prior to the intervention. While the UN and most states 
contributing troops to the INTERFET coalition had not recognized Indonesian sovereignty 
over East Timor following the Indonesian invasion in 1975, Australia had. This affected the 
legal status of the Australian leadership. For the UN and most intervening states, except 
Australia, the status of East Timor at the time of the INTERFET deployment was that of a 
non-self-governing territory.606 However, the UN recognised the reality of Indonesia’s control 
over the region by pointing out in paragraph 5 of UN Security Council Resolution 1264 that 
the government of Indonesia has “continuing responsibility (...) to maintain peace and 
security in the interim phase between the conclusion of the popular consultation and the 
start of the implementation of its result”. This decision was based on previous agreements 
between Indonesia, Portugal and the UN in May 1999.  
 
The de facto recognition of Indonesian control over East Timor had further 
implications for the laws applied during the INTERFRET mission. Due to Indonesia’s 
consent to the intervention, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) concluded that the laws of 
armed conflict, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols, 
did not apply to INTERFET as there was no armed conflict in the territory of East Timor. 
While Australia accepted Indonesia’s legal status in East Timor and, with that, the local 
                                                          
605 Smith, M. and Dee, M. (2006), East Timor, in: Durch, W.J. (ed.), Twenty-First Century Peace Operations, Washington 
DC: US Institute of Peace, p. 421. 
606 Kelly, M.J., McCormack, T.L.H., Muggleton, P. and Oswald, B. M. (2001), ‘Legal aspects of Australia's involvement in 
the International Force for East Timor’ in: International Review of the Red Cross, No. 841.  
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jurisdiction and the enforcement of local laws, other intervening states, such as New 
Zealand, argued that NZDF forces were immune from local jurisdiction and the enforcement 
of local laws on the basis of customary international law. Due to the absence of an 
indigenous judicial system, INTERFET also established a military ‘quasi-judicial’ regime to 
temporarily detain suspected criminals, though it lacked the authority to try criminal 
suspects.607 Australia’s decision was based on the reasoning that there was no exchange 
of military force between coalition troops and the Indonesian military. In fact, paragraph 4 of 
Resolution 1264 welcomed “the expressed commitment of the Government of Indonesia to 
cooperate with the multinational force in all aspects of the implementation of its mandate” 
and anticipated “close coordination between the multinational force and the Government of 
Indonesia.”608  
 
The incorporation of the Indonesian military forces into the multinational support 
mission turned out to be impossible, as elements of the Indonesian military remained in the 
province and were hostile to the Australian forces.609 In response to this problem, the 
INTERFET mandate was ambiguous. The INTERFET mission had to be conceptualized as 
a peace support operation in order for the military forces to be able to move between 
traditional peacekeeping tasks (in order to facilitate conflict resolution and lay the 
groundwork for the interim administration) and peace enforcement tasks (in response to 
specific breaches of the peace by the Indonesian militias). The intervention, nonetheless, 
had a reasonable prospect of success. The East Timorese were positively disposed to the 
UN, there was broad consensus about the territory’s future political status and there were 
no armed factions opposing each other.610 By the end of October 1999, the UN Security 
Council decided that INTERFET had created a secure environment in East Timor and 
established UNTAET, giving it overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and 
empowering it to exercise legislative and executive authority. 
 
 
 
                                                          
607 Bull, C. (2008), No Entry without Strategy: Building the Rule of Law under UN Transitional Administration, Tokyo: 
UN University Press, p.191. 
608 UN Security Council Resolution 1264, paragraph 4. 
609 Dee, M. (2001), ‘Coalitions of the willing and Humanitarian Intervention’ in: International Peacekeeping, volume 8, 
issue 3, p.11. 
610 Howard, L.M. (2008), UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 268. 
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Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, there are certain conditions which may be necessary for middle power 
leadership to achieve a sustainable and context related normalization of humanitarian 
interventions. Even though power might, to a certain extent, have shifted and expanded 
beyond simple military might to normative soft power in the international system since the 
end of the Cold War, middle power led initiatives regarding humanitarian intervention 
initiatives should not threaten  either core P5 foreign policy interests and general principles 
of international law. In fact, no middle power is capable of conducting a humanitarian 
intervention on its own due to limited military and fiscal resources. A multilateral leadership 
with clear divisions of working areas seems the most efficient and beneficial form of 
intervention based on shared expertise. In fact, a middle power led campaign will be much 
stronger if it has the determined will of civil society behind it which means that the reasons 
for a specific intervention must have domestic support and be conducted out of humanitarian 
interests rather than interests in power or resources. In practice then, the normalization of 
humanitarian intervention through collective constant middle power foreign policy 
engagement can be effective if it is (1) covering specific, clearly defined cases of 
humanitarian crisis that demand action, such as genocide, mass murder and (2) is in 
accordance with principles of international relations and international law.  
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East Timor Fulfilled Criteria Absent Criteria  
Severe Abuse of Human 
Rights 
Final Resort 
Right Intention 
Proportional Means 
Reasonable Prospect 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
Chapter VII Authorization 
International Engagement 
Invitation of Government 
X 
X 
X 
 
Conclusion 7 1 
 
 
The INTERFET intervention was legitimate pursuant to Indonesian consent as well 
as a Security Council Chapter VII mandate. With almost all of the criteria for a legal and 
legitimate humanitarian intervention fulfilled, the Australian led peacekeeping mission in 
East Timor was successful and restored peace and security in East Timor. The 1999 
humanitarian intervention in East Timor is often classified as a success story, yet, as Noam 
Chomsky points out, the conduct of the intervention in East Timor came late, following 24 
years of widely ignored genocide on the island.611 
 
  
                                                          
611 Bricmont, J. (2009), Humanitärer Imperialismus – die Ideologie von der humanitären Intervention als Rechtfertigung 
für imperialistische Kriege [Humanitarian Imperialism – the Ideology of Humanitarian Intervention as a Justification for 
Imperial Wars], Kai Homilius Verlag, p. 27.  
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Chapter 7: Norway’s engagement in Afghanistan 
 
Traditionally, Norwegian military history was presented as a defence of Norwegian territory 
and participation in operations abroad was rarely mentioned in the literature concerning 
foreign policy.612 However, the 1990’s saw a change in Norwegian foreign policy, especially 
after the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999.613 Norwegian military participation in UN 
peacekeeping operations was welcomed as a ‘citizen in uniform’ approach that combined 
military and civilian skills and attitudes. Yet, Norway denies a right to humanitarian 
intervention beyond the UN Charter.  
 
“Since the UN pact, Norway’s view has been that there is no right to humanitarian 
intervention beyond international law. This is because the UN pact does not only govern 
what types of threats should be dealt with using international military initiatives, but also 
establishes procedures for how resolutions on military initiatives shall be carried out: The 
UN Security Council has the monopoly on providing the mandate for international force 
beyond the self-defence cases.”614 
 
 Norway has been a prominent supporter of the human security policy which is 
represented by a whole of government approach, applying defence, diplomacy, norms and 
networks to achieve humanitarian goals. As such, Norway is an active member of the 1998 
Lyösen Declaration,615 a bilateral human security network between Canada and Norway, 
which formed the basis for the 1999 multilateral Human Security Network.616 Through this 
network Norway supported global human security policies such as the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), and the ratification of the Ottawa Treaty on anti-personnel 
landmines.617 Norway, along with the other Nordic countries, was also among the major 
                                                          
612 De Coning, C.; Lurås, H.; Nagelhus Shia, N. and Ulriksen, S. (2009), Norway’s Whole of Government Approach and its 
Engagement in Afghanistan, in: Security in Practice, volume 8, NUPI report, The Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs.  
613 Ulriksen, S. (2007), Deployments for Development? Nordic Peacekeeping Efforts in Africa, in: International 
Peacekeeping, volume 14, issue 4, pp. 553-568. 
614 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/documents/nou-er/2008/nou-2008-14-2/12/5.html?id=538524  
615 The Lysøen Declaration in 1998 which focused on issues both countries perceived as a vital part of a human 
security agenda such as disarmament and human rights/rule of law issues: the effort to create an International 
Criminal Court, the role of human rights and international humanitarian law, especially in the context of organized 
violence. Furthermore, other agenda topics such as child soldiers, small arms, and gender-related issues in peace 
building were related to conflict prevention. 
616 Member states include Canada, Austria, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Slovenia, 
Switzerland, Thailand, and South Africa (as observer).  
617 International Criminal Court. 
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troop contributors to UN peacekeeping operations until the early 1990s.618 Norway has 
identified peace and reconciliation, development, humanitarian aid, support for international 
organizations, human rights, and democracy-building as key components of its international 
agenda. It has more than tripled its development budget since 1990, becoming one of the 
few countries to fulfil the commitment to raise the development assistance contribution to 
one per cent of GDP.619 Yet, Norway’s military engagement in human security operations 
since 1990 has been limited to commitments in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, 
the Middle East, and Sudan. There exists no “Norwegian model”620 of human security policy 
solutions to the norm collision in humanitarian intervention. Success on the ground owes far 
more to the characteristics of the conflicting parties than to the efforts of the intervening 
state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Norwegians Participation in international peace operations 1947-2007.621  
  
                                                          
618 De Coning, C.; Lurås, H.; Nagelhus Shia, N. and Ulriksen, S. (2009), Norway’s Whole of Government Approach and its 
Engagement in Afghanistan, in: Security in Practice, volume 8, NUPI report, The Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs. 
619 De Coning, C.; Lurås, H.; Nagelhus Shia, N. and Ulriksen, S. (2009), Norway’s Whole of Government Approach and its 
Engagement in Afghanistan, in: Security in Practice, volume 8, NUPI report, The Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs, p. 38. 
620 The term “Norwegian Model” has been introduced by former Norwegian State Secretary Jan Egeland and describes 
a pattern of cooperation between the Norwegian government and Norwegian NGOs in peace negotiations, evident 
from at least the early 1990’s.  
621 Source Data from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs:  
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/documents/nou-er/2008/nou-2008-14-2/12/5.html?id=538524  
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Although Norway developed its own whole of government policy, its policy approach 
is best described by the original Canadian 3D (defence, diplomacy and development) 
concept.622 It is interesting that neither Patrick and Brown nor the OECD’s study of whole of 
government approaches, has studied the Norwegian approach but focused instead on 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US). This chapter attempts to analyse Norway’s 
whole of government approach to its human security policy. According to the Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, two aspects are central to the state’s whole of government 
approach: human security and the responsibility to protect.623 The Ministry defines human 
security as complementing state security by being human-centred and addressing insecurity 
that has not been considered a threat to states. The responsibility to protect populations 
from mass murder, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity is defined as 
a governmental obligation aimed at preventing and reacting to serious crises, regardless of 
where they occur. Identifying Norway as an active norm entrepreneur on the global stage, 
the aim of this chapter is to evaluate Norway’s practical response to the norm conflict 
inherent in humanitarian intervention and its applied policy to coercive humanitarian 
intervention. This chapter further considers the role that middle powers, such as Norway, 
play in overcoming the norm collision in humanitarian intervention. As such, they might be 
able to overcome the arbitrary decision-making process by the UNSC through their 
normative influence on international relations and international law.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
622 Patrick, S. and Brown, K. (2007), Greater than the Sun of its Parts? Assessing the Whole of Government Approach to 
Fragile States, International Peace Academy.  
623 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, text available online:  
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/documents/nou-er/2008/nou-2008-14-2/12/2/3.html?id=538519  
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Picture: FlagPost, Australia’s Commonwealth Parliamentary Library, available online at: 
http://parliamentflagpost.blogspot.com.au/2011/06/australias-militaryinvolvement-in.html  
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Ethnic Conflict and the Fight against Terrorism in Afghanistan  
 
After the fall of the Soviet-supported Najibullah-regime in 1992, Afghan Mujahideen parties 
created the Islamic State of Afghanistan and appointed an interim government for a 
transitional period by the Peshawar Accords. Yet, due to traditional ethnic tensions, some 
parties, supported by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, refused to recognise the interim 
government.624 Conflict between the parties escalated and the new government was not 
able to build up a working government or infrastructure. Nevertheless, in 1994, the Islamic 
State of Afghanistan’s army defeated the opposition groups and tried to initiate a nationwide 
political process with the goal of national consolidation and democratic elections. At that 
time, the Taliban emerged as a political-religious force in Southern Afghanistan, under the 
control of neither foreign-backed militias nor the government in Kabul.625 Instead of joining 
the democratic election campaign, the Taliban initiated attacks on Kabul in 1995 but were 
defeated by the Islamic State of Afghanistan’s army.626 Following the Taliban’s defeat, 
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia militarily and financially supported the Taliban in preparation for 
another offensive. The Taliban seized Kabul in 1996, and established the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan. They subsequently imposed their political and judicial interpretation of Islam.627 
As a response, Tajik and Uzbek forces in Northern Afghanistan formed the United Front 
(Northern Alliances) to prevent the Taliban from moving north. Despite violent conflicts 
between the Taliban and the United Front, the Taliban also committed systematic 
massacres against civilians. According to UN officials there had been "15 massacres"628 
between 1996 and 2001. Within the civil conflict, Al Qaeda, under Osama Bin Laden and 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, became a de facto state within the Taliban state. Supported by the 
Taliban, Al-Qaeda was able to establish military training camps, import weapons, coordinate 
with other jihadists, and plan terrorist actions.629 Following the 1998 bombings of US 
Embassies in East Africa, then US President Bill Clinton ordered missile strikes on militant 
                                                          
624 Nojumi, N. (2002), The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the 
Region, first edition, Palgrave, New York. ǀ Saikal, A. (2006), Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival, 
I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., London New York, p. 352. 
625 Matinuddin, K. (1999), The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994–1997, Oxford University Press, pp.25–6. 
626 Amnesty International (1995), Afghanistan: Further Information on Fear for Safety and new Concern. Deliberate 
and Arbitrary Killings: Civilians in Kabul, 16 November 1995. ǀ International Committee of the Red Cross (1995), 
Afghanistan: escalation of indiscriminate shelling in Kabul, 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jly2.html        
627 Human Rights Watch (2001), Human Rights Watch Backgrounder, available online: 
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/afghan-bck1005.htm#uf  
628 Chicago Tribune (2001), Taliban massacres outlined for UN, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-10-
12/news/0110120312_1_taliban-fighters-massacres-in-recent-years-mullah-mohammed-omar  
629 US Government (2001), 9/11 Commission Report, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf , p. 66 
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training camps in Afghanistan. The international community imposed sanctions on the 
Taliban in 1999 and called for bin Laden to be surrendered. 
 
 The terrorist attacks on the United States of America 11th September 2001 lifted the 
regional conflict in Afghanistan to the international level. The US identified Al Qaeda as 
responsible for the hijacking of four commercial airplanes and crashing them into the World 
Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. Although not authorized 
by the UN Security Council, the US led Operation Enduring Freedom against Al Qaeda and 
the Taliban in Afghanistan as a response to the terrorist attacks. On 14th September 2001, 
three days after the terrorist attacks, then US President Bush was authorized by the 
Congress630 to use force against those responsible for the attack.  Since the Bush 
administration did not declare war against Afghanistan it argued that neither Al Qaeda nor 
Taliban fighters were protected by the Geneva Convention and due process of law.  
 
 By December 2001 the Taliban and Al Qaeda had been defeated and surviving 
elements had fled across the border to Pakistan. To stabilize the political situation in 
Afghanistan the UN held a conference in Bonn, Germany. Representatives of four Afghan 
opposition groups, representatives of neighbouring and other involved major countries, 
including the US, signed the Bonn Agreement which created an Afghan Interim Government 
under Hamid Karzai. Following the Bonn Agreement, the UN Security Council authorized an 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in 
maintaining security. Yet, Al-Qaeda continued to conduct global insurgency from diverse 
centres of operation. At the 2010 peace conference in London Afghan President Hamid 
Karzai offered to talk with the Taliban regarding a peace initiative. Yet, the Taliban refused 
to enter peace talks until the withdrawal of all foreign troops. Significantly, 2010 saw a 
renewal of attacks in Afghanistan631.  
                                                          
630 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists 
631 Nordland, R. (2011), An Uncharacteristically Upbeat General in Afghanistan, 
http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/24/an-uncharacteristically-upbeat-general-in-afghanistan, New York Times 
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Map highlighting the areas of insurgency attacks by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda 2002-2006.632 
 
 The aspect of mass atrocities, as a justification for a humanitarian intervention 
(instead of a war against terrorism) in Afghanistan since 2001 present difficulties. Prior to 
the 2001, war in Afghanistan, the ethnic and religious conflict enduring in Afghanistan 
resulted in extensive human rights violations. According to a report by the UN, the Taliban 
committed systematic massacres against civilians. Between 2001 and 2009, according to 
the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), fifty-five per cent of the civilian deaths 
were caused by anti-government forces; thirty-nine per cent by international-led military 
forces, while the remaining six per cent could not be attributed because they died in crossfire 
or were killed by unexploded ordnance.633  As US General Stanley McChrystal wrote in 
2009: "Civilian casualties and collateral damage to homes and property resulting from an 
over-reliance on firepower and force protection have severely damaged ISAF's legitimacy 
in the eyes of the Afghan people."634 As such, there was evidence of mass atrocities in 
Afghanistan prior to the US intervention in 2001 but it has not been invoked as a justification 
for the engagement in Operation Enduring Freedom or ISAF since 2001.  
                                                          
632 Giustozzi, A. (2009), Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan. Columbia University 
Press, New York. 
633 UNAMA (2009), Number of Afghan civilian deaths in 2008 highest since Taliban ouster, http://www.unama-
afg.org/_latestnews/2009/09feb17-civilian-casualties.html   
634 COMISAF Initial Assessment (Unclassified) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/09/21/AR2009092100110.html The Washington Post from 21.09.2009. 
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Norwegian Foreign Policy: Between Ethics and Alliance Commitment 
 
Prior to 1990, there was no precedent for deploying Norwegian military forces beyond 
Europe other than in peacekeeping operations. Although the Norwegian engagement has 
been described as an ad hoc initiative,635 the Norwegian military mission in Afghanistan was 
at a level where it surpassed that of any other Norwegian engagement abroad, representing 
by far the largest international deployment of Norwegian military personnel.636 The main 
justification for the Norwegian commitment was the same justification that had informed the 
country’s security policy since the late 1940s; that full support to the United States and NATO 
was essential for a reciprocal security guarantee.  
 
 However, Norwegian engagement in Afghanistan was controversial as the public 
criticised the increase in Norwegian casualties. By 2011, Norway has lost a total of nine 
soldiers in five different incidents as well as an aid worker and a journalist.637 Before 
analysing Norway’s engagement in Afghanistan in more detail it is necessary to examine 
key factors shaping Norway’s policy decision. These factors influencing Norwegian foreign 
policy were embedded in national history. 
 
 From a geopolitical perspective, Norway can be identified as a middle power in 
accordance with both the material, as well as the behavioural definition of middle powers. 
Norway is part of the Scandinavian countries in northern Europe. Olav Riste identifies three 
phases in Norwegian foreign policy strategies: a classic neutralism in international affairs, 
from Norway’s emergence as a sovereign state in 1905 to the dawn of World War I; a 
moralistic advocacy of international law during the interwar years; and the embrace of active 
internationalism following the German occupation of World War II and subsequent 
membership in NATO. Norway has not been exposed to a direct security threat since the 
German invasion of Norway in 1940.638 Since the end of the Second World War, Norway’s 
foreign security policy has been safeguarded by its NATO membership and its alliance with 
the US. Norway’s humanitarian foreign policy since the 1990’s is primarily characterised by 
                                                          
635 De Coning, C.; Lurås, H.; Nagelhus Shia, N. and Ulriksen, S. (2009), ‘Norway’s Whole of Government Approach and 
its Engagement in Afghanistan’ in: Security in Practice, volume 8, NUPI report, The Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs, p. 25.  
636 From 2006 to 2009, up to 95 per cent of Norwegian soldiers serving abroad were found in Afghanistan, where they 
operated under NATO command (albeit with a UN mandate). 
637 Forsvaret (2011), Skadde i Afghanistan, 2001-2010, Oslo: Forsvarets sanitet [Defence Medical Service]. 
638 Riste, O. (2005): Norway’s Foreign Relations—A History, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, p. 206. 
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a civil approach based on humanitarian aid rather than military force. According to Dobinson, 
key aspects of the Norwegian approach to peacemaking include its prioritization as a key 
foreign policy objective and the tremendous support among domestic constituents for 
Norway’s role as a peace mediator; the Norwegian government’s willingness to share 
responsibility for mediation with NGO leaders; and the government’s willingness to engage 
in dialogue with the parties to any conflict.639 As such, Norway is one of the UN’s highest 
donor countries, with humanitarian aid amounting to 0.97 per cent of Norway’s GDP.  
 
Another key aspect of Norway’s humanitarian foreign policy is its active role as a 
mediator in international and civil conflicts. One of the early examples of Norway’s 
engagement with peaceful conflict resolution and human rights was in the struggle for justice 
in South Africa. The Norwegian success in mediating the struggle for the end of apartheid 
in South Africa was based on significant cooperation between NGO’s, the Norwegian 
Church, and government. The effectiveness of this approach became known as the 
Norwegian model of working for peace and justice. Norway also applied this model to peace 
processes in the Middle East; notably the signing of the Oslo Accords to mediate the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict; Sri Lanka, Haiti and Darfur/Sudan.640 Norway’s activism as a global 
conflict mediator was further enhanced through its comparative advantage in peace 
promotion, based on the country’s small size, its non-colonial past, and the close relationship 
between the state and NGOs.641 It can be argued that Norway’s active humanitarian foreign 
policy promotes a form of soft power to advance its standing in the international community. 
As Joseph Nye explains, “the posture of peacemaker identifies Norway with values shared 
by other nations that enhance Norway’s soft power”.642 This is not to say that Norway 
engages in peace diplomacy for cynical reasons. Nevertheless, Riste maintains that peace 
                                                          
639 Dobinson, K. and Dale, G. (2000), Den Norske Ryggsekk: En Analyse Av “Norsk” Fredsdiplomati, [The Norwegian 
Backpack: An Analysis of “Norwegian” Peace Diplomacy] in: Dale, G. (ed.), Grenser for Alt: Kritiske Perspektiver På 
Norsk Utenrikspolitikk, Oslo: Spartacus Forlag, p. 58. 
640 Dobinson, K. and Dale, G. (2000), Den Norske Ryggsekk: En Analyse Av “Norsk” Fredsdiplomati, [The Norwegian 
Backpack: An Analysis of “Norwegian” Peace Diplomacy] in: Dale, G. (ed.), Grenser for Alt: Kritiske Perspektiver På 
Norsk Utenrikspolitikk, Oslo: Spartacus Forlag, p. 45. ǀ Matlary, J. (2002), Verdidiplomati—Kilde til Makt? En Strategisk 
Analyse av Norsk Utenrikspolitikk, in: Makt- og Demokratiutredningen 1998-2003, Report 46, p. 49. 
641 De Coning, C.; Lurås, H.; Nagelhus Shia, N. and Ulriksen, S. (2009), ‘Norway’s Whole of Government Approach and 
its Engagement in Afghanistan’ in: Security in Practice, volume 8, NUPI report, The Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs, p. 13. 
642 Nye, J. (2004), ‘Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics’ in: Public Affairs, p. 10. 
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mediation may serve to deflect attention from the more divisive foreign policy issues of EU 
and NATO membership,643 which also shape Norway’s foreign security policy.  
 
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US, public discourse in Norway became 
increasingly concerned with a terrorist threat to the country, despite very low internationally 
rooted terror threats in Norway. While a concern for terror does not necessarily mean a 
conviction that partaking in the war in Afghanistan makes Norway safer; Norwegian 
politicians emphasized that military operations in Afghanistan would safeguard the world – 
and Norway – from terror attacks. The reason for Norway’s decision to contribute military 
force in Afghanistan, in addition to its civil humanitarian aid program, can be explained by 
the argument that military force was indispensable to the peacebuilding644 process in 
Afghanistan.  
 
The concept of soft power provides a rationale for why an active human security policy 
may in fact advance the Norwegian national interest. As Nye explains, “Norway’s place at 
so many negotiating tables elevates its usefulness and value to larger countries”645. 
Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Utenriksdepartementet) describes Norway’s key 
foreign interest as the protection of the international order to safeguard Norway’s freedom, 
security and prosperity. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is a NATO-led 
security operation in Afghanistan, which was formed initially in accordance with the Bonn 
Agreements in December 2001. Whereas Norway’s military role is focused on the regional 
military mission in Meymaneh province, its foreign policy, development, rule of law and 
humanitarian policies and interventions in Afghanistan demonstrated a wider ambition646.  
 
 Norway’s involvement in Afghanistan is long term, and involvement is both military 
and non-military, which is described as in line with NATO’s policy, consisting of promotion 
of universal values of democracy, freedom, human rights, and rule of law in Afghanistan, in 
addition to reconstructing Afghan society or state-building.647 Norway’s contribution to the 
                                                          
643 Riste, O. (2005), Norway’s Foreign Relations—A History, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, p. 285 
644 Mingst, K. (2007), The United Nations in the 21st Century, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, p. 10.  
645 Nye, J. (2004), ‘Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics’ in: Public Affairs, p. 10. 
646 De Coning, C.; Lurås, H.; Nagelhus Shia, N. and Ulriksen, S. (2009), ‘Norway’s Whole of Government Approach and 
its Engagement in Afghanistan’ in: Security in Practice, volume 8, NUPI report, The Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs, p. 33. 
647 Norway’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan Petersen (2004). Foreign Minister Jan Petersen’s statement to the Storting 
on foreign policy, 27 January 2004. Oslo, Utenriksdepartementet. available at: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumentarkiv/Regjeringen-Bondevik-II/ud/Taler-
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ISAF mission in Kabul started in early 2002, and was at first strikingly modest compared to 
its contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The mission basically included a 
transport control unit and an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team. Despite Norway’s 
military contribution to ISAF falling from 1.5 per cent in 2004 to 0.3 per cent in 2010 as a 
share of the total international mission, Norway did deploy Special Forces. Norway 
contributed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) to the Meymaneh region, the capital of 
the Faryab province. Following the Norwegian elections in 2005, the new centre-left 
government, under Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, announced an end to the participation 
in the OEF in Afghanistan. The new Prime Minister explained the decision by emphasizing 
that “Norway shall be a distinct peace nation.”648 Yet, this decision was not welcome in 
Washington, Norway’s key security ally, and Norway had to compensate for its withdrawal 
from OEF by a significant increase in the commitment to its ISAF mission in Afghanistan.  
 
Although the official justification for the operation went through significant changes 
during the decade that Norway was engaged, the key justification for Norway’s military 
engagement remained the state’s long-standing commitment to NATO and the US. 
Significantly, in contrast to the US, Norway did not adopt the justification of a war against 
terror, but framed the engagement in Afghanistan as a NATO commitment according to 
article 5 of the Washington Treaty. As such, then foreign minister Petersen, placed the main 
emphasis in 2001 on the commitment to NATO: 
 
 “For Norway as a NATO member, we are (. . .) obliged to assist the USA in the fight against 
international terrorism through the collective defence commitments codified in the Atlantic 
Pact. (. . .) Norway has a clear interest of its own in offering such assistance. The Article 5 
guarantee has been the spine of the defence of Norway for more than 50 years – and will 
remain so in the future.”649  
                                                          
ogartiklerrkivertindividuelt/2004/foreign_minister_jan_petersens_statement.html?id=268198; Norway’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, J. G. S. (2008). Foreign Policy Address to the Storting. Oslo: Norway´s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Utenriksdepartementet, available online at http://www.regjeringen.no/mobil/en/dep/ud/Whats-new/Speeches-
andarticles/speeches_foreign/2008/foreignpolicy_address.html?id=511988. Norway’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, J. G. 
S. (2010). Foreign policy address to the Storting. Oslo: Norway´s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Utenriksdepartementet, 
available online at: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Whats-new/Speeches-
andarticles/speeches_foreign/2010/storting_address.html?id=598586. Norway´s Minister of Foreign Affairs, J. G. S. 
(2011). Foreign policy address to the Storting 10 February 2011, Utenrikspolitisk redegjørelse for Stortinget 10. 
februar 2011. Oslo, available online at:  
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/aktuelt/taler_artikler/utenriksministeren/2011/redegjorelse_110210.html?id
=633292.  
648 Berg Harpviken, K. (2011), A Peace Nation Takes Up Arms: The Norwegian Engagement in Afghanistan, Peace 
Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Papers, p. 8. 
649 Petersen, J. (2001), Mulige norske styrkebidrag til Afghanistan, Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 December 2001. 
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The ISAF mission in Afghanistan is a NATO-led security operation, formed initially in 
accordance with the Bonn Agreement in December 2001. Further, UN Security Council 
(UNSC) resolution 1386 has been the framework of participation for both Norway and 
Sweden in Afghanistan since 2001. In 2002, Petersen affirmed his previous foreign policy 
statement by arguing that the fight against international terrorism must be won by concerted 
effort under the leadership of the UN Security Council.650 As such, military measures must 
go hand in hand with political, diplomatic, legal, and economic developments. The 
Norwegian Government described its involvement in Afghanistan as “long-term” 
humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people. Military operations were considered 
necessary to support humanitarian assistance.  
 
In 2003, Petersen reaffirmed the importance of coalitions for Norway’s foreign 
security policy. Alliance commitment was interpreted as necessary in order to gain 
recognition and acceptance for Norway’s views and interests. According to Petersen, 
Norway must be prepared to contribute in areas important to its allies demonstrate readiness 
to support its close partners.  
 
“The terror attacks in the USA in September 2001 demonstrated that the most serious 
threats against our common security now stems from international terrorism and the spread 
of weapons of mass destruction. A decisive and joint effort is a critical in order to counter 
these new security threats. It is therefore important that also we take part in the efforts to 
maintain the broad coalition that was formed in the aftermath of the terror attacks in 2001.”651  
 
He further argued in 2004 that: 
 
 “During the Cold War era it was relatively unproblematic for us [Norway] to gain the 
understanding and support of our [Norwegian] close friends and allies because of our 
[Norwegian] vulnerable geographical position. Now the situation has since changed 
radically. We [Norway] are no longer regarded as threatened…But our [Norwegian] need for 
good, responsive partners has not lessened”652  
                                                          
650 Petersen, J. (2002), Foreign Minister Jan Petersen’s statement on foreign policy to the Storting, 16 October 2002, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available online at: 
 http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Bondeviks-2nd-Government/ministry-offoreign-affairs/Taler-og-artikler-
arkivertindividuelt/2002/foreign_minister_jan_petersens-2.html?id=266318.  
651 Petersen, J. (2003), Norske bidrag til internasjonale operasjoner og samlet innsats i Afghanistan og Irak, Oslo: 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
652Petersen, J. (2004), Foreign Minister Jan Petersen’s statement to the Storting on foreign policy, 27 January 2004, 
Oslo: Norway´s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Utenriksdepartementet. Available at: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumentarkiv/Regjeringen-Bondevik-II/ud/Taler-ogartikler-
arkivertindividuelt/2004/foreign_minister_jan_petersens_statement.html?id=268198.  
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More particularly, the 2004 statement describes Norway’s engagement in 
Afghanistan as difficult, reaffirming the long-term humanitarian commitment to the 
reconstruction of the country. In 2008, Jonas Gahr Støre, argued that:  “If we want others to 
play relevant role for us, we have to make sure we have relevance for them”.653 Støre 
describes this engagement in Afghanistan as a hallmark of Norwegian foreign policy, which 
provided Norway with access to key international decision-makers and arenas. These were 
also important for Norway in other contexts. He explains the use of military force in 
Afghanistan was “included in range of tools, but only as a supplement to a broader approach 
that emphasises political, economic, cultural and social factors”654. In 2011, Støre stated 
that Norway cooperated with the United States in areas of common interest such as 
strengthening international legal order, promoting a more effective UN and a modern NATO. 
He argued that:  
 
“[i]t is important to first say this: The goal of our engagement in Afghanistan, as it has been 
emphasized in numerous resolutions of the UN Security Council, is to contribute to prevent 
terror organizations from again finding a free haven from where to plan and execute large 
scale terror attacks. State building is not a goal in its own right. But, when we do pursue a 
comprehensive civilian engagement to promote economic growth, political rights, respect 
for human rights, sustainable institutions, this is rooted in the acknowledgement that these 
are important conditions for preventing Afghanistan from again becoming such a free 
haven.”655  
 
As such, preventing terrorism, which has always been part of the main justification 
for Norway’s role in Afghanistan,  has become the ultimate objective, while the NATO 
commitment, so prominent in the 2001 justification by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Jan Petersen, is barely noticeable. The commitment to international collective action is 
there, but with the emphasis on the UN Security Council mandate and the need to further 
                                                          
653 Støre, J. G. (2008), Foreign Policy Address to the Storting, Oslo: Norway´s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Utenriksdepartementet, available at 
 http://www.regjeringen.no/mobil/en/dep/ud/Whats-new/Speeches-
andarticles/speeches_foreign/2008/foreignpolicy_address.html?id=511988  
654 Støre, J. G. (2008), Foreign Policy Address to the Storting, Oslo: Norway´s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
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strengthen the UN. Støre also stated that any Afghan peace solution would have to involve 
neighbouring countries. After 2008, the overall security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated 
and any lasting solution will have to be the result of an either political process or military 
defeat of the Afghan army. 
 
In general, the engagement in Afghanistan supports a broad humanitarian policy, 
promoting the role of human rights, and development. Promotion of democracy and human 
rights are described as primary objectives of Norway’s foreign policy. At the same time, in 
terms of national security, the state’s commitment to its alliances with NATO, the EU, and 
the US remain central. In fact, Norwegian government regards continued NATO 
membership as a mainstay of Norway’s security. Norway’s involvement in Afghanistan is 
based not only on the commitment to human rights protection but also on its alliance 
commitment and its collective security. As such, Norway regards its engagement in 
Afghanistan as in line with NATO’s policy, promoting universal values of democracy, 
freedom, human rights, and rule of law in Afghanistan, in addition to reconstructing Afghan 
society or state-building. 
 
Since early 2010, tensions in the northern part of Afghanistan, the area which is 
controlled by Norway and Germany, have increased and affected the whole international 
effort in Afghanistan. Civil Conflict in the region increases between two formerly multi-ethnic 
movements, the Hizb-e Junbesh-e-Melli-ye Afghanistan (the National Islamic Movement, 
which is dominated by Uzbeks) and the Jamiat-i Islami (now a predominantly Tajik party). 
Prominent Uzbek and Tajik warlords lead the region. There has also been a dramatic 
increase in attacks on ISAF forces in Faryab and Sari Pul. According to Ulriksen, the main 
challenge in northern Afghanistan is to prevent the escalation of violence and, in the worst 
case, a civil war between ethnic groups.656 With the US focusing its military forces in the 
South and Germany, the lead ISAF nation in the north, being occupied in Kundus, Norway 
leads military and humanitarian operations in the Faryab region.  
 
Somehow problematically, the limited achievements of the intervention on the ground 
in Afghanistan, the strategic goals and the organisation of the international effort with its 
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Peacebuilding Centre, Noref Policy Brief, number 4, April 2010, p. 5.   
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operational concepts increasingly conflict with Norwegian interests, values and practices. 
By 2008, military operations were politically controversial among the Norwegian public and 
at least potentially at odds with the ambitions of Norwegian governments to position Norway 
as an active peacemaker on the international scene. Political and aid involvement in 
Afghanistan helped initial the engagement. Despite the US being Norway’s vital strategic 
security ally since the Second World War, it was obvious that Norway broadly disagreed 
with the US in questions concerning the handling of Afghanistan. Still, the US was the 
dominant external actor in Afghanistan since the regime change of November 2001 and 
Norway had to adjust its policy goals accordingly. Norwegian future engagement in 
Afghanistan would necessitate the intensification of efforts towards a negotiated settlement 
and thus somehow stay true to both, its own values, US interests and NATO strategies.  
 
 As the Afghan case shows, the promotion of democracy and human rights play a 
central role in Norway’s foreign and development policy. Norway has a long tradition of 
supporting international legal and institutional order, of generous assistance programs, and 
of direct involvement in peace and reconciliation in conflicts around the world. In 2010, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre argued that “[t]here is our perceived impartiality 
and low degree of self-interest. This is because we do not have a past as a colonial power, 
or political and economic interests that could cast doubts on our political engagement.”657 
Norway’s international good citizenship is an expression of the widespread national support 
for protecting human rights and development. This is expressed through a commitment to 
international aid which predates that of other industrialised nations without a colonial past. 
As such, three of the most distinctive features of Norwegian foreign policy relate to peaceful 
conflict resolution, disarmament and aid. In the 1880s and 1890s members of the Norwegian 
parliament were active advocates of peace through international treaties. This was the 
reason why the Swedish industrialist Alfred Nobel decided that the peace prize he endowed 
would be awarded by a committee chosen by Norwegian parliamentarians.658  
 
Like Canada and Australia, Norway is committed to the international rule of law and to 
multilateral co-operation through the UN. From a security perspective, “NATO is the anchor 
                                                          
657 Quoted in: Berg Harpviken, K. (2011), A Peace Nation Takes Up Arms: The Norwegian Engagement in Afghanistan, 
Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Papers, p. 20.  
658 Riste, O. (2005): Norway’s Foreign Relations—A History, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, p 83. 
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point for Norway’s national security policy”659 which represents the importance of Norway’s 
alliance with the US.  
 
There are thus several key aspects to the Norwegian model of humanitarian foreign 
policy. Norway focuses its foreign policy on the niche of humanitarian aid which has allowed 
the country to take on a leadership role in the international community and increased 
Norway’s influence on global decision making processes in areas of humanitarian concern 
despite the country’s relative small size, population and economy.  
 
One distinctive feature of Norwegian foreign policy has been the high priority given to 
disarmament. Examples include co-operating with the UK in a major research project on 
verification of nuclear disarmament agreements; co-operating with Germany to urge NATO 
to adopt a new strategic concept, in which one of the key issues is a new nuclear doctrine; 
and providing financial support totalling A$10 million in 2010 to multilateral and civil society 
organisations engaged in disarmament issues.660 To be successful, Norway cooperates with 
NGO’s, such as the Red Cross, which are vital to the negotiation processes of treaties 
banning land mines and cluster bombs. It can be argued that the most striking feature of the 
Norwegian model of foreign affairs is the contribution of NGOs and academic bodies to 
Norwegian foreign policy. The five largest Norwegian NGOs have a combined staff of 
several thousand worldwide, and are increasingly operating on behalf of the UN and with 
funding from outside Norway. A further distinctive feature of Norwegian foreign policy is the 
generosity of the country’s aid to developing countries.  
 
Despite this background, the Norwegian government fully supported Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF), the US-led war against the Taliban regime and Al Qaeda since 2001. By 
late November, Norway offered military resources, including Special Forces, F-16 jet fighters 
and one Hercules C-130 transport aircraft with personnel.661 While Norwegian politicians 
emphasised that an engagement was necessary for the safety and security of the 
international community – and Norway - , the first and foremost reason for Norway’s 
                                                          
659 Lunde, L. and Thune, H. (2008), Norske interesser: Utenrikspolitikk for en globalisert verden, Cappelen Damm, Oslo,  
p79.  
660 Langmore, J. and Egeland, J. (2011), ‘Learning from Norway: Independent, middle-power foreign policy’ in: The 
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engagement was infect solidarity, not humanitarian motives, which was perceived as 
necessary to maintain the NATO security guarantee that is pivotal to Norway since 1945. In 
fact, Norway has few, if any, direct interests in Afghanistan. Its heavy involvement in the 
country is largely due to the country’s alliance commitments with the US, NATO, and UN 
that have been the pillars of Norwegian foreign and security policy for more than half a 
century. Understood in terms of realism, Norway’s interests in Afghanistan also concerned 
both the maintenance and strengthening of the international community – and the promotion 
of certain ideals and values.662 Yet, such alliance commitment is also limited. The Norwegian 
polity at large was unwilling to support what was increasingly seen as an illegitimate 
occupation. The conclusion that can be drawn from the Norwegian case study of active 
human security is that Norway’s commitment to the Afghan mission was ambivalent. 
Described as a long term interest in leveraging its position as a supporter of international 
law, conflict resolution and human rights protector, the Norwegian mission in Afghanistan 
increasingly revealed the persistent dominance of traditional security and alliance interests 
in an unsecure world.  
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Criteria Application 
Defence Norwegian National Defence 
Re-Orientation of Norwegian Defence in 1990s towards 
international peacekeeping, preventive action and 
peacebuilding. 
Diplomacy Rhetorical Commitment to multinational cooperation. 
Mainly through NGO’s and financial aids.  
Development Whole of Government Approach 
Multipurpose military capability. 
Niche Human Security 
Peacekeeping 
Norms Human Security 
Including; peace and reconciliation, development, 
humanitarian aid, support to international organizations, 
human rights and democracy-building. 
Networks UN 
NATO 
EU 
Lyösen Declaration and Human Security Network 
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Legal Arguments  
 
The foundation for Norway’s engagement in Afghanistan is the UN mandate, following UN 
Security Council resolutions 1386 and 1510, as well as various framework agreements like 
the Bonn Agreement, the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), the Afghanistan 
Compact, the Paris Declaration, and the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board structure 
(JCMB).663 In accordance with the Bonn Agreement, Norway increased its engagement in 
Afghanistan after 2001.664 Norway’s reason for engagement was to assist in stabilising and 
developing the country, and to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a base for terrorist 
operations. Arguments on the legal and legitimate character of the Afghanistan intervention 
vary between a necessary step in the “war against terror” after September 11 and one of 
several examples of American hegemonism and imperialism.665  In order to defend the 
Norwegian self-image as a “peacemaker” involved in a military operation that some critics 
said was a violation of international law, Norway framed its engagement as a legitimate 
“peace effort”.666 In fact, although the UN Security Council never officially disapproved or 
denounced the war in Afghanistan (or the war in Iraq, for that matter), neither UN Security 
Council resolution 1368 of 12th  September 2001, which states that the UN “unequivocally 
condemns in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks… and regards such acts, 
like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security”;667 nor 
UN Security Council resolution 1373, which sets forth certain antiterrorism measures that all 
states must apply form a legal basis for the Afghanistan intervention. In fact, the resolutions 
simply repeats UN Security Council resolution 1267 (1999); paragraph 113 of Resolution 
1214 (1998); and resolution 1333 (2000) - namely, to stop providing sanctuary and training 
for international terrorists and their organizations, and to “cooperate ... to bring indicted 
terrorists to justice …” UN Security Council resolutions 1368 and 1373 from 2001 reiterate 
the “inherent right of individual and collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter of 
the United Nations”. UN Security Council resolution 1373 refers to “its determination to take 
                                                          
663 De Coning, C.; Lurås, H.; Nagelhus Shia, N. and Ulriksen, S. (2009), ‘Norway’s Whole of Government Approach and 
its Engagement in Afghanistan’ in: Security in Practice, volume 8, NUPI report, The Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs, p. 28. 
664 De Coning, C.; Lurås, H.; Nagelhus Shia, N. and Ulriksen, S. (2009), ‘Norway’s Whole of Government Approach and 
its Engagement in Afghanistan’ in: Security in Practice, volume 8, NUPI report, The Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs 
665 Chomsky, N. (2001), 9-11: Was there an Alternative? First published by Aftonbladet in Sweden, August 2002, and in 
11 September—ett år efteråt (September 11—One Year After) (Stockholm: Aftonbladet, 2002), Seven Story Press.  
666 Garbo, G. (2002), Også Krig er Terror, Eget Forlag, Oslo.  
667 Recognition of the right to self-defence is placed in the preamble of the resolution and not in the operative part. It 
cannot therefore be used to justify any change in existing law. 
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all necessary steps” with the term "its" referring to the UN Security Council, not the US or 
NATO. 
 
The Afghanistan intervention was unilaterally directed by the US and led by a 
multilateral coalition ‘of the willing’ NATO member states, invoking Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic (Washington) Treaty. Under this provision, an armed attack against any NATO 
country is considered an attack against all member states. As such, articles 5 and 6 of 
NATO's Washington Treaty can be interpreted as more war-friendly than the UN Charter. 
However, article 52 UN Charter restricts regional agencies, including NATO, to activities 
consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN. Legally, the NATO resolutions cannot 
override the provision of the UN Charter. Separately from the US led multilateral Operation 
Enduring Freedom, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1386 on 20th December 
2001 which established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). NATO assumed 
authority for the ISAF mission in August 2003, expanded its geographical remit far beyond 
the initial focus on Kabul and took overall responsibility for security in Afghanistan in October 
2006.668 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
668 Cyrus, H. and Sedra, M. (2007), ‘The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan’ in: International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper, volume 391, p.45. 
Colliding Norms in Humanitarian Intervention - PhD Thesis - Birte Ahlhaus 
 
196 | P a g e  
 
Conclusion 
 
The chapter has demonstrated that Norway is an active and successful norm entrepreneur 
on the global stage in terms of human security norm development. As such, Norway has 
been able to achieve, in cooperation with like-minded middle powers, global human security 
policies.669 At the same time, however, the 3D and 3N policy analysis of Norway’s military 
humanitarian engagement in Afghanistan indicates that the country’s whole of government 
approach to a human security policy lacks a comprehensive strategy to actively respond to 
coercive humanitarian conflicts, due to its limited material power as a middle power and its 
alliance commitment to NATO. This policy focus on a strategic normative policy, by 
increasing diplomatic efforts as a norm entrepreneur and improving military relations with its 
NATO’s allies to achieve rapid military support in cases of coercive humanitarian conflicts.  
 
Afghanistan Fulfilled Criteria Absent Criteria  
Severe Abuse of Human Rights 
Final Resort 
Right Intention 
Proportional Means 
Reasonable Prospect 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
 
Chapter VII Authorization 
International Engagement 
Invitation of Government 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
Conclusion 7 1 
 
 
The case studies of middle power led humanitarian intervention demonstrated that 
the interventions were initially met with popular support. Yet, these interventions also raise 
serious questions notably regarding a general legal normalization of humanitarian 
intervention and the subsequent inaction in cases such as Syria. By examining the practice 
of humanitarian intervention of middle power states, this chapter showed how the actual 
decision to engage in intervention differs from the original intent to normalize humanitarian 
intervention. The conclusion that derives from the analysis of state practice in humanitarian 
intervention is that the middle powers in the international community push the agenda for 
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intervention in states like Zaire, East Timor, and Afghanistan if they are sure of receiving 
dividends in return or if the intervention serves the protection of national interests. As all 
three case studies show, the legal basis for humanitarian intervention in international law is 
far from clear. The Canadian intervention in Zaire, the Australian intervention in East Timor, 
and Norway’s engagement in Afghanistan have been tested against the 3D and 3N policy 
approach, which revealed that, while motivated by good intentions, the humanitarian 
missions were always subject to national political calculations.  
 
Significantly then, humanitarian interventions always remain political. David Michael 
Crane, former Chief Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, points out that “At the 
end of the day, violations of human rights and international law are very much beholden to 
the bright red thread of politics. The decision to do something is not a legal one, or even a 
moral one, but a political one.”670 Yet, the case studies of middle power leadership in 
humanitarian interventions since the 1990s also provide an insight into the dynamics of 
international law – its living instrument character and the influence of politics on legal norm 
development. Smith and Dee671 conclude that, analysing the East Timor intervention, four 
important lessons about peace support operations can be learned: First, peace support 
operations must have a capable lead/pivotal state and comprise adequate forces with good 
war-fighting skills; second, successful peacekeeping depends on the degree of host-state 
support; third, peace support operations are large and expensive and, therefore, require a 
sound funding base; and fourth, peacekeepers must be able to assume civilian functions 
until such time as civilian agencies themselves have the necessary capacity.  
 
The chapters on Canada, Australia and Norway highlighted the shift in the security 
and foreign policy of UN member states away from a strict prohibition of the use of force 
towards a human rights protective policy. At the same time, however, it shows an emerging 
reluctance to intervene when there are no additional interests for the intervening state other 
than pure humanitarianism. Additionally, with regard to the current state of military spending 
in western states, no one country, the US apart, is able to address and intervene effectively 
in a severe humanitarian crisis by itself. In fact, few states remain in a position, both 
politically and in terms of capabilities, to intervene directly when a developing security 
                                                          
670 Crane, D.M. and Anderson, E. (2009), The Proceedings of the Second International Humanitarian Dialogs, ASIL.  
671Smith, M. and Dee, M. (2006), East Timor, in: Durch, D.W. (ed.), Twenty-First Century Peace Operations, Washington 
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situation demands it. This is centrally the case with middle power states, which are generally 
willing to support and lead humanitarian intervention, but lack the military capabilities or 
political power to get UN Security Council authorization. Whilst it should be the aim of the 
UN, with its intention to protect human rights, to support member states in operations in the 
name of common security this is rarely in fact the case.  
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Chapter 8: Aims and Realities of the R2P doctrine 
 
ICISS Report 4.13 
 
[T]here are exceptional circumstances in which the very interest that all states have in 
maintaining a stable international order requires them to react when all order within a state 
has broken down or when civil conflict and repression are so violent that civilians are 
threatened with massacre, genocide or ethnic cleansing on a large scale. … Generally 
expressed, the view was that these exceptional circumstances must be cases of violence 
which so genuinely “shock the conscience of mankind,” or which present such a clear and 
present danger to international security, that they require coercive military intervention. 
 
 
The R2P doctrine highlights the ongoing norm conflict between humanitarian intervention 
and state sovereignty.672 New concepts emerge in politics, international relations, and law 
in response to historical and social contingencies. The recent debate on the legality of the 
use of force for humanitarian ends, as advocated in the R2P doctrine, highlights the enduring 
effects of the collision inherent in international law between non-intervention and the 
protection of human rights norms. Building on the traditional idea of just war theory, the R2P 
doctrine attempts to consolidate the moral need for humanitarian intervention while, at the 
same time, maintaining the wide interpretation of the prohibition of the use of force. As such, 
the R2P doctrine highlights, rather than overcomes, the problem of norm collision between 
humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty. This is, in large part, due to the doctrine’s 
failure to address the norm collision within international law. International law was created 
as an instrument to govern international relations in an era of substantial inter-state warfare, 
with the aim to prevent further aggressive use of force and protect human rights. Yet, states 
application of international law has proven versed in the art of inaction. While the inaction of 
states and international organizations in times of humanitarian crises is legal, it seems in 
the broadest sense of the term amoral. According to international law, the use of force is 
subject to the interests of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. The R2P 
doctrine supports this provision and, thus, re-emphasises the ambivalent authorization of 
                                                          
672 For a general overview of the R2P doctrine in practice see for example: Amerasinghe, C.F. (2006), ‘The Conundrum 
of the Recourse to War – To Protect Persons’ in: International Organizations’ Law Review, volume 3, p. 7. ǀ Boisson de 
Chazournes, L. and Condorelli, L. (2006), ‘De la Responsabilité de protéger ou d’une nouvelle parure pour une notion 
déjà bien établie’ in:  Revue Générale de Droit International Public, volume, 110, p. 11. ǀ Weiss, T.G. (2004), ‘The 
Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a unipolar Era’ in: Security Dialogue, volume 35, 
p. 135. ǀ Evans, G. (2004), ‘The responsibility to Protect and the Duty to Prevent’ in: American Journal of International 
Law, volume 98, p. 77. ǀ Williams, P.D. and Bellamy, A.J. (2005), ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur’ 
in: Security Dialogue, volume 36, p. 27.  
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humanitarian intervention. This has become evident in recent state practice. The doctrine 
was somewhat providentially implemented in Libya in 2011 but was also perceived to have 
failed in the conflict in Darfur or the civil war in Syria after 2012. The R2P doctrine, thus, 
reached “a difficult point in its development,”673 highlighting the influence of norm conflict 
and power politics on the practice of an emerging norm of humanitarian intervention.  
 
 Significantly, established by the middle power Canadian Government, the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) published its 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine in 2001. The doctrine came as a response to UN 
Secretary Kofi Annan’s challenge to the inviolability of state sovereignty and the need to 
respond to gross and systematic violations of human rights. The doctrine is best summarised 
as: “the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from 
avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that when they 
are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community 
of states.”674 It offered a normative framework for the international community to prevent 
humanitarian crises occurring within the boundaries of a sovereign state. Formally, the R2P 
doctrine entails three notions with varying degrees of legal approval, the most controversial 
of which seeks to permit coercive intervention, under certain conditions. Political arguments 
in favour of humanitarian intervention often assume that, once a certain threshold is 
reached, a right to use force exists. Yet, a right to use force on humanitarian grounds can 
only exist if all peaceful means have been exhausted and a military option anticipates an 
improvement of the humanitarian situation. Where there is no such expectation, there is no 
right. This means that the purpose qualifies the right. The use of force is further reserved for 
actions within the UN Charter’s Chapter VII framework. As evident from the Syria crisis, this 
reservation continues to hinder efforts by the international community to protect populations 
from humanitarian crises. As such, the R2P doctrine has to be interpreted as a guideline 
rather than a general policy as it has to be applied to each case individually. There is, thus, 
an inherent tension between R2P as a political ideal and R2P as a potential legal doctrine. 
This is due to the fact that sovereignty in international law, as conceptualized under the 
                                                          
673 Moses, J. (2013), ‘Sovereignty as Irresponsibility: A Realist Critique of the Responsibility to Protect’ in: Review of 
International Studies, volume 39, issue1, p. 119. 
674 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001), The Responsibility to Protect, 
Ottawa, p. VIII.  
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Treaties of Westphalia, continues to protect the rulers of nation states and prevents the 
international community from averting state acts of mass atrocity.  
 
 This chapter argues, in accordance with the overall argument presented in this thesis, 
that the R2P doctrine may be advanced by normalizing the use of low-intensity military 
options that are focused on protecting populations once peaceful measures have been 
exhausted and the UN Security Council is deadlocked. This is based on the fact that R2P 
cannot be considered a source of binding international law, as none of the relevant R2P 
documents conform to those sources of international law identified in Article 38 of the Statute 
of the ICJ. As such, R2P is perhaps best defined as a political commitment towards existing 
but contested legal responsibilities, best articulated in its current form as soft law. Soft laws 
can act as precursors to future legal development or the formation of binding treaties if 
applied regularly and consciously by states. Article 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document in which the UN General Assembly adapts parts of the R2P doctrine 
are considered soft law675 and are not legally binding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
675 Welsh, J.M. and Banda, M. (2010), ‘International Law and the Responsibility to Protect: Clarifying or Expanding 
States’ Responsibilities?’ in: Global Responsibility to Protect, volume 2, p. 230.  
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The R2P doctrine defined 
 
“… if humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how 
should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systemic violations of 
human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”676 
 
Following discussions on how to respond to humanitarian crises in the late 1990s, as 
summed up in the above quotation, the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (“ICISS”) published a doctrine entitled The Responsibility to Protect. R2P is 
seen as a response to the inconsistent way in which the UN and the international community 
more broadly have exercised the contestable right of humanitarian intervention which has 
led to failed responses to humanitarian catastrophes in Somalia in 1993, Rwanda in 1994, 
and Srebrenica in 1995.677 Following former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s quest for a 
global consensus on the appropriate response to evolving humanitarian crises in Sub-
Saharan Africa and elsewhere in the developing world, the R2P doctrine shifts the emphasis 
from the right to intervene, which inevitably generates considerable criticism, to the notion 
of a responsibility. The R2P doctrine highlights the problem of conflicting principles within 
the UN Charter, notably those of non-intervention articulated in Articles 2(4) and 2(7) with 
the protection of human rights in Article 1, and the powers vested in the Security Council 
regarding the authorization of force under Chapter VII.  
 
 ICISS identifies the R2P doctrine as a new legal doctrine in which the concept of state 
sovereignty under international law “implies responsibility”. This means that if a population 
is suffering  
 
“serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the 
state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention 
yields to the international responsibility to protect.”678  
 
As such, it is argued that the R2P doctrine allows a legal exception for the rule of 
international law on non-intervention and the prohibition of the use of force as outlined in 
Article 2(4) UN Charter. Francis Deng argued, in 1996, that the state practice of 
interventionism and the institutionalisation of human rights since the end of the cold war 
                                                          
676 Millennium Report of the UNSG (2000) P.48. 
677 Joyner, C. (2007), ‘‘The Responsibility to Protect’: Humanitarian Concern and the Lawfulness of Armed Intervention’ 
in: Virginia Journal of International Law, volume 47, p. 698. 
678 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001), The Responsibility to Protect, 
Ottawa, p. VIII. 
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reflects “the growing resolve of the international community to override sovereignty in 
support of international human rights and humanitarian intervention.”679 Gareth Evans, one 
of the doctrine’s founding fathers, argued that the legal status of the use of force for 
humanitarian ends was a nuanced and multidimensional tool, referring to the doctrine’s 
emphasis on preventing humanitarian conflicts. Yet, the key aspect and apparent 
significance of the doctrine addressed the two most controversial issues resulting from the 
norm collision between Article 1 and Article 2 UN Charter: when could states use force to 
protect populations and which authorities would be competent to authorize it? ICISS argued 
that the international community could use force to prevent atrocities when peaceful options 
had been exhausted and identified that the UN is the principal organization competent to 
authorize such intervention. While the doctrine provides answers to both questions, it fails 
to clarify the specific circumstances under which a “responsibility” to act exists and who can 
authorize an intervention in case the UN Security Council is deadlocked.  
 
The UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change took the R2P doctrine 
to the international level. In its 2004 report, A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility, the panel states that “there is a growing acceptance that while sovereign 
Governments have the primary responsibility to protect their own citizens from such 
catastrophes, when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility should be taken 
up by the wider international community.”680 As such, the panel focused its definition of the 
doctrine on the nexus between the traditional principle of state sovereignty and the emerging 
responsibility to protect populations.681  
 
Yet, the wording in the panel’s report remains open to interpretation. In line with the 
original ICISS report, the panel limits the external responsibility to protect to UN Security 
Council authorised interventions. The panel states that:  
“it may be that some States will always feel that they have the obligation to [protect] their 
own citizens, and the capacity to do whatever they feel they need to do, unburdened by the 
constraints of the collective Security Council process. But however understandable that 
approach may have been in the Cold War years, when the United Nations was manifestly 
                                                          
679 Deng, F.M.; Kimaro, S.: Zartmann, I.W.; Rothchild, D. and Lyons, T. (1996), Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict 
Management in Africa, Washington: Brookings Institutions.  
680 High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004), A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, UN 
Doc A/59/ 565, para. 201. 
681 High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004), A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, UN 
Doc A/59/ 565, para. 29. 
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not operating as an effective collective security system, the world has now changed and 
expectations about legal compliance are very much higher.”682  
 
Yet, as evident from state practice, the effect of the norm conflict of two indispensable 
norms of current international law means that legal compliance is difficult and the UN 
Security Council manifestly continues to not operate effectively due to power political 
realities. Ultimately, the UN Security Council still reflects the strategic interests of the 
victorious powers at the end of the Second World War rather than any normative order. 
Moreover, conflicting interests between the permanent members means that achieving a 
consensus on the use of force for humanitarian intervention remains problematic.  
 
There is some recognition of the problems of power, judgement and enforcement of 
an emerging norm of humanitarian intervention. Deng argued for example that:  
 
“Equality among sovereign entities has always been a convenient fiction that has never been 
backed by realities because some powers have always been more dominant than others 
and therefore have been explicitly or implicitly charged with the responsibilities of enforcing 
the agreed norms of behaviour.”683 
 
For a rule to become part of international law and, hence, legally binding on all states, 
one criterion is that it has to be clear and precise in its wording. Yet, the wording by ICISS 
and the High Level Panel on the situation in which a responsibility to intervene exists is 
broad: What is meant by “serious harm” and what are the guidelines according to which the 
UN Security Council can identify a situation as either “internal war, insurgency” and/or 
“repression”? The UN General Assembly defined specific cases of atrocities when it adopted 
the R2P doctrine in its 2005 World Summit Outcome. As such the Outcome Document states 
that:  
“In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, 
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a 
case by case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, 
should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to 
                                                          
682 High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004), A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, UN 
Doc A/59/ 565. 
683 Deng, F.M.; Kimaro, S.: Zartmann, I.W.; Rothchild, D. and Lyons, T. (1996), Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict 
Management in Africa, Washington: Brookings Institutions, p. 33. ǀ See also: Thakur, r. (2011), The Responsibility to 
Protect: Norms, Laws and the Use of Force in International Politics, Oxford Routledge, p. 191.  
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protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity”.684  
 
While the list of events in which a military intervention can be authorized enhances 
the definition of the doctrine, the cases listed repeat rather than broaden the already existing 
rules in international law. States are already required to prevent acts of genocide under the 
Genocide Convention and customary international law. Furthermore, states are required to 
protect against war crimes [as part of international humanitarian law], ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity [as part of international human rights law]. The wording of 
paragraph 139 of the Outcome Document further points towards an optional responsibility 
rather than an obligation as an intervention is decided on by a case by case basis instead 
of a systematic obligation which renders it contextual rather than normative. Yet, the specific 
reference to ethnic cleansing can be seen as a broadening of international law as the aspect 
of ethnic cleansing has previously not been considered a as a free standing international 
crime. Overall, the agreement incorporated into the Summit Outcome Document adopted by 
the General Assembly was more restrained than the visions of the international enforcement 
of sovereign responsibilities, as earlier offered by the ICISS in order to build international 
consensus. At a 2009 UN General Assembly meeting UN member states voted in favour of 
the incorporation of the R2P doctrine in the UN by seventy-seven votes in favour and forty-
four votes against.685 Regarding the UN Security Council, two of the permanent members, 
Russia and China, voted against it while the US, UK, and France voted in favour.  
 
                                                          
684 UN General Assembly (2005), World Summit Outcome Document, UN GA Res. 60/1 from 24 October 2005, para. 
139. Emphasis added.  
685 Only 94 of the 192 member states have voted. For a detailed list see Appendix List 2.  
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In 2006, the UN Security Council adopted paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World 
Summit Document in its Resolution 1674 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.686 
The doctrine has further been referred to in several resolutions by the UN Security Council 
and the UN General Assembly, and has sparked an intense international debate about the 
legality and legitimacy of the protection of foreign populations from mass atrocities. These 
UN documents are clear on the reservation that the protection of populations by the use of 
force was only available when authorized in accordance with the UN Charter’s Chapter VII 
framework. Gareth Evans acknowledged that the objective was never to find an alternative 
to the UN Security Council, but to make it work better by devising a “self-denying ordinance,” 
whereby the UN Security Council members would be bound by a “gentlemen’s agreement” 
not to cast a veto in the presence of gross human rights violations.687 From a legal 
perspective, the UN documents mentioned above simply reinforces the limit of coercive 
humanitarian intervention to military action that is clearly authorized by the UN Security 
Council – a rule that already exists under UN Charter Chapter VII. By leaving the decision 
about the authorization of a forceful intervention with the UN Security Council, the legal 
advance of the R2P doctrine is ultimately somewhat limited.  
                                                          
686 UN Security Council (2006), Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Resolution 1674, from 28 April 2006, para. 4 
“reaffirming the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the 
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”  
687 Press conference on General Assembly dialogue on R2P. Full record is available online at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RS9bSUdW6b4&feature=PlayList&p=FF755F2208DE4CD6&playnext=1&playnext_f
rom=PL&index=14  
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The adoption of the R2P doctrine by the UN General Assembly in such a formal way 
reflects the importance attributed to human security in world affairs today.  Stahn describes 
the adoption of the doctrine by the UN General Assembly as a broader systematic shift in 
international law in which the protection of human security substantially limits the traditional 
principle of state sovereignty.688  As such, the R2P doctrine is seen as part of a growing 
transformation of international law from a state and government elite based system of rules 
into a normative framework designed to protect certain human and community interests. 
However, the agreement incorporated into the Summit Outcome Document by the General 
Assembly was more restrained than the original ICISS vision in order to build international 
consensus. The doctrine reinforces already existing, and increasingly controversial, 
principles of international law relating to the UN Security Council and its Chapter VII authority 
to regulate matters of international peace and security. In January 2009, UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon released a report, implementing the Responsibility to Protect, which 
outlined a three-pillar strategy for advancing the agenda for the responsibility to protect that 
was said to be mandated by the World Summit agreement.689 Since then, the Secretary-
General’s three pillar approach has become widely accepted, having been endorsed by 
more than fifty states.690  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
688 Stahn, C. (2007), ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Norm?’ in: American Journal of 
International Law, volume 101, p. 101. ǀ see also: Bellamy, A.J. (2006), ‘Whither the Responsibility to Protect? 
Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit’ in: Ethics and International Affairs, volume 20, p. 143.  
689 Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’, A/63/677, 12 January 2009. 
690 Williams, P.R; Ulbrick, J.T. and Worboys, J. (2012), ‘Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes: The Responsibility to Protect 
and the Syria Case’ in: Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, volume 45, issue 1, p. 15.  
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Three Pillars of the R2P doctrine:  
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Absent global support in practice 
 
“…we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council in accordance with the UN Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case by 
case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should 
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly failing to protect their 
populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”691 
 
Although adopted by the UN, the R2P doctrine struggles to be implemented universally. As 
the history and case study chapters have shown, severe violations of human rights within 
states have occurred repeatedly since the 1990s, and continue to occur. Interestingly, it has 
most often been cases of inaction by the international community of states in cases of severe 
human rights violations, such as Rwanda in 1993, and Syria in 2012, that have shocked the 
liberal conscience of the international community of states. In contrast, under current 
international law, unilateral or unauthorized intervention by states in cases of humanitarian 
crises, such as in Kosovo in 1999, remain illegal. To be considered customary law, the 
principles of R2P would require the consistent repetition, and a corresponding belief that 
such conduct is required by a rule of international law.  
 
 The optimistic view, that R2P could allow for the consideration of situations that 
otherwise would have remained outside the reach of the UN Security Council’s agenda, did 
not last long after its inception. At first, the R2P doctrine was celebrated as a significant 
policy and legal development in international responses to humanitarian crises in the course 
of the 2011 Libyan conflict. Resolution 1973 of the UN Security Council authorised UN 
member states to “take all necessary measures” to “protect civilians and civilian populated 
areas under threat of attack” in Libya. UN Security Council resolution 1973 further authorized 
the use of force in Libya on the basis of R2P’s third pillar, and in accordance with UN Chapter 
VII authority of the UN Security Council. The Council’s decision to authorise the use of force 
follows previous resolution 1970 which called for the extensive adoption of peaceful means 
to end the conflict. The question that the Libya intervention raised was whether or not 
international law had redefined state sovereignty and established a legally binding rule 
governing humanitarian intervention. Most states, notably the great powers, China, Russia, 
and the US, disagreed over this proposition in the past. However, resolution 1973 could also 
be interpreted as a reaffirmation of the already existing power of the UN Security Council to 
                                                          
691 UN doc A/60/L. 1 para 139. 
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authorize military intervention in cases of a threat to international peace and security, as 
outlined in Chapter VII UN Charter. Nevertheless, in the Libya case all permanent members 
of the UN Security Council either agreed to or remained silent regarding the implementation 
of the R2P doctrine in Libya.  
 
Yet, only a year later the R2P doctrine appeared to be in disarray when the 
international community failed to react to an even more devastating civil war in Syria which 
violated the prohibitions on the use of chemical weapons. The international community tried 
to resolve the Syrian crisis, and its humanitarian implications through diplomatic approaches 
and sanctions, but their attempts proved unsuccessful. Following the use of the veto by 
Russia and China regarding the authorisation of a military support mission, states were 
compelled either to act alone or as a coalition against the current regime. In the meantime, 
the UN Human Rights Council concluded that Syria’s humanitarian crisis was driven by a 
state policy of deliberate attacks against civilians,692 which would support a legal argument 
that the current Syrian government has failed as a sovereign state in not protecting its 
population. The failure to act in the Syrian crisis, together with the controversial aftermath of 
the Libyan crisis, demonstrate the clear political limitations to the R2P doctrine and its limited 
applicability to distinct crises.   
 
The UN Security Council also had the opportunity to invoke R2P, in the cases of Sri 
Lanka in 2012, Zimbabwe in 2011, Somalia, and Myanmar in 2013. The failure to overcome 
the paralysis of the UN Security Council to authorize a humanitarian intervention since 2011 
highlights the difficulty in arguing that the R2P doctrine represents the evolution of a new 
set of legal norms or obligations. The argument by R2P proponents, that the decision making 
of the UN Security Council represents an intentional threshold to prevent any abuse of the 
exception to the prohibition of the use of force in cases of humanitarian crises, seems 
unsustainable in the light of ongoing conflicts in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere. Yet, it should 
also be mentioned here that the global inaction regarding Syria cannot be blamed on the 
legal limits of a doctrine alone, but on the decision making by states to uphold or not to 
uphold certain erga omnes obligations (i.e. human rights protection).  
 
                                                          
692 Independent International Commission of Inquiry (Aug. 16, 2012), Report of the Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, §50 and §57 respectively, UN Doc. A/HCR/21/50.  
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A new approach,693 re-characterization of sovereignty,694 or emerging norm695? 
 
“The responsibility to protect does not alter, indeed it reinforces, the legal obligations of 
Member States to refrain from the use of force except in conformity with the Charter.”696 
 
Having recapitulated the adoption of the R2P doctrine by the international community of 
states as a moral guideline to counteract severe humanitarian crises, and the practical 
shortcomings of the implementation of the R2P doctrine, the question remains; how and to 
what extent the doctrine changes or clarifies current international law. Is the R2P doctrine 
best classified as a legal obligation, a political concept,697 soft law,698 or an emerging legal 
norm699? According to current international law, a right to use force only exists in case of an 
armed attack as a right of self-defence, or as a means to protect nationals abroad. 
Humanitarian interventions cannot generally be interpreted as cases of self-defence. In light 
of this, the R2P doctrine is generally described as an emerging or newly binding norm of 
customary international law. Most supporters regard R2P as a legal norm de lega ferenda, 
or an emerging norm of customary law. Yet, from a traditional legal positivist view, the 
legality of a norm does not depend on its moral intent but on its status in the relevant legal 
system. John Austin, a legal and philosophical positivist scholar, described this approach as 
“[t]he existence of the law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another.”700 In contrast, Lon 
Fuller, for example, argues that the legal validity of a rule or action rests not simply on formal 
compliance with the process that a legal system establishes for the formulation of a legal 
rule or the exercise of power but also on its content.701 Hans Kelsen highlighted a modified 
positivist conception of international law in his pure theory of law.702 Kelsen distinguished 
between moral norms, which are typically derived from general moral principles, and legal 
                                                          
693 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001), The Responsibility to Protect, 
Ottawa, chapter 2.  
694 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001), The Responsibility to Protect, 
Ottawa, para. 2. 14.  
695 High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004), A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, UN 
Doc A/59/ 565, para. 202.  
696 Report of the UN Secretary General (2009), UN General Assembly meeting on 12 January 2009, A/63/677. 
697 Clapham, A. (2007), Responsibility to Protect – Some Sort of Commitment, in: Chetail, V. (ed.), Conflits, Sécurité et 
Cooperation / Conflicts, Security and Cooperation, Brussels, p. 191. 
698 Welsh, J.M. and Banda, M. (2010), ‘International Law and the Responsibility to Protect: Clarifying or Expanding 
States’ Responsibilities?’ in: Global Responsibility to Protect, volume 2, p. 230. 
699 Szurek, S. (2008), La responsabilité de protéger, nature de l’obligation et responsabilité internationale, in Société 
Française pour le droit international (ed.), Colloque de Nanterre, La responsabilité de protéger, Pedone, Paris, p. 93. 
700 Austin, J. (1995), The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Cambridge University Press. 
701 Fuller, L.L. (1969), The Morality of Law, Yale University Press.  
702 Kelsen, H. (1992), Introduction to Problems of Legal Theory: A translation of the First Edition of the Reine 
Rechtslehre or Pure Theory of Law, Oxford University Press. 
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norms, which are the product of an act of will. In the context of emerging norms this means 
that certain actions, although formally prohibited by positive international law, might 
nonetheless possess moral validity because they are required by the rule of law or moral 
reasoning. 
 
 As Arbour703 noted in 2008, the R2P doctrine is a “new norm,” yet, at the same time, 
conceded it is “anchored in existing law, in institutions and in lessons learned from practice.” 
In contrast, Feinstein argues that R2P ‘redefines sovereignty’ from being inviolable and 
absolute as it was for 350 years, to entail ‘rights as well as responsibilities’. However, even 
such a limited definition of sovereignty is not a new idea in international law. In the Island of 
Palmas case, it was noted that “territorial sovereignty… has a corollary duty” which was to 
respect the sovereignty of other states. In a similar way the Lotus Principle makes it clear 
that sovereignty is not absolute; states have the right only to do that which is not prohibited 
by international law. Following from the question of the legal status of the R2P doctrine it 
has to be questioned whether the R2P doctrine can be accepted as a guiding principle in 
international affairs and, hence, constitutes a normative change in international law. This 
thesis therefore questions the legal status of humanitarian intervention in general and, by 
doing this, the R2P doctrine in particular. The debate about the status of the R2P doctrine 
and humanitarian intervention in general is not simple as it involves a variety of legal, political 
and moral arguments. 
 
 Scholars have debated this question.704  Supporters of the legality of the R2P doctrine 
argue that the doctrine is rooted in pre-existing treaty obligations, more specifically in  article 
1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, article I of the 1948 Genocide Convention, and in the 
Human Rights Covenants which oblige states parties to prevent inhumane acts in 
advance.705 By contrast, opponents of the R2P doctrine argue that the doctrine serves to 
                                                          
703 Louise Arbour is former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, justice of the Supreme Court of Canada and the 
Court of Appeal for Ontario and former Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
704 See for example: Arnauld, A. von (2009), ‘Souveränität und Responsibility to Protect’ in: Die Friedens-Warte, 
volume 84, pp. 39 and 42. ǀ Bellamy, A.J. (2008), ‘Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect’ in: Global 
Governance, volume 14, issue 2, pp, 135–156. ǀ Bellamy, A.J. (2011), Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect, 
London.  
705 See for example Arbour, L. (2008), ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in International Law and Practice’ 
in: Review of International Studies, volume 34, p. 450: “anchored in existing law”, and resting upon the undisputed 
obligation to prevent and punish genocide. ǀ See also Boisson de Chazournes, L. and Condorelli, L. (2006), ‘De la 
‘responsabilité de proteger’ ou d’une nouvelle parure pour une notion déjà bien établie’ in: Revue Générale de Droit 
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undermine the current international legal system as it strives for nothing short of democracy 
and cosmopolitan justice, imposed by military intervention.  Such critiques often regard R2P 
as an emerging legal norm, structured to legitimize humanitarian intervention and excuse 
forms of military negligence. In fact, R2P’s legal dimension has been subject to intense 
scrutiny. Rather than criticizing the R2P doctrine for its controversial legal status the purpose 
here is instead to define the doctrine within the existing parameters of international law, 
highlighting the shortcoming of the doctrine to aid clarification and implementation of existing 
norm conflicts in international law. 
 
To clarify the legal status of the R2P doctrine and its legal authenticity as a new norm, 
it is helpful to look at each pillar of the doctrine. Special emphasis is given to the last pillar 
on the legality of coercive international responses to humanitarian crises. The first pillar 
refers to a responsibility held by states, to protect their own populations from mass 
atrocities—specifically from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity. Although this specification of mass atrocities was missing from the original R2P 
doctrine, it has been added to the version which was adapted by the UN General Assembly 
in 2005. Several states expressed concern that the endorsement of the concept would 
facilitate self-interested interference by powerful states in the domestic affairs of the weak. 
To prevent this, the R2P version in the Outcome Paper expressly ties intervention to the 
authority of the UN Security Council, and the responsibility to protect is expressly limited to 
specific crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. As such, 
the first pillar does not add or undermine in anyway existing international law but reflects 
state duties set out in a range of universal and regional human rights conventions.706 These 
conventions are only legally binding on states party to them but some of their core provisions 
are recognized as customary international law. The global legality and legitimacy of the first 
pillar is further highlighted by the acceptance of the responsibility by states that have been 
cautious about the R2P doctrine, such as Venezuela, Cuba, Myanmar, Nicaragua, and 
                                                          
International, volume 110, pp. 11–18. It is argued that R2P does not a norm beyond current international law 
obligations and is therefore nothing new. 
706 For example Articles 1, 5 and 6 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, as 
adapted in UN General Assembly Resolution 260 A (III) from 9 December 1948. ǀ Articles 2 and 9 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as adapted in UN General Assembly  Resolution 2200A (XXI) from 16 December 
1966, 999 UNTS 171. ǀ and Articles 1, 2 and 5 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 1950, 213 UNTS 222; ETS 5. 
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Sudan.707 The responsibility of states to protect their own citizens from mass atrocities is 
further protected in international law by the UN Security Council’s right to authorize 
sanctions in response to the occurrence of mass atrocities and humanitarian crises, under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Yet, the language of the 2005 World Summit document 
indicated reluctance amongst states to accept a legal obligation by the UN Security Council 
for the protection of populations.  
 
Moving to the second pillar; the R2P doctrine argues that states not only have a 
responsibility to protect their own population, but have a further collective responsibility to 
assist other states in protecting their populations especially where a state is clearly failing to 
do so. In contrast to traditional ideas of just war and humanitarian intervention, the R2P 
doctrine chose a different wording, describing the extraterritorial protection of populations 
not as a right, but as a positive duty – or responsibility -, held by all states. In fact, the 
doctrine’s objective was to shift the focus of discussion from the rights of interveners, to the 
rights of those in need of protection from mass atrocities; and the resulting duties to ensure 
that these rights were protected. Whether the responsibility to assist other states is seen as 
an option or obligation remains open, but determines the effects of the doctrine on 
international relations and international law. The US, in particular, rejected any notion of an 
obligation of when and where to respond to mass atrocities and humanitarian crises. While 
the US, like many other states, has repeatedly acknowledged that the international 
community does have a responsibility to protect populations when states fail to do so,708 it 
did not accept this as a legally binding obligation. US Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, 
argued that “the responsibility of the other countries in the international community is not of 
the same character as the responsibility of the host”, insisting that “the responsibility of the 
international community to protect was a moral responsibility”.709  
 
According to the last pillar of the R2P doctrine, states have a further responsibility to 
act in cases of severe atrocities. While preferring peaceful means, under Chapter VI UN 
                                                          
707 Official statements by these states regarding the first pillar have been made in the UN General Assembly in 2009. 
See: UN General Assembly documents A/63/PV.99, 24 July 2009, at 3–6, 21–3. ǀ A/63/PV.100, 28 July 2009, at 7–8, 12–
3. ǀ and A/63/PV.101, 28 July 2009, at 10–11. 
708 Rice, Susan, E. (2009), Remarks by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative, on the UN Security 
Council and the Responsibility to Protect, at the International Peace Institute Vienna Seminar, 15 June 2009.  
709 Bolton, J. (2005), Letter from John R. Bolton, Representative of the United States of America to the UN, to Jean 
Ping, President of the UN General Assembly, 30 August 2005, available at: 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/US_Boltonletter_R2P_30Aug05[1].pdf  
Colliding Norms in Humanitarian Intervention - PhD Thesis - Birte Ahlhaus 
 
215 | P a g e  
 
Charter, such as negotiations, mediation, and referrals to the ICC, the last pillar also allows 
for collective, coercive action, if authorised by the UN Security Council. Leaving the final 
responsibility to authorise coercive action in response to humanitarian crises with the UN 
Security Council is in accordance with international law, as set out in Chapter VII UN Charter. 
While it was widely accepted that the responsibility of states to protect their own citizens 
was a principle grounded in existing international law, little was said at the 2009 UN General 
Assembly discussion of the implementation of the R2P doctrine about the international 
collective responsibility to protect beyond borders. Significantly in Bosnia in 1995, Rwanda 
in 1994, and Syria in 2013, states and regional organizations failed to protect populations 
from mass atrocities.  
 
The 2009 UN General Assembly resolution decided to continue its consideration of 
the responsibility to protect.710 As such, the last pillar, as adopted by the UN General 
Assembly, does not create binding legal obligations under the sources of international law 
defined in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ; that is, international conventions, international 
custom, or general principles of law. Yet, the partial adoption of the R2P doctrine by the UN 
General Assembly may play a contributory role in the gradual development of customary 
international law. However, the most authoritative of the documents analysed above, the 
Summit Outcome Document adopted by the General Assembly, is also the document that 
outlines the principle of international collective responsibility most weakly. States comments, 
such as US Ambassador Bolton’s; state practice such as in the Syria case in 2013, and the 
interpretation of the UN General Assembly texts provide little guidance that states intend to 
create a new, legally binding obligation. Nonetheless, seen in accordance with 
complementary customary law developments in recent years, there is evidence of a potential 
for legal norm development regarding the responsibility to protect.  
 
In order to define state understandings, opinio juris, of a shared responsibility to 
protect, foreign populations in cases of mass atrocities or humanitarian crisis; it is useful to 
consider supporting documents and developments in international law. In 1986, the ICJ 
observed in the Nicaragua case that ‘...no […] general right of intervention in support of an 
opposition within another State, exists in contemporary international law’. Yet, on 27th 
February 2007, the ICJ handed down its judgment in the Case Concerning the Application 
                                                          
710 UN General Assembly resolution GA Res 63/308, 14 September 2009, A/RES/63/308 (2009). 
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of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro, considering cases of genocide only. According to 
the Court, its jurisdiction was not permitted to consider breaches of other obligations, such 
as human rights, even if these obligations were owed erga omnes. Regarding the ethnic 
conflict in Bosnia, the ICJ ruled that the state of Serbia was neither directly responsible for 
the Srebrenica genocide in 1995, nor was it complicit in the genocide. However, it did hold 
Serbia responsible for failing to prevent the genocide. The Court based its decision solely 
on the obligation to prevent genocide found in the Genocide Convention. In its decision, the 
ICJ argued that the Genocide Convention imposes an obligation upon every state to do all 
it reasonably can to prevent genocide beyond its borders. According to the Court, a 
distinction has to be made between conduct and result. A state cannot be under an 
obligation to succeed in preventing genocide being committed by another state regardless 
of the circumstances. Rather, the obligation of states is to employ all means reasonably 
available to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as possible. This notion of ‘all means 
reasonably available’ is both, extensive and yet ambiguous in scope.  
 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) suggests in a similar way that an 
obligation “must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or 
disproportionate burden on the authorities”.711  While the ICJ ruled in the specific case that 
Serbia was not directly responsible, due to insufficient means to prevent genocide, the Court 
highlighted that “the possibility remains that the combined efforts of several States, each 
complying with its obligation to prevent, might have achieved the result – averting the 
commission of genocide – which the efforts of only one State were insufficient to produce”.712 
As such, the Court makes clear that the obligation to prevent genocide is not territorially 
limited which is in accordance with the second pillar of the R2P doctrine. The Court justified 
its decision by arguing that while the positive obligation of due diligence under most human 
rights treaties is dependent upon a state having jurisdiction over a certain person or territory, 
there is no such threshold criteria in the Genocide Convention. Rather, the scope of a state's 
obligation is simply determined by its ‘capacity to influence effectively’ the genocidal actors, 
as far as is permissible under international law.713 The ICJ’s judgment is further supported 
                                                          
711 Osman v United Kingdom 29 EHRR 245, at para 116, quoted in Hakimi, supra n 80 at 375. 
712 Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) ICJ Reports 2007, at paragraph 430.  
713 See: Goodin, (1985), Protecting the Vulnerable, University of Chicago Press, at 117–135. ǀ Pattison, (2010), 
Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene? Oxford University Press. ǀ and 
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by Article 41(1) of the ILC's Articles on State Responsibility which provides that ‘States shall 
cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach’ of the peremptory 
norms of international law. Yet, the Court provided no indication of what particular measures 
are demanded by the obligation to prevent genocide. The Bosnia v. Serbia judgment shows 
that the ICJ seems to embrace the R2P notion of collective action taken in instances where 
a state is already ‘manifestly failing’ to protect its population from genocide. However, there 
is no legal support in other case law or in state practice to defend a legal obligation by states 
to protect foreign populations from humanitarian crises.  
 
In 2011 the International Law Commission (ILC) elaborated the institutionalization of 
the R2P doctrine through the UN. The ILC has over the years published reports and codified 
legal rules concerning various controversies in international law, especially the issue of 
colliding norms of human rights protection and non-intervention. The ILC report contends 
that international organizations can be attributed responsibility for internationally wrongful 
acts—acts of commission and also omission—and that they are bound to obligations arising 
from peremptory norms of international law, such as the prohibition of genocide, just as 
individual states are.714 This statement is in accordance with the R2P doctrine that has been 
adopted in the 2005 UN General Assembly Outcome paper, giving the UN Security Council 
an obligation to act in cases of mass atrocities.  
 
Yet again, the argument of a legally binding obligation by an international institution 
such as the UN Security Council has been met with criticism as it does not reflect either 
state practice or opinio juris, best articulated by the US, China and Russia who deny any 
absolute obligation to assist other states. Alvarez further identifies a lack of clarity around 
the idea that international organizations such as the UN are subject to the rule of law since 
“the institutional practices of these organizations, unlike the internal rules of states, are often 
a constitutive part of international law.”715 In fact, decisions by the UN Security Council are 
                                                          
Tan, (2006), The Duty to Protect, in: Nardin, and Williams (eds), Humanitarian Intervention, New York University Press, 
p. 84. 
714 Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, with Commentaries, adopted by the International 
Law Commission at its sixty-third session, in 2011, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the 
Commission’s report covering the work of that session, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2011, Vol II 
(Part Two), A/66/10 (‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations’). Article 26 states: ‘Nothing in this 
chapter precludes the wrongfulness of any act of an international organization which is not in conformity with an 
obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law.’ 
715 Alvarez, J. (2007), ‘Book Review of Dan Sarooshi’s: International Organizations and Their Exercise of Sovereign 
Powers’ in: American Journal of International Law, volume 101, p. 677. 
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a source of legal obligation. As such it is difficult to argue that the UN Security Council has 
acted illegally in cases where the permanent members did not reach agreement on an 
intervention in a humanitarian crisis. The decisions of the UN Security Council are also not 
subject to any judicial review although the ICJ is considered to have the right to review its 
decisions.  
 
As the ongoing debates on humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect 
have shown, the legal immunity of the UN Security Council is unlikely to change in the near 
future as states like to transfer responsibility for certain activities away from themselves and 
to entities which are not subject to effective accountability mechanisms.716 Accepting the 
legal immunity and political decision making of the UN Security Council, Louise Arbour and 
Anne Peters have suggested that the exercise of a veto could “under special circumstances 
constitute an abus de droit by a permanent member”717. The argument is based on the idea 
that the permanent 5 members of the UN Security Council can and should be bound in their 
use of the veto by their obligations arising from international legal norms such as the 
Genocide Convention. The ILC’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of International 
Organizations supports this idea, arguing that states can be liable for seeking to circumvent 
their international obligations when acting through an international organization. Yet, 
considering the political nature and interests represented in the UN Security Council it also 
unlikely that the use of the veto by the permanent five member states can be rendered 
illegal, or be subject to legal scrutiny in cases of humanitarian crises. In fact, the permanent 
five members of the UN Security Council opposed any limit and legal scrutiny on their right 
to veto in the lead up to the 2005 UN World Summit.718  
 
Therefore, it can be argued that R2P remains a somewhat ambivalent instrument. It 
seeks to clarify the idea of an intervention on humanitarian grounds by shifting the 
vocabulary from a right to a duty or responsibility. However, this still fails to resolve the 
problem of norm collision and the fact that this collision might ultimately serve the interests 
                                                          
716 Wilde, R. (2006), ‘Enhancing Accountability at the International Level: The Tension between International 
Organization and Member State Responsibility and the Underlying Issues at Stake’ in: ILSA Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, volume 12, p. 411. 
717 Arbour, L. (2008), ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in International Law and Practice’ in: Review of 
International Studies, volume 34, p. 454. ǀ Peters, A. (2009), ‘Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty’ in: European 
Journal of International Law, volume 20, p. 540. 
718 Blatter and Williams, (2011), ‘The Responsibility Not to Veto’ in: Global Responsibility to Protect, volume 3, p. 301. 
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of states, notably the strategic interests of the permanent five members of the UN Security 
Council. In this context, the growing tension between a Western democratic state’s 
commitments – in principle – to humanitarian norms increasingly clashes with the power of 
political interests and traditional notions of state sovereignty advocated in the UN Security 
Council by Russia and China.  
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Conclusion 
 
“The general problem with intervention, even when it is justified, even when it is necessary 
to prevent terrible crimes – even when it poses no threat to regional or global stability, is 
an imperfect duty – a duty that doesn’t belong to any particular agent. Somebody ought to 
intervene, but no specific state or society is morally bound to do so. And in many of these 
cases, nobody does.”719 
 
Considering the arguments given in the previous chapters on the history of humanitarian 
intervention, normative approaches in law and politics, and the summary of the aims and 
effectiveness of the R2P doctrine in this chapter, the debate surrounding R2P repeats a 
long-standing discussions of just war and humanitarian intervention rather than the creation 
of a new norm. A doctrine alone cannot make it easier to remove political difference, to 
summon political will, or overcome the deadlock problem of the UN Security Council. This 
said, it has to be acknowledged that the R2P doctrine has the capacity to impact on the 
justificatory discourse720 in international law. As such, the doctrine can raise the political 
costs of action or inaction in the face of gross human rights violations.721  
 
 However, as Walzer points out, the question remains: who is responsible to act? As 
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the R2P doctrine can be advanced by 
normalizing the use of low-intensity military options that are focused on protecting 
populations, once peaceful measures have been exhausted and the UN Security Council is 
deadlocked. To do that, specific criteria that allow for the limited use of force when the UN 
Security Council fails to act have to be established. Such criteria could include, but are not 
limited to, the following:  
 
1) All peaceful options must be exhausted (preferably decided upon by the UN General 
Assembly);  
2) The UN Security Council must be unable to act;  
3) Any military force used must be designed and limited to protect populations;  
4) The use of force must be authorized by a legitimate authority, e.g. the UN General 
Assembly;  
                                                          
719 Walzer, M. (1993), Just and Unjust War: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, New York Basic Books, 
p.xiii.  
720 Johnstone, I. (2003), ‘Security Council deliberations: the power of the better argument, in: European Journal of 
International Law, volume 14, issue 3’ 
721 Chayes, A. and Handler Chayes, A. (1996), The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements, Brookings Institute. 
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5) The intervention must have a specific goal, timeline and plan for the post intervention 
state.  
The chapter on the law of humanitarian intervention has argued that a new norm of 
international law may be created through a repeated process of interaction, interpretation 
and internalization.722 By providing a moral pull factor for states to commonly and repeatedly 
comply with the new norms, the R2P doctrine may provide the legal base for the emergence 
of a legal norm. Yet, by looking at current state practice, there is, at this stage, a lack of 
opinio juris among states on the legality of a specific responsibility to protect or a right to use 
force for humanitarian ends in general. In fact, states are generally adverse to any use of 
force outside the UN Security Council; and it is a foundational principle of international law 
that the use of force should be avoided wherever possible. The debate between the 
protection of human rights and the traditional principal of non-intervention, as conflicting 
norms in the UN Charter, seems to be gradually moving toward the human rights direction; 
and may represent a very slow crystallization of a new norm of behaviour. For example, the 
prohibition of mass atrocity crimes is now recognized as jus cogens.723 Attaining such a 
status in international law is important, because it creates a moral pull on states, reminding 
the international community that it should prevent atrocity crimes wherever possible. As 
evident from the analysis of the ICJ decisions and ILC views relevant to the legality of the 
R2P doctrine it is argued that the issue of enforcement, with respect to the obligation to 
protect foreign populations from humanitarian crises, remains under-developed. Thus, there 
is no acceptable and feasible solution to the norm collision of human rights protection and 
the principle of non-intervention. Consequently, states feel less compelled to act when faced 
with humanitarian crises in another country, interpreting a responsibility to protect as an 
option, rather than an obligation. As such, humanitarian interventions remain subject to 
power politics and the interests of the permanent five members of the UN Security Council. 
Yet, as Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Darfur, and now Syria demonstrate, the UN Security 
Council will not always act to prevent humanitarian crises. There is a stark truth in 
international law that sovereignty, as conceptualized under the Treaties of Westphalia, 
continues to protect the rulers of nation states and prevents the international community 
from preventing state acts of mass atrocity. The R2P doctrine is indicative of policy change, 
                                                          
722 Hathaway, O. and Koh, H. (2005), Foundations of International Law and Politics, New York: Foundation Press. 
723 Bassiouni, M.C. (1996), ‘Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability’ in: Law and 
Contemporary Problems, volume 59, p. 17.  
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away from a traditional notion of security and sovereignty toward a broader definition of 
individual human security; yet it remains in a state of possible normative change in law and 
politics. This argument is supported by statements made by the International Court of Justice 
and the International Law Commission in recent years, which aspire to the gradual 
development of legal responsibilities for the extraterritorial protection of human rights.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
“Indeed, we have no excuses anymore. We have no excuses for inaction and no 
alibis for ignorance. Often we know even before the very victims of conflict that they 
will be victimized.”724 
 
By one estimate, forty million civilians were killed during wars between states and 
approximately 240 million civilians were killed by their own governments between 1900 and 
2000.725 Since 1950 more civilians were killed during civil conflicts than military 
personnel. The move from inter-state conflicts to intra-state conflicts, such as civil wars, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide, resulted in an increase in civilian casualties. The 
prevention of such suffering and death should be of paramount importance for the 
international community of states. Against this background, how and to what extent has the 
concept of human security promoted and advanced a right to humanitarian intervention 
since the 1990s? Has there been a notable difference in the interests leading to a 
humanitarian intervention and the effectiveness of such interventions? 
 
 The primary conclusion from the preceding analysis of the legal and political dilemma 
of human security is that recent normative approaches to institutionalise a right to intervene 
repeat a long-standing discussion of “just war” rather than creating a new norm. While the 
importance of power politics has been emphasised in this thesis, it has not been the intention 
to deny the importance of law and norms on the justificatory discourse726 on the use of force 
for human security. Moreover, the contention that human security has successively been 
adopted as a foreign policy by middle powers is beyond dispute. As such, human security 
can raise the political costs of action or inaction in the face of gross human rights 
violations.727 What remains questionable and open for further debate is whether a normative 
right to intervene can be neutrally and objectively applied to diverse cases of mass atrocities 
and civil conflict. In applying a critical analysis to human security case studies it is evident 
that normative principles and rules of international law remain subjects to “realities of politics 
                                                          
724 United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan February 5, 1998 
725 Rummel, R.J. (1995), Death by government, London: Transaction Publishers, p. 21. 
726 Johnstone, I. (2003), ‘Security Council deliberations: the power of the better argument’ in: European Journal of 
International Law, volume 14, issue 3. 
727 Chayes, A. and Handler Chayes, A. (1996), The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements, Brookings Institute. 
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and power”.728 In failing to provide a comprehensive account of the power politics governing 
the interpretation of the use of force for human security, advocates of human security, R2P, 
and just war theory fail to provide a realist account of the practical limits of a right to 
intervene. This thesis, therefore, offered a third way of approaching the humanitarian 
intervention debate: rather than drawing on a Kantian inspired normative application of 
abstract norms to contingent cases of mass atrocities, this thesis highlights Aristotle’s, 
Walzer’s and Toulmin’s idea of a phronesis – or practical moral reasoning.  
  
 Chapter 1 of this thesis revealed that, over time, the normative prohibition of the use 
of force in the UN Charter expanded the prohibition of military action from war, as outlined 
in Articles 15 and 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
of 1928, to use of force and even to the threat of use of force. In fact, the debate about the 
legality of such military intervention has taken place in European political science and 
international law since the nineteenth century. Further, the controversy over the just war and 
good cause justification for the use of force is as old as the discipline of international relations 
itself and can be traced back to the writings of Thucydides during the Peloponnesian War. 
How then does the concept of human security differ from principles long used in foreign 
policy to justify the use of force for humanitarian ends? 
 
 Article 2(4) UN Charter introduced a rule of International Law that makes it illegal for 
states to use or threaten to use force, for any reasons other than the permissible exceptions. 
This principle has not only been recognized as a rule of international law, but has now 
achieved the status of a jus cogens norm – a peremptory norm of International Law from 
which no derogation is permissible. This was not only expressed by the International Law 
Commission as far back as in 1966, but has also been recognized as such by the 
International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case.  Moreover, Article 103 of the UN Charter 
expressly states that obligations under the Charter would supersede obligations under any 
other international agreement.  
 
 Nevertheless, the increased focus on and institutionalization of the UN Charter’s 
principal purpose of human rights protection, as outlined in the preamble and Article 1 UN 
                                                          
728 Moses, J. (2013), ‘Sovereignty as Irresponsibility: A Realist Critique of the Responsibility to Protect’ in: Review of 
International Studies, volume 39, issue 1, p. 133.  
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Charter, resulted in some instances, in colliding norms. Due to, but not limited to, such norm 
collision, the use of force for humanitarian ends remains selective and the practice itself has 
been criticised as illegitimate and ineffective. As evident from the case studies of middle 
power interventionism and the list of authorised and un-authorised intervention since the 
1990s, the majority of humanitarian interventions have been authorised by the UN Security 
Council while at the same time a large number of civil conflicts have received no international 
response.  
 
Chapter 3 showed that legal scholars like to solve the question of the legality of a 
case with a clear answer. Yet, the debate on the normalisation of humanitarian intervention 
does not allow for a simple yes/no response. Indeed, the current rules of international law 
do not allow the use of force for such intervention unless authorised by the UN Security 
Council. To give a precise answer to whether or not humanitarian intervention can and 
should be legally normalised is therefore difficult. The literal and contextual interpretations 
of the colliding rules in international law, as outlined in Chapter 3, highlight that neither the 
UN Charter based interpretation methods (Article 103 UN Charter), nor external theoretical 
approaches to the norm collision, such as Article 31(c) VCLT or principles such as lex 
posterior or lex specialis, are able to overcome the practical implications of norm collision, 
leading to the selective conduct of humanitarian intervention.  
 
The study of human rights law in Chapter 3 further highlights that UN bodies confirm 
that states have a duty to respect and protect human rights. Core obligations arising from 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the following Covenants establish a 
threshold both for states to provide minimum essential levels for the dignified life of its 
citizens and for the international community to assist civilians in a foreign state. International 
human rights law might fail to prevent abuse due to a lack of legal or legitimizing frameworks 
allowing for humanitarian interventions in severe cases; but it does not fail to identify the 
most basic function of defining a duty holder. The 2004 report titled A More Secure World 
issued by the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change appointed by Kofi 
Annan; Kofi Annan’s own document In Larger Freedom and the Outcome document of the 
World Summit 2005, all agree that no change in the UN Charter provisions relating to the 
use of force is necessary, and that they are adequate to meet new threats. 
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Yet, the norm collision between two incontestable norms of international law has 
effects on state practice. It has been shown in Chapter 4 that states, in particular middle 
powers, increasingly refer to international law in constructing their foreign politics. This is not 
to deny the overarching influence of power politics still governing international relations and 
the application of international law as shown in Chapter 3. All three case studies had legal 
authorisation from the UN Security Council, and argue for a prevalence of the norm on the 
protection of human rights abroad over the traditional prohibition on the use of force. In fact, 
by claiming adherence to Article 2(4) UN Charter, the intervening states have only reinforced 
the validity of the provision. According to the justifications offered, the use of force for the 
protection of human rights does not breach the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state; nor is it in breach of the purposes of the UN, and therefore, is not in breach of 
Article 2(4) UN Charter. It is, in fact, an action for humanitarian purposes, something which 
member states have been obliged to follow under the purposes of the UN. Even on an 
empirical and statistical level, the majority of states have adhered to the provisions of Article 
2(4) UN Charter for addressing their international disputes.  
 
Consequently, the examples of middle power led coercive interventions for human 
rights protection with authorisation from the UN Security Council; has led to the emergence 
of soft law. This argument is significant because it presupposes that such use of force is 
based on colliding norms, which are both peremptory and cannot be seen as prevailing and, 
therefore, must find legality in soft law. What is of importance to this analysis is the claim 
that the emergence of this soft law permitting the use of force for the norm of human rights 
protection, has resulted in acceptance of a law that is in conflict with Article 2(4) UN Charter. 
More precisely, the effect of the norm collision of modern human rights and traditional law 
on the use of force results in a gap between state practice and international law. What is 
interesting is that the case with arguably the purest humanitarian motive - the Canadian 
intervention in Zaire- was neither deployed nor did it prevent atrocities taking place. In 
contrast, the cases in which economic, security and political interests coincided with the 
humanitarian justification – as in Australia’s intervention in East Timor - the use of force took 
place. Nevertheless, the effectiveness and success of these coercive interventions differ 
greatly. Accordingly, some scholars have argued that such humanitarian justifications only 
reflect a legal camouflage to a patently illegal act.  
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Somewhat differently, Rosalyn Higgins argues that we must not lose sight of the fact 
that we live in a decentralized international legal order, where claims may be made either in 
good or bad faith.729 She adds that we delude ourselves if we think that the role of norms is 
to remove the possibility of abusive claims being made. The role of norms, she points out, 
is the achievement of values for the common good. What the ongoing debate about the 
legality and legitimate use of force for humanitarian intervention has shown is that the issue 
cannot be solved by one discipline alone; as any attempt to interpret the existing norms on 
the use of force and human rights is “sterile and unhelpful”.730 The debate about the use of 
force for humanitarian intervention in law and politics therefore remains a challenge to 
international relations and international law. A state’s conduct is substantial to the 
development of customary international law and when a state’s policies and practice conflict, 
what the state does would seem to be more persuasive evidence of what it believes than 
what it says.731 There is no indication that states will bind themselves to a legal obligation to 
use force in cases of mass atrocities in the near future. Yet, the strengthening of moral 
reasoning, in terms of human security policies, improves the chances of humanitarian 
intervention on a case by case basis following a process of moral reasoning. 
 
 
 
                                                          
729 Higgins, R. (1998), Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use it, Chapter 14: The Individual Use of 
Force in International Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 247. 
730 Byers, M. and Chesterman, S. (2003), Changing Rules about Rules? Unilateral humanitarian intervention and the 
future of international law, in: Holzgrefe, J.L. and Keohane, R.O. (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical Legal and 
Political Dilemmas, Cambridge University Press, p. 203. 
731 This decision has been supported by the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case: ‘[t]he mere fact that States declare their 
recognition of certain rules is not sufficient for the Court to consider these as being part of customary international 
law, and as applicable as such to those States’. 
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Chapter 5 highlighted the gap between the agreed value of human rights protection 
in theory and the conduct of humanitarian intervention in practice. Significantly, Michael 
Walzer argued that justice and morality are not coterminous, and that an action can be just 
but not moral.732  
 
“The proper method of practical morality is casuistic in character. Since I am concerned with 
actual judgments and justifications, I shall turn regularly to historical cases. My argument 
runs through the cases, and I have often foregone a systematic presentation for the sake of 
nuances and details of historical reality.”733 
 
While offering no account of morality, Walzer argues that we can at least “hold … 
people to their own principles” and that we can “expose the hypocrisy” of those who say one 
thing and do another.734 The adoption of a human security policy by middle powers can be 
interpreted as a normative argument that links policy decisions to certain value principles. 
Such policy outlines hold some weight regarding the interpretation of international law in the 
respective circumstances. Put differently, a state’s human security policy offers an indication 
as to whether the state consents (or continues to consent) to the rule in question. Yet, a 
policy outline can become void when the evidence of state practice is contrary to the policy 
rhetoric (the hypocrisy of saying one thing and doing another). Canada, Australia, and 
Norway support a human security policy to some degree yet, the implementation of such 
policy remains subject to traditional security and strategic interests. In fact, as no country, 
except the US, Russia, and China is capable of unilaterally conducting a military 
intervention, multilateral cooperation is crucial. This poses significant problems for the 
development and, most of all, implementation of a national human security policy. Given 
limited resources, Canada, Australia, and Norway cannot claim to carry out an effective 
human security policy if their  objectives are negated by more powerful states such as the 
US, Russia, or China. States therefore increasingly follow a prudential rather than purely 
normative approach to the practice of humanitarian intervention. Further, past experiences 
have revealed the uncertain outcome and high contingency in social, legal, economic, and 
political consequences of humanitarian intervention. As evident from the case studies, it 
would be wrong to define human security policies as, in Walzer’s terms, hypocritical. On the 
international level, the adoption of the R2P doctrine by the international community of states 
                                                          
732 Walzer, M. (2006), Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, fourth edition, p. xxii.  
733 Walzer, M. (2006), Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, fourth edition, p. xvi. 
734 Walzer, M. (2006), Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, fourth edition, p. xxii. 
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reflects a theoretical move towards accepting the use of force for humanitarian intervention 
even though the practice of the doctrine remains highly problematic.  
 
More specifically, while the debate surrounding R2P is often regarded as a rewording 
of the long-standing discussion on just war and humanitarian intervention; the codification 
of the doctrine at the UN World Summit meeting in 2005 indicates the increasing importance 
attributed to human security in world affairs. Furthermore, with the implementation of the 
doctrine of human security it becomes more difficult to hold a humanitarian intervention 
illegal in cases of severe humanitarian crises. As such, human security and R2P can affect 
the justificatory discourse in international law, and raise the political costs of action or 
inaction in cases of mass atrocities.735 Yet, one of the ad bellum concerns remains the lack 
of institutional ability to control and regulate external coercive protection of human rights. 
The doctrine is far from crystallizing into anything resembling binding law or a legally 
acceptable solution for the norm conflict inherent in humanitarian intervention. As such, 
human security and R2P has had limited effects on the practical implications of legal norm 
conflict and has not changed the fact that humanitarian interventions more often than not 
occur on behalf of the powerful.  
 
Considering the ambiguous political interests and power political limits to 
humanitarian intervention, the question remains whether there is a solution to the dilemmas 
of human security and, more precisely, the collision of norms in international law. The most 
common response to the norm conflict in humanitarian intervention is to promote a soft law 
norm of humanitarian intervention, for example in form of the R2P doctrine. Yet, the term 
soft law and the idea of a moral right to intervene blur the distinction between legality and 
morality. As argued in this thesis, soft law does not represent a long term solution to norm 
conflict in international law as it increases the influence of realpolitik in the interpretation and 
application of international law. Further, a normative approach, as advocated by the R2P 
doctrine, aims to create a universal responsibility to protect which cannot be upheld – nor 
be appropriate - in each and every case of humanitarian crises as it fails to address the 
particularity of each case.736 From the analysis presented here it would seem that a 
                                                          
735 Johnstone, I. (2003), ‘Security Council deliberations: the power of the better argument’ in: European Journal of 
International Law, volume 14, issue 3. ǀ Chayes, A. and Handler Chayes, A. (1996), The New Sovereignty: Compliance 
with International Regulatory Agreements, Brookings Institute. 
736 As a growing literature documents, humanitarian policies cannot only fail but can also make things worse. See for 
example: Rieff, D. (2003), A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis, New York. ǀ Barnett, M. and Weiss, T.C. 
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prudential application of human security policies may be better suitable to advance the 
humanitarian intervention debate and may enhance the chances of a normative change in 
international law. While a prudential approach allows for the interpretation of norms in 
regards to their application in each case, it does not imply an improved or increased 
response to civil conflicts as this remains subject to political interests of the powerful states 
and military strategies. Indeed, moral reasoning alone does not end civil conflict but it allows 
for a legitimating discourse on the use of force in certain contingent situations. As such, the 
prudential approach highlights the differences between universalism and particularism. The 
concept of human security policies might be able to respond more effectively to particular 
cases of humanitarian crises and raise awareness of such crises in the international 
community. While human security policies alone cannot end humanitarian crises, they do 
have the potential be effective by combining national interests with humanitarian needs.  
  
                                                          
(2008), Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics, Cornell University Press. ǀ Polman, L. (2010), The Crisis 
Caravan: What’s wrong with Humanitarian Aid? New York, Picador. 
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Appendix 
 
 
1. List of civil conflicts and the respective responses by the international 
community 
 
 
Year 
Country UN Security 
Council 
authorization 
and UN 
mission 
UN Security 
Council 
authorization 
and delegated 
mission 
Intervention 
without initial 
UN Security 
Council 
authorization 
No 
Response 
1990-
1993 
Rwanda    Rwandan 
Civil War 
1990-
1997 
Liberia   ECOMOG  
1990-
2006 
Senegal    Civil War 
Since 
1991 
Northern Iraq  coalition Coalition  
Since 
1991 
Western 
Sahara 
MINURSO    
Since 
1991 
Somalia    Somali War 
1991-
1992 
Cambodia UNAMIC    
1991-
1995 
Angola UNAVEM II    
1991-
1995 
El Salvador ONUSAL    
1991-
2003 
Iraq/Kuwait UNIKOM    
1991-
1993 
Georgia    Civil 
Conflict 
1991-
1999 
Sierra Leone    Civil 
Conflict 
1991-
1001 
Algeria     
Since 
1992 
Former 
Yugoslavia 
UNPROFOR IFOR 
SFOR 
  
1992-
1993 
Somalia UNOSOM I UNITAF   
1992-
1993 
Cambodia UNTAC    
1992-
1994 
Mozambique ONUMOZ    
1992-
1997 
Tajikistan    Civil 
Conflict 
1993-
1995 
Somalia UNOSOM II    
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1993-
1994 
Uganda/ 
Rwanda 
UNOMUR    
1993-
2009 
Georgia UNOMIG    
1993-
1997 
Liberia UNOMIL    
1993-
1996 
Haiti UNMIH    
1993-
1996 
Rwanda UNAMIR  Operation 
Turquoise 
  
1993-
2004 
Burundi    Civil 
Conflict 
1994-
1997 
Haiti UNMIH MNF   
1994-
2000 
Tajikistan UNMOT    
1994 Yemen    Civil 
Conflict 
1994-
1996 
Chechnya    Civil 
Conflict 
1995-
1997 
Angola UNAVEM III    
1995-
1996 
Croatia UNCRO    
1995-
2002 
Bosnia 
Herzegovina 
UNMIBH    
1996-
1997 
DR Congo    Civil War 
1996-
1997 
Haiti UNSMIH    
1996-
1998 
Slavonia, 
Baranja, 
Sirmium 
UNTAES    
1996-
2006 
Nepal    Civil 
Conflict 
1996-
2002 
Prevlaka UNMOP    
1997 Cambodia    Civil 
Conflict 
1997-
1997 
Guatemala MINUGUA    
1997-
1999 
Angola MONUA    
1997-
1997 
Haiti UNTMIH    
1997-
2000 
Haiti MIPOMUH    
1997 Albania    Civil 
Conflict 
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1997-
1999 
DR Congo    Civil 
Conflict 
1998-
2000 
Central African 
Republic 
MINURCA    
1998-
1999 
Sierra Leone UNOMSIL    
1998-
1999 
Guinea Bissau    Civil 
Conflict 
1999-
2005 
Sierra Leone UNAMSIL ECOMOG   
Since 
1999 
Kosovo UNMIK KFOR NATO  
1999-
2002 
East Timor UNTAET INTERFRET   
1999-
2010 
DR Congo MONUC IEMF 
EUFOR  
Congo 
  
1999-
2003 
Liberia    Civil 
Conflict 
1999-
2009 
Chechnya   Russia  
2000-
2008 
Ethiopia / 
Eritrea 
UNMEE    
2001 Macedonia    Civil 
Conflict 
Since 
2001 
Afghanistan  ISAF   
2002-
2005 
East Timor UNMISET    
2003-
2007 
Darfur    Civil 
Conflict 
Since 
2003 
Liberia UNMIL ECOMIL   
Since 
2004 
Ivory Coast UNOCI Operation 
Licorne 
  
2004-
2006 
Burundi ONUB    
Since 
2004 
Haiti MINUSTAH    
Since 
2004 
Yemen    Civil 
Conflict 
2005-
2011 
Sudan UNMIS    
2005-
2007 
Chad    Civil 
Conflict 
2006-
2007 
Palestine    Fatah-
Hamas 
2006-
2012 
East Timor UNMIT    
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Since 
2006 
Mexico    Drug War 
Since 
2007 
Darfur UNAMID    
2007-
2010 
Chad MINURCAT    
Since 
2010 
DR Congo MONUSOC    
Since 
2011 
Republic of 
South Sudan 
UNMISS    
Since 
2011 
Ivory Coast    Civil War 
2011 Libya    Civil 
Conflict 
2011 Syria    Civil 
Conflict 
2012 Syria UNSMIS    
Since 
2013 
Mali MINUSMA    
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2. List of States voting for or against the adoption of the R2P doctrine: 
 
States Pro R2P Contra R2P 
OAS USA 
Canada 
Costa Rica 
Mexico  
Columbia 
Chile 
Argentina 
Uruguay 
Panama 
Venezuela 
Cuba  
Haiti 
Peru 
El Salvador 
Ecuador 
Jamaica 
Surinam 
Dom. Republic 
Barbados 
Bahamas 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Belize 
Grenada 
Guyana 
St. Kitts 
Nevis 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent 
Grenadines 
Trinidad and Tobago 
EU Ireland 
Holland 
Germany 
Great Britain 
Italy 
Norway 
Sweden 
Croatia 
Portugal 
Spain 
Austria 
Liechtenstein 
Island 
Monaco 
Cyprus 
Austria 
Czech  Republic 
Rumania 
Luxemburg 
Hungary 
Andorra 
San Marino 
France 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Slovenia 
Serbia 
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Slovakia 
Vatican 
 
Asia Australia 
New Zealand 
Bangladesh 
Singapore 
Japan 
South Korea 
East Timor 
Papua New Guinea 
Kazakhstan 
Azerbaijan 
Indonesia 
India 
Pakistan 
China 
Russia 
Vietnam 
Malaysia 
North Korea 
Sri Lanka 
Philippines 
Middle East Armenia 
Israel 
Jordan 
Iran  
Syria 
Qatar 
Palestine 
Africa Ruanda 
Sierra Leone 
Botswana 
Tanzania 
Kenia 
Morocco 
Ghana 
Guinea Bissau 
Lesotho 
South Africa 
Nigeria 
Zimbabwe 
Sudan 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Mali 
Swaziland 
Benin  
Groups EU NAM  
CARICON 
Total 70 44 
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